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ABSTRACT 
 
The issue of same-sex unions in the EU has been differently addressed by Member 
States. From same-sex marriage to non-recognition, the situation in the EU poses a 
series of questions related to the principle of nondiscrimination and to the right of 
free movement for EU citizens. However, all Member States are bound by the same 
human rights obligations. Among the legal instruments adopted in the context of 
fundamental rights protection, the now binding force of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU represents a novelty introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. This 
research investigates two aspects of the issue related to same-sex unions’ recognition 
between the period 2008-2011. First, by analyzing the case law at different spheres of 
adjudication, the dissertation examines whether same-sex unions’ legal recognition 
constitutes an obligation Member States are today obliged to fulfill. Second, it 
explores judicial orientations in relation to the claims brought before them by same-
sex couples, explaining the reasons behind an apparently deferential attitude toward 
the legislator. As discussed in this thesis, there exists a duty to recognize, thus 
‘indifference’ of Member States constitutes a violation of fundamental rights. 
Accordingly this research clarifies how the ‘duty to’ approach, if compared to ‘a right 
to’ approach, might better explain the answer given by the judiciary to the claims 
posed by LGBTI people in the context of same-sex unions legal recognition. In 
particular, this thesis contends that while it is possible to frame the argument of same-
sex unions in terms of states’ obligations, it would not be desirable to establish a 
single rule concerning the legal recognition of same-sex unions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As shown by the 2011 Rainbow Europe Map
1
, the situation of LGBTI
2
 people in 
the European Union (EU) is still characterized by a number of differences among EU 
Member States (MSs). In particular, distinctions can be observed by looking at how 
national legal systems recognize, protect, and generally address the issue of including 
LGBTI people in society. The purpose of this research is to analyze one of the main 
issues related to the inclusion of LGBTI people in the ‘EU society’, namely the right 
to be recognized by the legal system as family for those of the same-sex who decide 
to form a basic social unit (e.g. a family). Adopting the expression ‘EU society’ could 
seem inappropriate since the EU is a union of states whose societies (social 
communities) might appear sensibly different. However, belonging to the EU means 
                                                          
1
 ILGA-Europe’s Rainbow Europe Map and Index rates each European country’s laws and 
administrative practices according to 24 categories and ranks them on a scale between 17 (highest 
score: respect of human rights and full legal equality of LGBT people) and -7 (lowest score: gross 
violations of human rights and discrimination of LGBT people).  The categories look at the 
(1)inclusion of the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in anti-discrimination and anti-
hatred/violence laws; (2) existence of legal/administrative procedure for legal gender recognition for 
trans people; (3) legal recognition of same-sex couples and parenting rights; (4) respect of freedom of 
assembly and association of LGBT people; (5) equality of age of consent for same-sex sexual acts; (6) 
discriminatory requirements to legal gender recognition of trans people. The Rainbow Map and Index 
are available at: http://www.ilga-europe.org (last retrieved on June 2011). 
2
 The acronym LGBTI is adopted instead of LGBT in order to include among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
and Transgender also Intersex people.  According to the Intersex Society of North America: ‘Intersex’ 
is a general term used for a variety of conditions in which a person is born with a reproductive or 
sexual anatomy that doesn’t seem to fit the typical definitions of female or male. For example, a person 
might be born appearing to be female on the outside, but having mostly male-typical anatomy on the 
inside. Or a person may be born with genitals that seem to be in-between the usual male and female 
types—for example, a girl may be born with a noticeably large clitoris, or lacking a vaginal opening, 
or a boy may be born with a notably small penis, or with a scrotum that is divided so that it has formed 
more like labia. Or a person may be born with mosaic genetics, so that some of her cells have XX 
chromosomes and some of them have XY. Though we speak of intersex as an inborn condition, 
intersex anatomy doesn’t always show up at birth. Sometimes a person isn’t found to have intersex 
anatomy until she or he reaches the age of puberty, or finds himself an infertile adult, or dies of old age 
and is autopsied. Some people live and die with intersex anatomy without anyone (including 
themselves) ever knowing. See http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex. (retrieved on 11/03/2011). 
2 
 
to be bound by the same significant fundamental principles. Indeed, all the MSs: 
share ‘common constitutional traditions’ as firstly acknowledged by the European 
Court of Justice
3
 (ECJ), and subsequently confirmed by the new wording of art.6 
(co.2) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU)
4
;  they are all required to respect 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); all of them are now compelled 
to adhere to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter, the EU Charter 
of Rights). 
Following the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decision in Maruko5, the aim of 
this research is to verify whether the duty to provide legal recognition for same-sex 
unions
6
 within the entire EU has become compulsory for MSs according to the 
fundamental guarantees now offered at constitutional, supranational, and international 
level. A comparative constitutional law perspective is adopted. In specific, the 
theoretical premise is that since the principle of equality and nondiscrimination have 
been uniformly assimilated within the EU through the application of EU law within 
                                                          
3
 The ECJ has constructed its case law on the protection of fundamental rights within the EU through 
its famous cases Stauder(1969), Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970), and Nold (1974). In the 
first case, the Court stated that ‘fundamental rights [are] enshrined in the general principles of 
Community law and protected by the Court’ (ECJ, case C-29/69, delivered on 12 November 1969). In 
the second case, it upheld that ‘Fundamental rights are an integral part of the general principles of 
law the observance of which the Court ensures’ (ECJ, case C 11/70, delivered on 17 December 1970). 
In the third case, the ECJ considered that ‘the Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are 
incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the Constitutions of those States’ 
(ECJ, case C-4/73 delivered on 14 May 1974). 
4
 F. BELVISI, The “Common Constitutional Traditions” and the Integration of the EU, in Diritto & 
Questioni Pubbliche, n.6, 2006, pp.30-33. 
5
 ECJ, case C-276/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, delivered on 4 
April 2008. 
6
 It is reasonable to argue that using the reference same-sex unions does not truly encompass the nature 
of these unions. Indeed, while sex is a biological reference associated to gender and can be changed, 
gender is a subjective quality an individual perceive of him/herself (e.g. a person decide to change sex 
in light of his/her perception of his/her own gender and not vice versa). However, for the sake of 
clarity, this research has preferred to use the common terminology, i.e. same-sex unions, instead of 
same-gender unions. 
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MSs and coherently with the common principles enchained in MSs constitutions/legal 
traditions
7, there exists a ‘duty to recognize’. The logic applied by this research is 
reversed: instead of focusing on ‘the right to’, the chosen approach is ‘the duty to’. 
The attention is thus shifted from the individual to the state, whose obligations must 
be fulfilled. 
It follows, that a lack of national political will to grant same-sex partners legal 
recognition, i.e. ‘indifference’ on this issue, constitutes a violation of fundamental 
freedoms. ‘Indifference’ in this context creates two main problems: (1) at national 
level, non-recognition of same-sex unions in light of the fundamental right to found a 
family (art.9 EU Charter of Rights) read in conjunction with art.21 
(nondiscrimination principle) cannot reasonably be supported without infringing EU 
law; (2) at supranational level, the right of free movement for individuals and families 
within the EU (ex Art. 39 TEC
8
, now Art. 45 TFEU) would remain available only for 
heterosexual couples, thus evidently violating the nondiscrimination principle. 
Before the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, though the 
EU Charter of Rights had been solemnly proclaimed in 2000, it did not represented a 
binding legal text, but merely an interpretative instrument used by judges as a set of 
driving principles. Therefore, the now changed legal context can lead to new 
developments in the context of same-sex unions’ rights. Indeed, the judiciary could 
be solicited in intervening to restore equality.  In other words, either constitutional 
                                                          
7
 The UK does not a have a written constitution but its legal traditions and the Human Rights Act can 
be considered as part of the so called ‘common constitutional traditions’ as recognized by the ECJ. 
8
 To be read in combination with ex arts 12,18, 40, 44 and 52 TEC. 
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courts or the ECJ as supranational judge could overcome discrimination through 
judicial law-making. 
Thus, judicial activism could operate at national or supranational level. Nationally 
it would find its justification in the constitutional principle of equality and dignity as 
accomplished in light of both EU principles and the ECHR. Supranationally, it would 
be reasonable to argue that in the light of the EU Charter of Rights –  according to the 
right not to be discriminated (art.21), the right to marry and the right to found a 
family (art.9), and also the right to free movement (art.45 TFEU), enjoyed by all EU 
citizens and granted to both individuals and their families –  same-sex partners need 
legal recognition to be capable of exercising concretely these rights. As underlined by 
several authors, the Court of Justice has been repeatedly proactive in the definition of 
the EU social policy, sometimes it has even ‘dictated and imposed’ its own view9. 
Consequently, it would not be surprising for the ECJ to decide to step into the debate 
over same-sex unions within the EU by adopting a decision far more reaching than 
those issued until now. 
At the international level, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) could 
also play an influential role for the behavior of the other two levels, but, given that 
the application of the European Convention goes far behind EU frontiers, and 
considering that the right to free movement applies only to EU citizens, a judicial 
intervention on the side of the ECtHR would be unlikely to occur. In addition, 
whereas it is possible to argue that among EU MSs, common constitutional traditions 
                                                          
9
 A. R. O’NEILL, Recognition of Same-sex Marriage in the European Community: The European Court 
of Justice’ Ability to Dictate Social Policy, in Cornell International Law Journal, vol. 37, 2004, p. 201. 
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and EU law create the basis for a coherent and shared understanding of fundamental 
principles, the same cannot be affirmed if Contracting Parties of the ECHR are 
considered (e.g.,  developments in the elaboration of the meaning of rights related to 
homosexual families and the degree of ‘social acceptance’ are still sensibly different 
among Contracting States of the ECHR, and consequently the ECtHR is more prone 
to leave a greater margin of appreciation to states).  
 Hence, this research examines whether judicial activism at national and/or 
supranational level is now more likely to take place and prompt the enhancement of 
homosexual families’ rights, or instead, there are still reasons to believe it is better to 
leave the legislative power the possibility to dictate when and how to address this 
specific issue.  
Before describing the structure and contents of this research it is useful to clarify 
one point: notwithstanding the multiplicity of countries in which same-sex unions 
have been legally recognized, this research does not consider non-EU legal systems. 
This decision is coherent with two exigencies: (1) the main purpose of this thesis is 
demonstrate whether the now binding EU Charter has an impact on same-sex 
partners’ rights within MSs and in the EU in general, thus excluding from the 
analysis non-MSs; (2) although other foreign legal experiences (e.g. U.S., Canada, 
South Africa) might surely reveal a judicial trend toward the right of sexual 
minorities, the EU is a very peculiar organization. None of the other countries outside 
the EU is characterized by a multilevel structure of protection of fundamental rights 
as it is for MSs (with three levels, national, supranational, and international). 
6 
 
This research is divided in three chapters leading the reader through an analysis 
that explains the reasons why it is possible to argue that a duty to recognize does 
exist, and the underlying limits of judicial intervention when considering this specific 
issue. As explained in the concluding part of this thesis, the assumption that MSs 
have a ‘duty to recognize’ is not to be confused with the idea of a clear and well-
specified individual right, i.e. the right to found a family. In other words, it is 
underlined how it is possible to establish a duty on the side of states without entering 
into its ‘specification’. This choice might allow the legislative power a certain degree 
of flexibility in the creation of a legal model of inclusion for same-sex families, while 
at the same time leaving the room open for judicial intervention in case of unfair 
discrimination among types of families. 
The first chapter firstly introduces and explains one of the main changes 
subsequent to the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty, i.e. the new formulation of 
art.6 TEU, whose contents might pose the basis for a new understanding of the 
system of source of law in the EU. As highlighted, art.6.3 TEU binds the EU to the 
ECHR. In doing so, the ECHR is de facto enshrined  within the system of sources of 
law of the EU
10
, thus raising the issue on whether national ordinary judges should 
consider also the ECHR as directly applicable uniformly within MSs. Indeed, this 
confusion has already emerged and both the ECJ and national courts had the occasion 
to deal with this issue.  
                                                          
10
 As established by Protocol 8 on the TEU, the EU will be allowed to accede the ECHR but it will 
have to preserve its own specific characteristics as Union and considering EU law, thus elaborating 
specific mechanisms for states’ (non-MSs) and individuals’ claims in order to allow the Union or MSs 
to address correctly future applications (art.1 (b)). 
7 
 
In addition, though art.6.1 TUE clearly confines the scope of application of both 
the EU Charter of Rights and the ECHR within the limits of the EU competence, this 
formal distinction cannot exclude the possibility – as happened in a number of 
occasions in the past – for the ECJ to exercise its competence indirectly over subjects 
outside the competence of the EU. Both the analyzed cases Maruko and Römer
11
 
demonstrate the ECJ’s willingness to address the issue of equality among types of 
families and related social benefits. In fact, the ECJ though avoiding a direct 
reference to family matters (excluded from the competence of EU law), has deemed 
necessary to define the limits of states’ discretion when differentiating among couples 
(either heterosexuals or homosexuals)   framing its reasoning around other EU 
principles such as ‘equal pay’ and nondiscrimination. 
Once clarified the importance of art.6 TUE, the beginning chapter offers a 
comparative examination of the case law at different levels of adjudication.  This 
comparative efforts offers an insight on what could be called a European idem sentire 
toward the recognition of same-sex unions. Indeed, by 2011, only 11
12
 MSs up to 
27
13
 MSs have not passed legislation on this subject. The comparative method offers 
at least two important advantages: (1) it allows to understand in depth the 
                                                          
11
 ECJ, case C-147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, delivered on 10 May 2011. 
12
 These countries are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Romania, and Slovakia. 
13
 EU MSs where legislation on same-sex marriage has been passed: Belgium (2003), Netherlands 
(2001), Portugal (2010), Spain (2005), Sweden (2009). EU MSs where legislation on civil unions or 
registered partnerships has been approved: Civil unions / registered partnerships are allowed in: 
Austria (2010), Czech Republic (2006), Denmark (1989), Finland (2002) France (1999), Germany 
(2001), Hungary (2009), Ireland (2011), Luxembourg (2004), Slovenia (2006), United Kingdom 
(2005). 
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mechanisms of a given legal order; (2) it offers the possibility to emphasize 
similarities, thus posing the basis for a possible generalization
14
.  
In other words, with the help of comparison, it is possible to understand whether 
and how the formation of a new ‘shared understanding of  the contents  of rights’ is 
taking place
15
. In addition, the comparative method has become crucial in contexts 
such as the EU, where EU law is now affecting almost every branch of MSs’ 
domestic law.  Moreover, since the EU system of protection of fundamental right 
represents a multi-level structure in which the relations among and between levels 
have led to a system governed by ‘heterarchy’ instead of hierarchy (as described in 
chapter III), it is necessary to examine the case law at different levels to frame the 
argument concerning the specific issue of same-sex unions. Furthermore, since this 
research intends to estimate whether and to what extent judicial activism might 
‘prevail’ over policy-makers’ reluctance to pass legislation on same-sex unions, it is 
meaningful to evaluate how judges (at national, supranational, and international level) 
have so far responded to those claims made by same-sex partners. 
Thus, the first operative choice has been to confine the analysis in the period 2008-
2011, i.e. one year before the EU Charter of Rights entered into force, until now. In 
2008 the ECJ issued the first judgment in which it stated that opposite-sex and same-
sex couples should be treated equally as long as the two situations are de facto 
identical. The analysis explains the reasoning behind judicial review in those cases 
                                                          
14
 See, generally, J. BRYCE, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Adamant Media, Boston, 2002, 
pp.189-191; See also, A. Watson, Legal Transplant, University of Georgia Press, Athens, Georgia, 
1993. 
15
 See B.S. MARKESINS, Foreign Law & Comparative Methodology, A subject and a thesis, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 1997, p.209. 
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issued before and after 2009 in which same-sex partners have brought their claims 
before European Courts.  
At national level four countries, namely Italy, France, Hungary, and Portugal have 
been selected according to three criteria: (1) in all these countries supreme courts 
have the capacity to address claims on the constitutionality of laws in light of 
fundamental rights protected by the constitution or as resulting by international 
agreements ; (2) the temporal dimension, i.e. constitutional courts in these countries 
had to deal with the issue of same-sex unions’ legal recognition in the period 2008-
2011; (3) the degree of protection/recognition afforded to same-sex unions is sensibly 
different between these countries (e.g. while in Italy there is no legislation allowing 
same-sex partners to be recognized as family, in Portugal same-sex marriage is 
allowed). The case of Germany – though representing the country whose legislation 
on registered partnerships has been declared in violation of EU law by the ECJ – is 
not considered separately because it is examined within the section regarding the 
supranational level. For each of the selected national cases a brief historical 
description of the legislative choices made in relation to same-sex unions is also 
provided to contextualize the analysis. 
As for the international level, the chapter preliminarily describes how the Council 
of Europe (CoE) has repeatedly recommended (e.g. the CoE Parliamentary Assembly 
Resolution 1547 of 2007
16
)  states to address the issue of same-sex unions in order to 
overcome discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. Subsequently, the 
                                                          
16
 Res 1547 (2000), para.34 (14), text adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 18 April 2007 (15th 
Sitting), available at: http://assembly.coe.int. 
10 
 
examination of the ECtHR’s case law shows a change in the understanding of the 
Strasbourg court over the concept ‘family’. In particular, while the ECHR does not 
distinguish – as art.9 of the EU Charter of Rights does – between the right to marry 
and the right to found a family as two distinct fundamental rights (e.g. art.8 ECHR 
protects family life, while art.12 ECHR speaks only about the right to marry), the 
ECtHR’s recent jurisprudence has begun to consider the right to found a family as a 
fundamental rights existing independently from the right to marry. This step made by 
the ECtHR can be influential for national courts, whose decisions are also driven by 
the interpretations elaborated in Strasbourg, as confirmed by the analysis of 
judgments at national level. 
The last section of the first chapter investigates the supranational level. As 
outlined, EU institutions – particularly the EU Parliament – have shown their concern 
about same-sex unions both in relation to the right of free movement within the EU, 
and in light of the principle of equality. The ECJ in this context has continuously 
played a crucial role. This part of the analysis explains how the ECJ has indirectly 
established its competence over ‘family matters’, by using as parameter an economic 
element.  
In addition, this section highlights how the Luxembourg court has developed its 
jurisprudence from Grant
17
 to Römer, establishing a doctrine of strict interpretation of 
the EU principle of equality, in which same-sex partners can find protection against 
unfair discrimination. This result has been achieved by the ECJ adopting the view 
that there is direct discrimination all the times two situations de facto identical are 
                                                          
17
 ECJ, case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains, delivered on 17 February 1998. 
11 
 
treated differently (registered partners and married couples). The reasoning embraced 
by the ECJ is discussed in order to understand why the ECJ has preferred to identify 
‘direct discrimination’ in the German legislation differentiating between homosexual 
and heterosexual partners, instead of opting for ‘indirect discrimination’, which 
would have had far more reaching consequences. 
The second chapter of this thesis approaches the argument of equality. The 
decision to elaborate in a separate chapter the concept of equality stems from the 
necessity to understand the theoretical reasons behind the argument that there exists a 
state’s duty to recognize same-sex unions, supporting those judicial decisions 
analyzed in chapter I. Evidently, an explanation of what equality means is to be 
provided if the premise is that homosexual people deserve equal treatment, as 
individuals as well as social units, when they decide to found a family. 
The first section of chapter II answers the question on ‘why equality should be 
considered’. The attention is thus directed toward those arguments opposing the idea 
that equality represents a value on its own, illustrating how this concept – though 
seemingly self-evident – is in reality a complicated mix of historical, sociological, 
philosophical, and legal developments. The aim is thus to discuss the importance of 
analyzing equality in contemporary terms, going beyond a simplistic view rotating on 
the postulation that ‘equals should be treated equally’, in order to overcome the 
likeness/unlikeness paradigm in favor of an argument that conceives diversity and 
equality as two sides of the same coin.   
The second section, borrowing from feminist and critical studies, identifies the 
number of meanings equality might assume depending on the context under 
12 
 
consideration. Hence, while equality is sometimes merely a descriptive tool 
(‘descriptive equality’), other times is a prescriptive element (‘prescriptive equality’) 
able to establish relation among and between individuals in a given legal system. 
Along these lines, equality can be considered in its evaluative dimension, i.e. in the 
sense of creating relationships among individuals considering the value of the social 
community where the principle equality is eventually applied.  It follows that the 
main risk undermining a discourse around equality is to create a system where the 
scheme superior/inferior governs the system: X is like Y, instead of X and Y are 
equals. 
To reinforce this argument, the third section examines equality from a non-purely 
legal perspective. The sociological and psychological standpoints are considered in 
order to comprehend how ‘tradition’ and stereotypes might influence the idea of 
‘equals’. What is made evident is that ‘the legal culture’ transformed into a system of 
legal rules is able to influence the understanding of diversity and equality.  Therefore, 
it is possible to conclude that individuals were not born equals; they have become 
equals once they have decided to grant each other rights. However, since the system 
of rights is dependent on the development of legal culture, the concept of equality is 
shaped/enhanced accordingly. In a constitutional democratic state, if politics is unable 
to realize how society is evolving, judges can thus play a prominent role in 
‘perceiving’ when ‘culture’ has changed and the legal system needs to conform. 
Another aspect of equality regards the difference between formal equality and 
substantial equality. In section four is thus developed a further argument concerning 
the difference between these two paradigms, considering how the application in 
13 
 
concreto of equality requires the adoption of policies aimed at removing historical 
disadvantages. Therefore, this section explores why formal equality does not ensure 
individuals the possibility to be treated equally, and why a neutral approach does not 
ensure social justice, whereas promoting diversity creates the basis for achieving full 
equality. 
Section five continues on the premises of the previous section evaluating how in 
the name of substantial equality positive actions have been adopted by states in order 
to rebalance historical differences. The analysis shows how these instruments are now 
less appetizing than they were in the past, since they raise strong criticism by those 
who believe affirmative action create more problems than they are able to solve. 
However, as argued in opposition to these critics, affirmative action still represent a 
fundamental tool at states disposal to remove discrimination. Of course, as pointed 
out, since these measures are meant to advantage temporarily one specific group, they 
must be adopted bearing in mind their exceptionality. In this context the attitude of 
the ECJ is analyzed in order to understand how it developed its case law on the 
principle of equality. 
In section six, the arguments developed around equality are used to consider 
directly those legal institutions for same-sex unions adopted by MSs. The purpose is 
to discuss whether these options comply with the principle of equality understood as 
an instrument to encompass diversity, while at the same time eradicating 
discrimination. Thus, opinions against same-sex marriage are described and discussed 
in order to verify their consistency.  Thereafter, it is evaluated whether the idea of 
opening up the institution of marriage (e.g. through the intervention of the judicial 
14 
 
power) would signify an achievement for homosexual people through homologation 
of same-sex unions to the heterosexual paradigm, or rather a defeat, since it clashed 
with the idea of promoting diversity. 
The third chapter pursues the aim of understanding the reasons behind judicial 
attitude/responses in relation to the claims raised by same-sex unions. The intention is 
to provide the theoretical frame able to conceptualize the role of judges – at national 
and supranational level – in constitutional democratic societies. As described, if on 
the one hand same-sex couples rightly address their claims before judges to be 
granted a fundamental right, i.e. the right to found a family, on the other, since judges 
acknowledge  a ‘duty to recognize’ upon states, they are not in the best position to 
provide the deemed ‘one-single-answer’ (e.g. deciding to open up marriage).  
The first section of chapter III explores ‘judicial law-making’ and ‘judicial 
interpretation’ as two phenomena characterizing the evolution of a given legal order 
constructed around the system of rules provided by the constitution. The role of the 
constitutional judges is examined, and references are made to the most influential 
schools of thought emerged in the legal doctrine regarding interpretation. The 
argument is developed by introducing the theory of originalism, i.e. a very strict 
adherence to the text leaving a little space for interpretation, the ‘living instrument’ 
theory, that is the most flexible idea of constitutions as a system of values capable to 
evolve. In addition, the concept of courts’ ‘countermajoritarian’ attitude, in the field 
of fundamental rights protection, is discussed opposing to this assumption the ‘non-
majoritarian’ approach; this last concept is able to encompass both the need to 
preserve the democratic distinction between legislative power and judicial power, and 
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the necessity to allow the judiciary – within the rules of the constitutional order – to 
intervene whenever the political majority does not acknowledge a violation of 
fundamental rights.  
In the second section, theories of constitutionalism illustrate the path toward the 
affirmation of constitutional courts as a means of democratic safeguard, in order to 
explain the rationale behind the attitude of judicial power in democratic constitutional 
states. For this reason, section third approaches the concept of ‘constituent power’. 
Indeed, ‘the constituent power’ might represent for judges one of theoretical obstacles 
on the possibility to interpret constitutional text according to society’s changes. For 
part of the constitutional doctrine, criticism on judicial activism stems from the idea 
that the separation of power confines judges in the application of law as strictly as 
possible. As clarified in this section, the constituent power is the ‘momentum’ in 
which the constitution has been elaborated and approved, thus it embraces the ‘spirit 
of the constitution’ that supreme judges are not allowed to betray.  
In the fourth section the concept of ‘constituent power’ is examined in relation to 
the structure of the EU adopting the so called ‘multilevel constitutionalism approach’. 
As explained, the classical theory of constitutionalism is unable to explain the nature 
of the EU as a constitutional system autonomous and distinct from MSs. In this 
section it is underlined how the inclusion of the EU Charter of Rights within the 
Treaty of Lisbon represents a natural evolution of a constitutional order whose 
constitutional elements might be recognized even if the EU does not represent a State 
itself. As discussed, this theoretical approach might result helpful in the 
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understanding of the EU as an independent system of values, though it cannot provide 
an exhaustive explanation in relation to the problem of legitimacy of EU institutions.     
The fifth section analyzes the European scenario and its specific structure for the 
protection of fundamental rights. Its multilevel structure is evaluated to understand 
how different levels are interconnected and influence each other.  This, in turn, helps 
to shed light on the possibility to prompt the evolution in the meanings of rights 
through judicial law-making at different levels, i.e. the possibility to reshape the 
scope of application of principles in a dialogic judicial system, in which judicial 
actors move toward an harmonious interpretation of rights within the system.  
Nevertheless, this might create problems of legitimacy vis-à-vis the possibility for 
judges to substitute politics (legislative power) in very sensitive political areas such 
as the legal recognition and protection of same sex partners’ rights.  
It follows, as explained in the conclusion of this thesis, that notwithstanding ‘the 
duty to recognize’ and the related violation of rights in case of  ‘indifference’ on the 
side of states, the complexity of the issue regarding same-sex unions cannot be reduce 
in an all-in-all comprehensive judicial answer. Therefore, it is highlighted how the 
now binding EU Charter, as enshrined in a multilevel system of fundamental rights 
protection, can produces its effects for same-sex unions within the EU only in relation 
to the possibility to reinforce the argument pro-legal recognition without creating, at 
least for the time being, the premises for judicial intervention; indeed, the 
achievement of full equality for same-sex partners is still a path to be walked and the 
process of legal recognition for same-sex unions cannot be considered a linear 
process.  
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CHAPTER I  
CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS ON SAME-SEX UNIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Summary: Introduction; 1.National dimension; 1.1. Italy; 1.2. France; 1.3 Hungary; 1.4. 
Portugal; 2. International dimension; 2.1. The CoE Framework and the role of the 
ECtHR; 2.2. From Karner to Schalk and Kopf; 3. Supranational dimension; 3.1. The EU 
level and the role of the ECJ; 3.2 From Maruko to Römer; 3.2.1 Maruko; 3.2.2. Römer: a 
final response?; 4. The duty to recognize and the comparability of same-sex unions.. 
 
Introduction 
 
EU countries where same-sex couples have been granted legal recognition have 
adopted different legal models for regulating rights and duties of partners, and 
defining those legal consequences related to being recognized as life-partners (e.g. 
social benefits). However, the EU frame as case-study shows a highly differentiated 
situation that goes from non-recognition in some countries, to total inclusion in the 
same terms of heterosexual unions for couples of the same-sex in other countries. 
Hence, depending on the national case under analysis, not only legislation diverges, 
but also those answers courts have been issuing in these years are characterized by a 
different approach on the same issue. 
Since the aim of this research is to demonstrate that the approval of the Lisbon 
Treaty (specifically, having regard for the now binding force of the EU Charter of 
Rights) might reinforce the idea that there exists a ‘duty to recognize’, thus 
‘indifference’ of states in relation to same-sex unions configures a violation of 
fundamental freedoms –  nationally, supranationally, and internationally defined – 
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this part of the thesis considers the recent responses elaborated by 
constitutional/supranational/international judges on the issue of same-sex unions. 
This chapter adopts a comparative methodology considering three levels of 
analysis: 
(1) National: constitutional courts’ case law; The national case law is used to 
explain how the meaning of family has to be reconsidered, and why it is 
possible to argue that whereas restrictions might be placed on the possibility to 
enter into matrimony for same-sex partners, the right to be legally recognized 
as life-partners is today acknowledged by the majority of supreme courts in the 
EU. To verify this hypothesis and conceptualize this conclusion this part of the 
research considers only recent constitutional courts’ pronouncements. The 
Italian, the French, the Hungarian, and the Portuguese national constitutional 
case law are examined. The selection of these specific cases responds to two 
different criteria. First, the temporary element: the selected case law has been 
issued between 2008 and 2011, thus representing the most recent judicial 
developments on this issue considering also that in 2009 the Lisbon Treaty has 
entered into force. Second, the degree of protection afforded to same-sex 
unions in the selected countries: as described in the annual ILGA-Europe 
Rainbow Map
18
 quoted in the introduction, these countries sensibly diverge as 
far as same-sex unions’ rights are concerned. Hence, following a conceptual 
                                                          
18
 The Rainbow Europe map reflects European countries’ laws and administrative practices which 
protect or violate the human rights of LGBT people.  Each country is ranked according to an overall 
average of 24 categories detailed in the Rainbow Europe Index. The rank is between -7 and + 17. It 
possible to observe how Italy is ranked 0, France 5, Hungary 7, and Portugal 10. This document is 
available at: http://www.ilga-europe.org (last retrieved on 20 May 2011). 
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scale, while Italian legislation does not provide any legal instrument for the 
recognition of same-sex partnerships, in France Pacs – where rights and duty 
of partners are few – has been adopted, in Hungary registered partnership has 
been introduced, and in Portugal same-sex marriage is allowed.  
(2) International: the ECtHR’s case law. The examination of this level clarifies 
how there has been a slow formation and sedimentation of a legal trend among 
States Member of the Council of Europe toward the recognition of same-sex 
couples. In 2010 in Schalk and Kopf a new important step toward the 
achievement of full equality for homosexual couples has been made. The role 
played by the ECtHR is in this context particularly salient since at national 
level its jurisprudence is considered as one of the elements for the 
interpretation of fundamental rights constitutionally defined. 
(3) Supranational: the ECJ’s case law. EU countries are not only bound by their 
own constitutional principles when framing the concept of equality. 
Nondiscrimination is one of the cornerstones of EU law. The ECJ has several 
times specified the meaning of this principle enhancing the degree of 
protection offered to disadvantaged groups of people. To what concerns the 
issue of same-sex unions, the ECJ both in 2008 and 2011 had the occasion to 
specify its position in relation to the treatment reserved to family members, 
thus implicitly giving recognition to same-sex partners in the same terms of 
opposite-sex partners. 
These three levels of analysis are all part of an interrelated system for the 
protection of fundamental freedoms in the EU. Although an explanation of this 
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multilevel system is provided in chapter III, it is now necessary to explain the reasons 
behind the decision of examining different jurisdictional dimensions when tackling 
the issue of same-sex unions. The exigency of considering all levels is justified by the 
observation that the sources of law in the EU are organized and recognized at 
different levels. An evidence of this assumption is provided by the new wording of 
art.6 of the TEU as amended by the Lisbon Treaty; it reads:   
1. The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. 
The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union 
as defined in the Treaties. The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter 
governing its interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations 
referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those provisions. 
2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union's 
competences as defined in the Treaties. 
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the 
Union's law.’ 
As explained in chapter III, the ECJ has considered the ECtHR’ case law and the 
constitutional tradition common to the MSs even before the reformulation of art.6 
TEU, and it has soon entered into a judicial dialogic relation between jurisdictional 
levels. Hence, the new wording of art.6, and the possibility for the EU to accede the 
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European Convention gives more emphasis on the role of fundamental freedoms in 
the EU. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that the path leading to the formation of the 
EU has not been linear in the field of human rights protection. From a purely 
economic association, the EU has become a Union of values, and the ECJ has played 
a key role in this context. Some authors regard the ECJ as a quasi-constitutional 
judge able to harmonize the acquis communautaire with the necessity to protect 
fundamental freedoms within the entire EU space
19
.  This new art.6 not only 
expresses the willingness of creating a common European space of rights, but it also 
pushes toward a strict collaboration among and between jurisdictional levels.  
Furthermore, national supreme judges are now accustomed with the idea of 
conceiving supranational and international case law as sources of law/interpretation. 
To provide an example, both the German and the Italian Constitutional Court 
(hereinafter Corte Costituzionale) have elaborated a doctrine giving the ECJ’s and the 
ECtHR’s case law a crucial role in the interpretation of fundamental provisions. In its 
judgments n.348
20
-349
21
 the Corte Costituzionale has referred to the ECHR 
provisions and its interpretation as ‘norme interposte’, i.e. legal provisions whose 
collocation is to be found between the constitution and primary law, thus giving these 
provisions supremacy over ordinary law
22
. The German Supreme Court has also 
                                                          
19
 S. LEIBLE, Non-Discrimination, in ERA Forum, vol. 6, n. 1, 2005, (pp. 76-89), p.78ss. 
20
 Corte Costituzionale, judgment n. 348, delivered on 22 October 2007. 
21
 Corte Costituzionale, judgment n. 349, delivered on 22 October 2007. 
22
 N. PIGNATELLI, Le sentenze della Corte costituzionale nn. 348 e 349 del 2007: la dilatazione della 
tecnica della "interposizione" (e del giudizio costituzionale), in Quaderni Costituzionali, n.1, 2008, 
(pp. 140-143); C. NAPOLI, Le sentenze della Corte costituzionale nn. 348 e 349 del 2007: la nuova 
collocazione della CEDU e le conseguenti prospettive di dialogo tra le Corti , in Quaderni 
Costituzionali, n. 1, 2008, (pp. 137-139); S.M., CICCONETTI, Creazione indiretta del diritto e norme 
interposte, in Giurisprudenza costituzionale, n.1 , 2008. (pp. 565-575). 
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acknowledged that the ECtHR’s judgments have to be taken into consideration, 
though it has clarified that these decisions may have to be integrated to fit into the 
domestic legal system
23
. In addition, as shown in the analysis of the selected case 
law, constitutional courts have dealt with the issue of same-sex unions’ legal 
recognition using among the interpretative parameters also the ECJ’s and ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. 
Nonetheless, in legal doctrine the ‘problem of sources’ has been raised several 
times, in particular when examining the EU legal space. Indeed, the European 
scenario might create confusion in the context of application and interpretation of 
fundamental guarantees. As explained by Guazzarotti
24
, the entrance into force of 
Lisbon Treaty might persuade ordinary judges that the ECHR is now directly 
applicable on the entire EU space in light of both the art.6 TUE and the principles of 
direct effect
25
, and the supremacy of European Union law
26
. Another possibility is 
that ordinary judges could deem appropriate to consider the EU Charter of Rights as 
applicable to subjects outside the competence of EU law. 
In this respect, the Corte Costituzionale court in its judgment n.80/2011 has made 
clear that the ECHR cannot be considered automatically applicable within the MSs 
                                                          
23
 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1481/04, judgment delivered on 14 October 2004. French 
translation available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20041014_2bvr148104fr.html (last 
visited 18 June 2009). 
24
 A. GUAZZAROTTI, I diritti fondamentali dopo Lisbona e la confusione del sistema delle fonti, in 
Rivista AIC, n.3, 2011, (pp. 1-12), pp.2ss. 
25
 The ECJ first articulated the doctrine of direct effect in the ECJ, case C-26/62, NV Algemene 
Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration., , delivered on 5 February 1963. 
26
 The ECJ established this doctrine since the case Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., ECJ, case C-6/64, 
delivered on 15 July 1964. 
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since its relation with the EU is confined to the scope of application of EU law
27
. 
Thus, notwithstanding the Lisbon Treaty, the ECHR is unable ‘to penetrate’ into 
domestic jurisdiction sic et simpliciter
28
.  
Additionally, as confirmed by the ECJ in its decision Asparuhov Estov
29
, the EU 
Charter of Rights is not applicable to those matters external to the competence of the 
EU. In specific, the Court of Justice held that it has clearly no jurisdiction to rule on 
the questions referred by the claimants, who contended that the application of the 
Bulgarian administrative law (non implementing EU law) was infringing their 
fundamental rights. This clear-cut position taken by the ECJ cannot be disregarded 
when approaching the issue of same-sex unions, since it is evidently related to 
national law governing marital status, expressly falling outside the competence of the 
EU. In fact, claims concerning discrimination of same-sex couples have been placed 
before the ECJ on the assumption that differential treatments reserved to married and 
registered partners or de facto unions are illegitimate vis-à-vis EU law (see, after, ‘the 
pay argument’).  
Indeed, the scope of application of the EU law must be clarified before entering 
into a debate aimed at verifying whether the now binding force of the EU Charter of 
Rights might contribute to the enhancement of the rights of same-sex partners in the 
EU as a whole. In other words, in order to understand the answers given at national 
and supranational levels by the judiciary it is necessary to underline how those 
                                                          
27
 A. RUGGERI, La Corte fa il punto sul rilievo interno della CEDU e della Carta di Nizza-Strasburgo 
(a prima lettura di Corte cost. n. 80 del 2011), in www.forumcostituzionale, 2011. 
28
 A. RANDAZZO, Brevi note a margine della sentenza 80 del 2011 della Corte Costituzionale, in 
www.giurcost.org, 2011. 
29
 ECJ, case C-339/10, reference for a preliminary ruling, Krasimir Asparuhov Estov, et all. v 
Ministerski savet na Republika Bulgaria, delivered on 12 November 2010. 
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national rules governing marital status fall outside the competence of the EU, and 
how the Lisbon Treaty does not introduce any direct element of innovation in this 
context
30
. 
Indeed, neither the EU Charter of Rights in art.9 and art.21 poses an obligation to 
provide same-sex partners legal recognition, nor the possible accession of the EU to 
the ECHR would extend the competence of the EU as far as to cover also family 
matters (new art.6.2 TUE).  In fact, as it will be examined in the section concerning 
the role of the ECtHR, the Strasbourg judge has not considered the legal recognition 
of same-sex partners as an obligation Contracting States must fulfill under the ECHR.  
However, it cannot be underestimate that both the EU Charter of Rights and the 
ECHR might provide the legal basis for future developments in this specific context.  
Indeed, by analyzing the ECJ’s case since Stauder (see chapter III), it would not be 
surprising if the ECJ would decide to extend its competence also over family matters 
indirectly
31
, in those situations where discrimination between married and unmarried 
                                                          
30
 It is better to remind that European Union law is a body of treaties and legislation, such as 
Regulations and Directives, which have direct effect or indirect effect on the laws of European Union 
member states. The three sources of European Union law are primary law, secondary law and 
supplementary law. The main sources of primary law are the Treaties establishing the European Union. 
Secondary sources include regulations and directives which are based on the Treaties. As for the 
competence of the EU, the consolidated version of the TFEU (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty) 
clearly states in artt. 2-6 those matters of exclusive competence of the EU, and those which are ‘shared 
competence’ between the EU and the MSs. As a matter of facts, those rules governing ‘family law’ do 
not fall within the exclusive competence of the EU. Nonetheless, as laid down in art. 81 TFEU (ex art. 
65 TEC) the EU ‘shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, 
based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such 
cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States.’ (art. 81, para.1) 
31
 A strong case could be represented by a same-sex couple married in one MS moving to another one 
where no recognition is provided. In this case it would be possible to argue that mutual recognition of 
the status of married couples is necessary to fulfill the MSs’ obligations under EU law.  
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couples create an unjustified differentiation among EU citizens. In other words, the 
‘normogenetic’ value32 of the EU Charter should not be underestimated.   
Indeed the EU Charter of Rights has already been used by the ECJ as a legal 
reference to argue against discrimination. In fact, in the case Association Belge des 
Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministers, the ECJ, 
when ruling in favor of the claimants, has explicitly referred to art. 21 and 23 of the 
EU Charter of Rights when framing its judgment against a national provisions 
differentiating between men and woman
33
. This attitude might be translated into 
future more proactive steps of the ECJ in the field of discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation in relation to non-recognition of same-sex partners vis-à-vis 
married couples
34
. 
The structure of this chapter is organized in three sections. In the first one, the 
national (horizontal) comparison is ordered following the rationale ‘from minimum 
to maximum’. Thus, Italy is analyzed as first case-study and Portugal as the last. 
Although the main focus remains on recent jurisprudence, references are made also to 
previous case law and legislation passed before 2008 in order to frame the argument.   
                                                          
32
 As suggested by some authors in constitutional law, some provisions, though unable to produce a 
direct effect on given legal system, might provide the needed legal and cultural background for future 
judicial development. In other words, since these provisions are within the legal system, judges can 
decide to develop a series of guarantees using these ‘driving princples’ even the absence of a specific 
legislation. See on this point, S. BARTOLE, Possibili usi normativi di norme a valore meramente 
culturale o politico, in Le Regioni, 2005, pp. 15 ss. 
33
 ECJ, case C-236/09, delivered on 1 March 2011. According to this ruling, insurers will no longer be 
able to use sex as a factor to determine whether someone represents a bigger risk in insurance terms, 
even though historical evidence shows that being male or female has a bearing on frequency and size 
of claims. 
34
 Indeed, if Directive 2004/38/EC was read having regard to the principle of equality, i.e. considering 
the “equality among family members” in light of art.21 of the EU Charter of Rights – in particular 
when “families” move to one MS to another – it could be possible to find non-mutual legal recognition 
between MSs as a de facto discrimination for those unions (e.g. same-sex unions), whose members are 
not legally acknowledge as family members. 
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The second section examining the international level explores the path toward 
recognition of same-sex partnerships, i.e. the redefinition of the principles enshrined 
in the European Convention according to new emerging society’s changes. This part 
explains the transition (through the adoption of a comparative analysis of European 
countries’ legislation by the ECtHR) from a purely traditional approach to the 
concept of marriage overlapping/including also the concept of family, to a new 
understanding of both terms as separate elements encompassing two distinct rights.  
The third section, related to the supranational level, underlines new EJC’s judicial 
developments in the field of discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. In 
particular, it is shown how the Luxemburg court does not differentiate a priori 
between spouses and life-partners, but establishes a new parameter (comparability) 
for determining whether discrimination had occurred. In this context, it is argued, the 
ECJ implicitly conceives same-sex partners in the same terms of opposite-sex 
partners, thus overcoming the issue of placing marriage above other legal institutions 
and reinforcing the argument – expressed in chapter II of this research – that sees in 
marriage ‘one of the possible legal solutions’ and not the standard/ideal legal type for 
granting families legal recognition. 
The concluding section tries to summarize the findings of this comparative 
analysis in order to understand whether it is possible to affirm that within the EU, the 
lack of legislation granting same-sex couples legal recognition, or ‘indifference’ on 
this issue by MSs, can configure a breach of fundamental freedoms, since states are 
called to respect ‘their duty to’.  
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1. National dimension 
1.1. Italy 
 
Among the selected cases, Italy is the only country in Western Europe where no 
legal institution has been introduced to legalize same-sex unions. For this reason it 
would be useful to provide some basic information about this specific national 
situation.  
The discussion around the legal recognition of de facto families in Italy has been 
considered by both the Prodi’s government (2006-2008) and the IV Berlusconi’s 
government since 2008
35
. Although political parties have always presented this  
argument as regarding ‘families in general’ – trying not to focus on gay unions per se 
and calibrating the attention on those situation in which two individuals have freely 
decided to share their life without getting married
36
 –  strong opposition has always 
been raised in relation to the recognition of same-sex unions. Proposals regarding de 
facto families have all been designated maintaining a neutral legal approach in 
relation to the sexes of the partners, i.e. mentioning the possibility for individuals 
(including of same-sex) to enter into this legal institution. 
                                                          
35
 In 2002, during the II Berlusconi’s government, Deputy Franco Grillini presented his proposal called 
‘Disciplina del patto civile di solidarietà e delle unioni di fatto’, whose constitutive elements 
resembled those of the legal institution of Pacs (the French pacte civil de solidarité, a legal institution 
for the recognition of de facto families regardless of the sexes of partners). This proposal, in order to 
overcome critics from the Catholic Church lacked terms such as ‘family’ or ‘marriage’. Nevertheless, 
the Parliament did not approve this bill. See, L. CECCARINI, Unioni di fatto e divisioni politiche, in M. 
DONOVAN, P. ONOFRI (eds), Politica in Italia 2008. I fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni, Bologna, 
pp.259-280. 
36
 The Italian Constitutional Court has dealt with the issue of de facto families several times in these 
years. Since 1988 in its judgment n. 404 (delivered on 24 March 1988) the Court has acknowledged 
the importance of protecting those unions outside the institution of marriage. See S. Rossi, La famiglia 
di fatto nella giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale, in www.forumcostituzionale.it, 2007. 
28 
 
The first draft bill presented by the left/centre majority was the so called DI.CO. 
(Diritti e doveri delle persone stabilmente Conviventi
37
).  According to this bill, adult 
couples, of the same or different sex, united by reciprocal affective ties, in stable 
cohabiting relationships, could make a declaration of intents at the registry office
38
. 
After the lapse of a certain time period (which varied from six to nine years) certain 
rights – health, welfare, residence permits, allocation of public housing, and transfer 
of tenancy agreement – and duties – pertaining to alimony – would have been 
granted
39
. This proposal never reached the possibility to be discussed and approved, 
since the left/centre coalition in the Senate could count on a very narrow majority, 
and some of its members, i.e. the Christian Democrat Minister of Justice (C. 
Mastella), were strongly in opposition to any proposal allowing homosexual couples 
the possibility to be legally recognized.  
During that period, civil society participated actively and demonstrations both in 
favor (‘DI.CO. Day’ on 10 March 2007) and against (‘Family Day’ on 12 May 2007) 
this bill were organized in 2007. This division both in society and among/between 
political parties
40
 led to the decision of definitively abandoning this bill in favor of 
another draft proposal called CUS (Contratto di Unione Solidale
41
). This bill was 
considerably different and diminutive in its contents if compared with DICO. No 
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 Translated: Rights and duties of Cohabitants. 
38
 See, N. PIGNATELLI, Obiettivo 1. Famiglie, convivenze di fatto, Cstituzione. I DICO tra resistenze 
culturali e bisogni costituzionali, in Questione Giustizia, n.2, 2007, pp.36-40. 
39
 See, A DONÀ, From Pacs to Didore: Why Are Civil Partnership Such a Divisive Issue in Italian 
Politics?, in Bulletin of Italian Poltics, vol. , n.2, 2009, pp.333-346. 
40
 Indeed, while it was clear that the right-centre opposition, driven by Berlusconi, was presenting 
itself as ‘the defender of the family’, within the left-centre majority divisions on this subject were 
transversal, i.e. inside political parties (in particular the Margherita party) there were different ethical 
views on the concept of family and on the role of the Catholic Church as reference for political 
decisions. 
41
 Translated: Solidary Union Contract. 
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reference to registration at the registry office was made – avoiding the ideological 
problem of ‘public recognition’ – and the entire legal scheme was designed as a pure 
contract between two individuals.  
Indeed, CUS was aimed at regulating the arrangements between a cohabitating 
couple (of opposite or same sex) without entering into any consideration of ‘why’ 
individuals might be living together, and the organization of their ‘common affairs’ 
would have been regulated within a contract stipulated and registered in the archives 
of a notary
42
 (seemingly to the French Pacs). Even in this case, the Catholic Church 
showed its concern arguing that there exists only one ‘natural family’43, i.e. a union 
of a man and woman. Finally, on 24 January 2008 the leader of the left-centre 
coalition, Romano Prodi, following the government crisis, decided to resign and the 
Senate Justice Committee in charge of discussing and approving the bill never met 
again. 
The XVI Legislature under Berlusconi’s government has never seriously 
considered the issue of de facto families. The Lega Nord party has always shown its 
reluctance in relation to the recognition of other types of unions outside the ‘natural 
family paradigm’. Nevertheless, maintaining the electoral promise that no bill 
undermining the concept of family would have been discussed by the right-centre 
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 See, M. SESTA, Una disciplina per le convivenze, in  Il Mulino, n.3, 2007, pp.342-351. 
43
 See, G. DALL’ORTO, I comportamenti omosessuali e il diritto occidentale prima della rivoluzione 
francese, in F. BILOTTA (ed), Le unioni tra persone dello stesso sesso, Udine, Mimesis, 2008, p. 19; M. 
MONTALTI, Separazione dei poteri e riconoscimento del matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso, in 
F. BILOTTA (ed), Ibid, pp.69-80; N. ESKRIDGE, The case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty 
to Civilized Commitment, New York, 1996, pp.60ss.. 
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majority, some of the most important members of the People of Freedom Party
44
 
(PdL) – Minister for the civil service Brunetta was one of the promoters – presented a 
new strongly criticized proposal called DiDoRe (disciplina dei Diritti e dei Doveri di 
Reciprocita dei conviventi
45
). According to this proposal, though marriage would 
have remained the only legal frame in which ‘family’ could be recognized as such, a 
union of solidarity between two individuals could have been formed, and some rights 
– mostly the same included in the DI.CO. proposal, with some significant exceptions 
such as residence permits – would have been granted to those who decided to live 
together in a stable relation. 
This last proposal, though presented by right/centre parliamentarians was 
unlikely to be approved in that Legislature for several reasons. First, the issue of de 
facto families was not perceived as a priority by that government. Second, there was 
still a strong opposition within the PdL and Lega Nord members to any proposal that 
might raise criticism by the Catholic Church. Third, civil society seems to be 
(reasonably) more concerned about other issues, such as the economic crisis and its 
consequences. From 12 November 2011, the DiDoRe proposal can be finally 
considered as the last political failure in the context of de facto unions legislation due 
to the resignation by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. 
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In 2009, in the lack of a political response, in two different proceedings – before 
the tribunal of Venice and the court of appeal of Trento
46
 – ordinary judges have 
suspended their proceeding and asked the constitutional court whether the refusal by 
the municipality to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple was to be 
considered illegitimate in light of Articles. 2
47
-3
48
-29
49
 of the Italian constitution
50
. In 
particular, the judge in Venice was persuaded that changes in the Italian society and 
the legal obligations under the ECHR (arts.8-12) and the Charter of Nice (art.9) could 
create the basis for judicial intervention – through judicial law-making – in lack of 
political will to provide an appropriate answer to the issue posed by same-sex unions 
in Italy. In the case n. 138/2010, the Corte Costituzionale followed a similar but not 
identical line of reasoning adopted by the ECtHR in its judgment Schalk and Kopf v. 
Austria issued almost three months after
51
.  
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Since the argument regarding discrimination of same-sex partnerships was built 
around articles 2, 3 and 29 of the Italian constitution, the court framed its decision 
approaching each claims separately.  
In relation to art.2 cost., the court acknowledged the fundamental right of 
individuals to express their personality as individuals as well as social unit regardless 
of the ‘nature’ of the union, thus conceiving homosexual unions as ‘units’ deserving 
constitutional protection. The court went even further by arguing that in light of art.2 
cost., stable homosexual relations should not only be recognized but also protected by 
the State. However, in the court’s view, the legislator should decide ‘when’ and 
‘how’ these relations should find their formal collocation in the legal system52.  
As argued by some scholars, this position seems to be contradictory. Indeed, how 
can the legal transposition of a fundamental right be left in the hands of the 
legislator? A fundamental right either exists or it does not; if so, there is no margin of 
discretion on the ‘when’, but only on ‘how’ the enjoyment of a specific right is to be 
developed. As some authors underline, this line of reasoning contradicts the 
contemporary widespread assumption concerning fundamental rights and the role of 
constitutional courts as safeguards against abuses
53
. 
In other words, when acknowledging the existence of a fundamental right, it 
seems difficult to maintain at the same time the position that only ‘when’ the 
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parliament is willing to grant that right, then individuals will enjoy it
54
.  It reasonable 
to believe that the court did not want to create ex novo a new right by using a 
‘creative interpretation’55, therefore, the result has been that the all reasoning 
concerning art.2 cost. – despite its potential – has not led to a concrete response to the 
issue at stake. According to art.2 cost. ‘The Republic recognizes and guarantees the 
inviolable rights of man’, thus if this right exists – and the court has recognized it – it 
follows that no discrimination should be tolerate
56
. This is even clearer if art.3(sect. I) 
cost. is considered, (i.e. principle of formal equality), which does not mention 
explicitly sexual orientation as a ground of discrimination but it has been interpreted 
as to cover also this aspect
57
. 
It appears that the Court was indeed concerned about this issue, but at the same 
time it was unwilling to step into the highly conflictual debate over gay unions; for 
this reason this judgment led to a conclusion in which non-recognition finds its 
justification in a very weak argumentation. Indeed, although it could be possible to 
agree with the constitutional judge on the fact that an analysis a fortiori of foreign 
legal systems shows how it would be impossible to establish ‘a rule’ in relation to 
homosexual life-partnerships
58
 – i.e. different legal solutions have been adopted and 
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allowing same-sex marriage is just one of the possible solutions, not ‘the solution’59–  
if no specific legal institution has been provided by the State, then discrimination 
continues to exist in the legal system with no remedy available, but the intervention 
of a court. 
The Italian constitutional judge has avoided tackling the historical systemic 
discrimination of the Italian legal system using as parameter the principle of equality 
under art.3 cost. Indeed, according to part of the Italian legal doctrine art.3 cost. 
would have represented the natural lens through which it could have been possible 
solving the case in favor of the claimants
60
. It seems evident that the court’s intent 
was to step out the debate around same-sex unions. Hence, in order to justify the 
actual discrimination of homosexuals, the court focused on art.3 cost. only in 
conjunction with art.29 cost. (instead of considering art.2 cost.). The result has been 
that it has been possible to affirm that, when marriage is concerned, the 
differentiation on the basis of sexual orientation does not constitute an 
                                                          
59
 For an exhaustive description of the different models of recognition adepted within the European 
Union and worldwide,  see, F. BILLOTTA, Le Unioni tra persone dello stesso stesso, profili di diritto 
civile, comunitario e comparato, Udine, 2008; M. MONTALTI, Orientamento sessuale e costituzione 
decostruita. Storia comparata di un diritto fondamentale, Bologna, 2007; K. BOELE-WELKI and 
ANGELIKA FUCHS, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Europe, Oxford, 2003. 
60
 See, R. ROMBOLI, Per la Corte costituzionale le coppieomosessuali sono formazioni sociali, ma non 
possono accedere al matrimonio, in Foro it., 2010, I, p.1367; M. CROCE, Diritti fondamentali 
programmatici, limiti all’interpretazione evolutiva e finalità procreativa del matrimonio: dalla Corte 
un deciso stop al matrimonio omosessuale, in www.forumcostituzionale.it, 2010; F. DAL CANTO, La 
Corte costituzionale e il matrimonio omosessuale, in Foro it., 2010, I, p.1369; L. D’ANGELO, La 
Consulta al legislatore: questo matrimonio “nun s'ha da fare”, in www.forumcostituzionale.it, 2010; 
F. CALZARETTI, Coppie di persone dello stesso sesso: quali prospettive, in www.forumcostituzionale.it, 
2010; P. A. CAPOTOSTI, Matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso: infondatezza versus 
inammissibilità nella sentenza n. 138 del 2010, in Quaderni costituzionali, 2010, n. 2, pp.361 ss. 
35 
 
unconstitutional discrimination since both men and women cannot enter into 
matrimony with a same-sex partner
61
. 
The reasoning of the court in relation to the concept of marriage was undoubtedly 
the most contradictory part of the judgment. Due to the logic applied in that context, 
the final outcome – i.e. the denial to intervene judicially reshaping the meaning of 
those articles of the civil code pertaining to the stipulation of marriage – should in 
fact not be surprising. If on the one hand the constitutional court admitted that ‘family 
and marriage’ cannot be considered as possessing a ‘crystallized meaning62’, on the 
other hand it underlined two main elements according to which it would be 
impossible to enhance the scope of the right to marry as to cover also same-sex 
couples: (1) though art.29(sect. I)  cost. does not mention ‘men’ or ‘women’ but 
speaks only about partners, at the time the constitution has been elaborated, framers 
did not considered homosexuals as individuals entitled to this right; (2) the traditional 
marriage has potentially a procreative element which significantly differentiate 
heterosexual unions (deserving protection under art.29 cost. from homosexual 
unions
63
.  
With regard to the first point, no formal objections can effectively be made: 
framers of the Italian constitution were certainly not concerned with rights of 
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homosexual couples; however an objection on the merit of this assumption might be 
placed: a judge that argues that ‘family’ and ‘marriage’ are concepts whose meaning 
is not crystallized, cannot simultaneously affirm that it is necessary to consider 
framers’ intents when writing the constitution. These two positions are simply 
antithetical. 
To what concerns the second point, i.e. that the right to marry protected under art. 
29 cost. would provide (proscribe) a legal institution aimed at procreation,  this 
interpretation is in contrast with the majority of the opinions expressed both by the 
Italian legal doctrine and by the constitutional judge in its previous judgments. The 
word ‘natural’ in art.29 cost. was not used to describe a non-positivistic pre-juridical 
concept (natural law); on the contrary, it was thought to provide protection against 
instrumental and ideological usages of the concept ‘family’ by the State, or any other 
institution whose aim was to impose its own understanding of ‘family64’.  
Indeed, by considering art.30 cost., the link between marriage, heterosexuality 
and procreation seems to blur completely in light of the constitutional guarantees 
ensured also to children born outside the marriage (i.e. outside the ‘traditional 
family’)65.The court did not conclude that there is constitutional ban on same-sex 
marriage, however, it was not persuaded that society’s changes would have already 
led to the point that the meaning of art. 29 cost. has evolved as far as to allow the 
court to intervene ‘opening marriage’ to same-sex partners. The Italian supreme court 
was very clear on this point. Recalling the EU Charter of Rights  and its 
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‘explanations’ of art.966, it concluded that it was still a matter the legislator must 
autonomously provide a solution.  
For some legal scholars, this position should be read as a compromise the 
constitutional court has preferred to adopt in order to preserve the possibility for the 
court to intervene ex post, i.e. whenever legislation on same-sex unions will be 
passed. In this scheme, the constitutional judge seems to be willing to behave as it did 
in relation to the more uxorio couples (unmarried) during the slow process of case 
law elaboration concerning de facto opposite-sex couples in Italy
67
. In other words, 
the court would verify whether the hypothetical legislation on this matter legitimately 
differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual couples. 
In 2011, the constitutional court had the occasion to deal again with the contents 
of the right to marry. In the case n.245/2011
68
, the court has declared unconstitutional 
the law n.94/2009 in the part it prevented an Italian citizen to marry a migrant without 
a regular residence permit. In this judgment, the court highlighted how, despite the 
state has a margin of discretion in defining its security and migration policy, the right 
to marry is a fundamental right constitutionally recognized and also enshrined in all 
international human rights documents Italy has accepted to be bound.  
According to the court, this fundamental right belongs to every human being in 
light of art.2 cost., and its spectrum covers individuals universally ‘bypassing’ the 
parameter of citizenship. As the court upheld: 
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…fundamental freedoms, as recognized by art. 2 cost., belong to each human being 
despite his/her membership of a specific political community, thus the condition of an 
alien cannot justify a differentiation in the enjoyment of these freedoms
69
. 
Hence, while in the case 138/2010 the court has mainly focused on the semantic 
issue regarding the meaning of marriage, in this judgment the supreme judge has 
clarified that the right to marry is a fundamental right. Thus, it would not be 
surprising if in the future (called again to respond to issue of same-sex partners) the 
court would be more proactive in lack of political will to legislate. Indeed, if as the 
court affirmed in the case n.245/2011 the fundamentality of the right to marry is 
rooted in its universality, it would be now more difficult to understand a ‘shift from 
universal to particular’ only when the reference is sexual orientation70. 
In addition, the court could be soon questioned again on this subject, but this time 
it should decide whether the different treatment between heterosexual married 
couples and homosexual married couples is consistent with the principles enshrined 
in the constitution. Specifically, on October 2011 an Italian man who married a Latin-
American man in Spain, obtaining the visa for his partner as a family member, has 
moved back to Italy. Once back home, his Latin-American spouse has been refused 
the permission to stay as a family member by Italian administrative authorities.  The 
case is now pending before the tribunal of Reggio Emilia
71
 which has to decide 
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whether to refer the case to the constitutional court, or whether asking for a 
preliminary ruling before the ECJ. Indeed, this case might configure both the 
violation of the principle of equality at national level, and also the EU supranational 
right to free movement. 
 
1.2. France  
 
On 15 November 1999 the French law introducing Pacs entered into force
72
. 
Differently from other countries’ legislative choices, the French legislator has 
adopted a specific legal institution whose contents are sensibly different from other 
institutions aimed at the same goal. In other words, while in other European countries 
the introduction of registered partnerships has created a similar institution resembling 
the institution of marriage, Pacs posses its own specificity among the possible 
solutions to regulate life-partnerships
73
. However, as some scholars have noticed, 
though Pacs is structured and identified within the civil code as a contract between 
two individuals who want to regulate their interests, in essence it delineates family 
relations
74
, thus falling de facto within the sphere of family law.  
Indeed, if on the one hand Pacs provides for a significant margin of discretion in 
relation to the what obligations the partners decide to be bound, on the other hand 
solidarity, mutual assistance, and the recognition of rights such as advantages linked 
to property, (for example, tenancy can be inherited in the case of the decease of one 
of the partners, or the joint liability to repay the debt payable to a third person), gives 
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this institution a typical form of a family law institution
75
. Moreover, while a generic 
contract can be stipulated also between ascendants and descendants in direct line, 
Pacs cannot be stipulated by those in these situations
76
. 
Pacs has undergone some relevant developments after its first instruction in 
French legislation. In 2005 the Finance Act has granted some benefits for the tax 
regime of the pacsés
77
 allowing joint income tax, and has also introduced a new 
regulation in the field of donation and company law
78
. In 2006 a new legislative 
adjustment has reformed the discipline of Pacs. Before 2006 those who entered into 
Pacs did not have their record of birth mentioning their status. This condition has 
brought to a bizarre situation in which all the time it was necessary to know whether a 
person was or not into Pacs the Tribunal d’Instance had to deliver a certificate.  
Thus, the introduction of the compulsory annotation on the birth certificate has 
responded to both practical and cultural exigencies. As for the former, it is now 
possible to know whether a person is single, as for the latter this makes Pacs more 
similar to ‘a family law institution’ than it was in the past. The 2006 reform has also 
introduced a new regime of property. Before 2006 Pacs and marriage both provided 
for joint property possession since it was presumed that partners would commonly 
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opt for this solution. Now the new regulatory regime automatically established 
separated possession for those stipulating a Pacs unless there is a contrary 
agreement
79
.  
Nonetheless, Pacs still remains a contract for several aspects. First, it can be 
terminated either with the agreement of the two parties or by one of the partners 
unilaterally presenting a declaration before the Tribunal d’Istance which recorded the 
formation of Pacs
80
.  Furthermore, although Pacs might be stipulated only between 
unmarried individuals
81
, it is not incompatible with marriage, i.e., two individuals in a 
mutual obligation under Pacs might get married (only opposite-sex partners)
82
. In this 
case, Pacs is considered terminated after marriage has been celebrated. Besides, 
guarantees offered to married couples are still far from being assimilated to those 
offered to pacsés. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 2010 a same-sex couple 
challenged the constitutionality of art.75 and 114 of the Code Civil – as it is 
interpreted – arguing that preventing same-sex marriage would violate the guarantees 
enshrined in the Constitution.  
It is necessary to underline that the question of constitutionality was raised in 
connection to the interpretation of the aforementioned provisions. The conseil 
constitutionel indeed, cannot exercise its constitutional scrutiny a posteriori. His 
supervision is exercised after Parliament has passed legislation but before the 
promulgation of the law, thus a priori. Nevertheless, the conseil through la question 
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prioritaire de constitutionnalité (QPC) might now consider to revise the actual 
interpretation given by ordinary judges of provisions whose meaning might have 
changed over the time
83
. 
In 2010, the cour de cassation referred the case to the conseil constitutionnel 
considering that society’s changes and the adoption of same-sex marriage in other 
legal systems could have led to a new interpretation of individuals’ constitutional 
rights as protected by the French constitution as far as to allow same-sex partners to 
enter into marriage. As the court emphasized: ‘…attendu que les questions posées 
font aujourd'hui l'objet d'un large débat dans la société, en raison, notamment, de 
l'évolution des mœurs et de la reconnaissance du mariage entre personnes de même 
sexe dans les législations de plusieurs pays étrangers ; que comme telles, elles 
présentent un caractère nouveau au sens que le conseil constitutionnel donne à ce 
critère alternatif de saisine ; Qu'il y a lieu, dès lors, de les renvoyer au conseil 
constitutionnel
84’. It is interesting to notice how the Cour de Cassation has changed 
its position ; as a matter of facts,  in 2007 it clearly stated that: ‘Selon la loi française, 
le mariage est l’union d’un homme et d’une femme ; ce principe n’est contredit par 
aucune des dispositions de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et de la 
Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne qui n’a pas en France de 
force obligatoire
85’. 
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Thus, the conseil constitutionnel has been urged to address the QPC in relation to 
those provisions whose interpretation has since then been accepted as excluding 
same-sex couples. According to the claimants, Corinne C. and Sophie H., the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage should be considered contrary to the right to lead a 
normal life as enshrined in the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution, and would violate 
the principle of equality (art.6 cost.) as provided by the Declaration of Rights of 
1789.  
The French judge has not been persuaded by these arguments since in its view: 
…that the right to lead a normal family life does not imply the right to marry for couples 
of the same sex; that, consequently, the provisions criticized do not infringe the right to 
lead a normal family life
86
.[and] … the principle of  equality does not prevent the 
legislator from settling different situations in different ways, or from derogating from 
equality for the general interest, provided that in both cases the difference in treatment 
that results is either in direct relationship with the subject of the law established thereby; 
that by maintaining the principle according two which marriage is the union of a man 
and a woman, the legislator has, in exercising his competence under Article 34 of the 
Constitution, deemed that the difference of situation between couples of the same sex 
and those composed of a man and a woman can justify a difference in treatment with 
regard to the rules regarding the right to a family; that it is not for the Constitutional 
Council to substitute its judgment for that of the legislator regarding the consideration of 
this difference of situation
87
. 
Thus, while refusing to open up marriage, the conseil constitutionel did not 
consider marriage as an exclusively opposite-sex prerogative. It did not explicitly 
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exclude this possibility, i.e. it seems to be open for further legislative developments; 
however, it did leave in the hands of the legislative the exclusive competence for 
possible transformation of the institution of marriage.  
1.3. Hungary 
 
Among the countries of the ‘Eastern Bloc’, Hungary was the first state introducing 
a legal framework for the regulation of same-sex unions.  The process of elaboration 
and adoption of a legislative measure in this context has been characterized by a 
strong political opposition.  
The constitutional court (Alkotmánybíróság) had the occasion to enter in the 
discussion on same-sex unions’ rights since 1995 when the first claim was brought 
before the Hungarian supreme court. In the decision n.14/1995 the petitioner 
questioned both the compatibility of the Hungarian family law with ex
88
 arts. 66(I)
89
 
and 70(A)
90
 of the constitution. Specifically, the question regarded the 
constitutionality of the ban on same-sex marriage, and the constitutionality of the law 
on unregistered cohabitation
91
 which, at that time, did not apply also to homosexual 
couples.  
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In this judgment the court seems to have approached the issue in a very 
conservative fashion in connection with marriage, while it has opted for a very 
progressive understanding of individuals’ rights in the context of unmarried couples.  
As for the first question, the constitutional judge held that marriage was to be 
considered as a union of a man and woman and no discrimination could be found in 
section 10 (1) of Act IV on Marriage, Family and Guardianship of 1952. The court 
stated: 
The legal provisions did not violate Arts. 66(1) or 70/A. As regards the latter, the 
institution of marriage is special, expresses constitutional protection and is generally 
recognized as the union between a man and a woman. Men and women separately 
comprised homogenous groups of legal subjects which had to be treated the same in 
order to prevent negative discrimination. This requirement of equal regulation of the 
conditions of marriage between persons of different sexes excluded the legal possibility 
of marriage between persons of the same sex. Moreover, in respect of Art. 66(1), the 
regulation restricting marriage to the relationships of persons of the same sex in the law 
on family, prohibited men and women equally from marriage with persons of their own 
sex. Taken together, the legal provisions did not discriminate on grounds of sex or 
otherwise
92
 
Thus, by using ‘sex’ instead of ‘sexual orientation’ as a ground of exclusion, the 
court did not accepted to ascertain discrimination since both sexes, according to the 
law, were equally prevented from getting married if homosexuals. This part of the 
decision carries the more conservative understanding of marriage as it has always 
(traditionally) been defined. Indeed, although the court has acknowledged that in 
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society the concept of family has undergone a process of re-conceptualization in its 
meaning as to include also other social entities outside marriage, it did not find 
sufficient reasons to allow a reconsideration of marriage including same-sex unions.  
The court has been clear on this point by affirming that according to ex art.15 cost., 
‘marriage is typically aimed at giving birth to common children and bringing them 
up in the family in addition to being the framework for the mutual taking of care and 
assistance of the partners’93. 
However, the court has been able to distinguish between ‘the impossibility’ and 
‘the possibility’ of providing a degree of protection for partners of the same sex. In 
fact, responding to the second question related to the law on domestic partnership the 
court has noticed: 
The cohabitation of persons of the same sex, which in all respects is very similar to the 
cohabitation of partners in a domestic partnership – involving a common household, as 
well as an emotional, economic and sexual relationship, and taking on all aspects of the 
relationship against third persons – gives rise today, even if not to the same extent, the 
necessity for legal recognition just as it did in the fifties for those in a domestic 
partnership. […] The sex of partners and relatives can be significant if the provision is in 
respect of a common child or – more rarely – if it concerns a marriage with another 
person. If these exceptional cases do not apply, however, the regulation of partners in a 
domestic partnership and relatives is arbitrary. It thus violates human dignity, which 
conflicts with Art. 70/A of the Constitution if those who are of the same sex are 
excluded from among persons living in a common household and in an emotional and 
economic union. [...]An enduring union of two persons may realize such values that it 
can claim legal acknowledgement on the basis of the equal personal dignity of the 
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persons affected, irrespective of the sex of those living together. Equal treatment always 
has to be interpreted with respect to the social relations that are subjects of the legal 
regulation. [Thus] a constitutional reason is required if the provision would legitimately 
discriminate on the grounds of sex between those living in such a union
 94
.  
Thus, the court has showed how, in light of the principle of human dignity and 
equality, the legislative should prevent unfair discrimination and social 
marginalization by allowing same-sex partners to enter into domestic partnership (on 
this perspective, see chapter II on the psychological meaning of equality).  
In 1995 the Hungarian supreme court, though declaring unconstitutional the 
provision of the civil code excluding same-sex partners from the possibility to 
recognize de facto relations, has decided to suspend the decision for another year, 
leaving the Hungarian parliament the possibility either to enhance the scope of the 
legal institution on domestic partnership or to create an ad hoc legal institution for 
same-sex unions.  
In other words, the constitutional ban was upheld solely in relation to marriage 
while other forms of recognition were deemed admissible and necessary. On June 
1996 a new statutory regulation on unregistered partnership was adopted including 
also same-sex unions. This new provision (section 685 civil code) referred to ‘life 
partners’ as two persons living together in a common household, without marriage, in 
an emotional and economic union.  
 In 2008 the court was newly requested to rule on the issue of same-sex unions, but 
this time the law under judicial scrutiny was the Act CLXXXIV of 2007 on registered 
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partnership (ARP). This bill presented contents which were extensively similar (if not 
identical) to those pertaining to marriage. Six petitions were brought before the 
constitutional judge and the law was eventually struck down by the court before 
entering into force.  
In this judgment the court has remained coherent with its view of 1995 and has 
asserted that under the Hungarian constitution (art.15 cost.) ‘marriage’ represents a 
constitutional value whit a specific meaning not be confounded or ‘diminished’ in 
association with other legal institutions.  
This position rotates around a strict adherence to a monolithic understanding of the 
function of marriage as a union aimed at generating children and protecting them. 
The contents of the ARP considered unconstitutional were both Section 1
95
 and 
Section 2
96
 of the parliamentary act. Nonetheless, as clarified by the court, since the 
exclusion of these two parts would have compromised the unity of the statutory 
regulation, the whole piece of legislation had to be annulled
97
. Notwithstanding the 
relevance of the final conclusion reached by the constitutional judge, this judgment 
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represents an important instrument of interpretation since the court has explored step 
by step the ‘European trend’. It has examined foreign constitutional courts’ decisions, 
foreign legislation on this subject, the ECJ’s case law, and the position of the ECtHR 
on this issue.  
The Hungarian constitutional judge has underlined that at the international level 
legal instruments for the protection of fundamental rights (art.16 UDHR, and art.12 
ECHR) recognize marriage as a fundamental legal institution, and the ECtHR has 
dealt with the issue of same-unions several time opting for a non-all-comprehensive 
understanding of marriage
98
.  
In particular the case of R. and F v. United Kingdom
99
 has been used by the 
Alkotmánybíróság to argue that ‘… in the actual attitude of the State in questions 
regarding the role of marriage in society, no such obligation may be deducted from 
the interpretation of the rights granted by EHRC
100’. At the time of this judgment the 
Hungarian constitutional court could have not considered also the case Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austira
101
 of 2010, to construe its argument. However it is possible that the 
conclusions reached by the ECtHR in its 2010 judgment would have even reinforced 
the Hungarian judge’ position, since the ECtHR confirmed that same-sex marriage is 
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still an option adopted by the minority of States Members of the Council of Europe 
(see, subsequent section).  
To what concerns the EU level
102
, the Hungarian judge recalled the case D. and 
Sweden v. Council of European Union where the ECJ stated that ‘It is not in question 
that, according to the definition generally accepted by the Member States, the term 
'marriage‘ means a union between two persons of the opposite sex103’. Furthermore, 
to strengthen its argument the Alkotmánybíróság has underlined (as its Italian 
counterpart in judgment 138/2010) how even the EU Charter of Rights does not 
impose MSs a specific solution in this field
104
. Indeed, according to art.9, ‘the right to 
marry and the right to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the 
national laws governing the exercise of these rights’. The accordance with national 
laws’ seems indeed to leave a broad margin of discretion to MSs.  
As for the examination of other national instruments and case law, the Hungarian 
court has highlighted how same-sex marriage was still a non-majoritarian alternative 
in Western countries. As argued, foreign constitutional courts have dealt with the 
issue of same-sex partnerships acknowledging the difference between marriage and 
registered partnerships. The example of the German Federal Constitutional Court’s 
understanding
105
 of registered partnerships has been considered by the Hungarian 
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judge to reinforce the argument that marriage and other legal institutions for 
regulating life-relations must not be identical
106
. 
Indeed, in 2008 the main concern of the court was related to the possibility of 
creating legal institutions strictly resembling marriage. Thus, the ARP was declared 
unconstitutional since it was a considered a quasi marriage institution
107
. Undeniably, 
if on the one hand the court has stressed the importance of self-determination and 
equal dignity as guiding principles to afford legal recognition also to other types of 
relations outside marriage, on the other hand it has not been persuaded that the 
meaning of marriage had changed as far as to cover also same-sex partners. 
In line with this reasoning the Alkotmánybíróság has dealt with the same issue 
again in 2010. In its decision n.32/2010 the court had newly to verify the 
constitutionality of the new Parliament Act XXIX of 2009
108
. This time, nine 
petitions were placed before the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality 
of the act. Opponents argued against this bill for several reasons: the bill was 
undermining (as argued in 2007) the institution of marriage; excluding opposite-sex 
couples was discriminatory; allowing same-sex couples to register was immoral, 
would promote disorder in society, and would harm children. 
The supreme court has ruled in favor of the this bill by considering how a clear 
distinction was made between marriage and registered partnership, since as in 
Germany, this time the law only allowed same-sex couples to opt for this legal 
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solution
109
. In addition, although most of the rights available for married partners 
were the same of those in a registered unions (e.g. rules governing the establishment 
and dissolution of registered partnership were identical to those applied for marriage), 
there were some exceptions mainly aimed at differentiating this new institution from 
marriage by excluding some of the elements traditionally accompanied to marriage. 
In fact, in Hungary registered partners cannot adopt the partners’ name, and are 
excluded from the right to adopt children and to participate in assisted reproduction.  
The court in this judgment has confirmed its previous case law, highlighting how it 
is a constitutional duty to provide protection for those of same-sex who are connected 
in a long-life emotional, economic, and sexual relationships. As noticed by the court, 
a same-sex relationship is fundamentally different from other relations, such as those 
occurring between friends, relatives, co-tenant, etc., which might also share the 
characteristics of ‘trust’, or even ‘emotional ties’ typical of a partnership, but cannot 
be compared in terms of social relevance
110
. Thus, by using as driving principles 
equal dignity and equality the court has considered the exigencies of sexual 
minorities as deserving social and legal attention. Moreover, the court has 
acknowledged how it is important in a democratic regime to promote social 
acceptance of sexual minority
111
. 
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1.4. Portugal  
 
The first step toward legal recognition of same-sex unions in Portugal was 
represented by the adoption of Act 7/2001
112
. However, it would be erroneous to 
argue that before the approval of this Bill the legal system did not acknowledge the 
existence of such unions. Indeed, even before 2001, a minimum set of guarantees was 
also afforded to same-sex couples. As a matter of facts, despite the lack of specific 
legislation, before 2001 if two individuals, regardless of their gender, were living 
together for at least five years in a regime of ‘joint household economy’, in case of 
death of one the partners, the surviving partner had the right to be granted a new 
lease
113
. 
In 2001 the Portuguese legislator decided to reform the legal discipline regulating  
união de facto amending the Act 135/99 and modifying the literal disposition using 
the ‘plural’ to cover also non-heterosexual types of unions. From ‘de facto union’ to 
‘de facto unions114’ under the new law, regardless of sexes of the partners, two 
individuals living together for more than two years were recognized by the law. 
Accordingly, the regulation provided for some protective measures mainly in relation 
to property rights and social security. In 2006 and 2007, new legislative measures 
have been introduced to extend some of the rights reserved to married couples also to 
de facto unions (e.g. the possibility for a foreigner who lived at least three years in a 
de facto union to acquire Portuguese nationality
115
). 
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The situation of same-sex couples did not undergo through significant changes 
during the period between 2001 and 2010. Only with the adoption of Lei n. 9/XI of 31 
May 2010, entered into force on June 5, 2010, the scope of the legal institution of 
marriage has been extended as to cover also same-sex partners. This Bill was 
promulgated only after the Tribunal Constitucional had confirmed its 
constitutionality in ruling n.121/2010 with a majority of 11-2 of Judges. The 
President of the Republic of Portugal, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, though explicitly against 
the adoption of this law, did not exercise his right to veto and signed the Bill on 17 
May 2010
116
. 
The role performed by the Portuguese supreme court in the period 2009-2010 has 
been crucial in addressing mainly to issues: (1) whether the introduction of same-sex 
marriage was legitimate in light of other constitutional principles; (2) which role a 
constitutional judge should play in this context. In order to understand the answers 
provided by the Tribunal Constitucional, it is necessary to examine both ruling 
n.359/2009, and ruling n.121/2010.  
In 2009, the Tribunal Constitucional has been enquired on whether the 
constitution required the elimination of the limit of sex in the institution of marriage. 
The argument prompted by the claimants – who were denied by the Lisbon court of 
Appeal  the possibility of entering into matrimony – was that there existed an 
‘unconstitutional omission117’ in the law, impeding same-sex couples to enter into 
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marriage. According to this position, since the Portuguese constitution does not only 
provide for the right to form a family and marry (art.36), but also protects 
individual’s identity and the development of individuals’ personality (art.26 co.1-2) 
forbidding discrimination also on the ground of sexual orientation (art.13)
118
, 
preventing same-sex partners to enter into marriage would have been 
unconstitutional. 
Although the Court has firstly noticed that ‘unconstitutionality by omission’ could 
not be claimed before the supreme court – in view of the fact that it is possible to 
challenge only existing legislation – it has nonetheless decided to scrutinize the 
reasoning followed by the Lisbon court of Appeal in the concrete application of the 
existing civil code provision restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples 
(art.1577)
119
. Thus, the constitutional court has stated: 
[F]elt that it should hear the appeal, because in the decision handed down by the Lisbon 
Court of Appeal, the latter effectively applied the challenged rule in a sense that the 
petitioners considered unconstitutional. However, in order to make the limits on its own 
decision perfectly clear, the Constitutional Court emphasized that the petition, the 
structure of which appears to be close to that of an allegation of the existence of an 
unconstitutionality by omission, necessarily had to restrict itself to the rule that was 
actually applied in an allegedly unconstitutional sense. This is why the Ruling underlines 
the fact that within the scope of the appeal before it, the Court was not only precluded 
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from adding rules needed to implement a hypothetical finding that the appeal should be 
upheld, but was also unable to evaluate the conformity with the law of other rules 
derived from the legal treatment of marriage, such as those concerning the latter’s 
effects, which were manifestly not applied in the decision against which the present 
appeal was lodged
120
. 
The court in its reasoning has extensively recalled foreign national examples (the 
U.S., Canada, South Africa, Germany, Spain, etc) and both the ECtHR’ s and the 
ECJ’s case law in order to establish whether the Portuguese constitution essentially 
imposes the same treatment for opposite and same-sex unions. Indeed, claiming that 
the constitution does not forbid same-sex marriage is significantly different from 
arguing that it does impose this solution according to the aforementioned arts.13-26-
36 cost. Finally, in ruling n.359/09 the supreme court concluded that ‘marriage’ 
possess its own cultural and historical meaning but since the two concepts ‘family’ 
and ‘marriage’ should not be overlapped, it is not compulsory to enlarge the scope of 
marriage to achieve full equality. In the court’s view, while there exists a legislator’s 
obligation to elaborate rules establishing a functional content for same-sex unions 
that are equivalent to marriage, there is no obligation to extend, purely and simply, 
the institution of marriage to persons of same-sex
121
.  
The question on the admissibility of same-sex marriage was then addressed again 
by the constitutional court in 2010. In ruling n.121/2010 the constitutional judge had 
to decide whether the law establishing the possibility for persons of same-sex to 
marry was constitutional. The supreme judge has firstly made clear that although 
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there was no obligation under the Portuguese constitution to allow same-sex marriage 
(coherently to what it upheld in ruling n.359/09) there was also no constitutional ban 
preventing the parliament to pass a bill on this subject. What the constitutional court 
has clarified is that the fact that marriage had been for long time a heterosexual legal 
institution, could not automatically lead to the conclusion that the exclusion of 
homosexuals was to be considered as peremptory.  
As underlined by the Tribunal Constitucional, there was a differentiation to be 
made when discussing marriage as a legal institution. In fact, one thing was to 
challenge the concept of marriage, i.e. trying to modify its essential characteristics as 
a legal institution; another thing was to use an historical parameter to restrict the right 
of individuals to enjoy the right to marry. The supreme court has thus noted how: 
What the Constitution does guarantee is the individual freedom to form a family and to 
enter into matrimony, together with the existence of the legal format of marriage. In 
other words the norm that has been invoked as a parameter only requires that the state 
must guarantee the existence of the legal ‘institute’ of marriage and at the same time 
refrain from any forms of behavior that prevent citizens from exercising the 
aforementioned rights or make it difficult for them to do so
122
. 
In addition to this point the court has affirmed:  
Now, while there can be no doubt that from the biological, sociological or 
anthropological point of view, a lasting union between two persons of the same sex and 
that between two persons of different sexes constitute different realities, from the legal 
perspective treating them in equivalent ways is not without material grounds. In truth, it 
is reasonable for the legislator to be able to privilege the symbolic effect and optimise 
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the anti-discriminatory social effect of its normative treatment by extending the 
protection of the unitarian framework of marriage to such unions
123
. 
According to the constitutional judge, the premise for entering into marriage was 
that two individuals have decided to form a family and legalize their relationship in 
light of their mutual commitment, “a common life path governed by the law, with a 
tendentially perpetual nature
124”. This premise can be identified both in heterosexual 
and homosexual couples, thus: 
As the Court has frequently stated, there can be no doubt that the principle of equality 
enshrined in Article 13(1) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic requires the 
legislator to treat that who is essentially equal equally, and to treat that who is essentially 
different differently. This maxim leads to the prohibition of arbitrariness, which 
functions as a negative principle of the control of legislative options. Treating situations 
that are de facto equal differently, and treating situations that are de facto different 
equally, both violate the principle of equality when it is not possible to find a reasonable 
motive that arises out of the nature of things, or is in some other way understandable in 
the concrete case in question, for the legal differentiation or the same legal treatment 
respectively – i.e. when the provision has to be qualified as arbitrary125.  
Therefore, the conclusion of the court has been clear-cut: preventing homosexuals 
from getting married has nothing to do with ‘nature’ or ‘appropriateness’. On the 
contrary, it is merely a political choice. The parliaments is free to decide how to deal 
with this issue. However, attributing the right to marry to persons of the same sex 
does not affect the freedom to enter into wedlock enjoyed by persons of different 
sexes. It does not change both the rights and duties which apply to those persons as a 
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result of their marriage, or the representation or image which they or the community 
may attribute to their matrimonial state
126
.  Again, in 2010 the Court has not foreseen 
any obligation stemming from the constitution to enlarge the scope of marriage; 
however it has recognized same-sex partners as ‘partners’ in the same terms of 
opposite-sex partners, and confirmed the legitimacy of Lei n. 9/XI of 31 May 2010 
which entered into force on 5 June 2010.  
 
2. International Dimension 
2.1. The CoE framework and the role of the ECtHR 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) has shown its concern related to discrimination 
based on sexual orientation since 1981. At that time, national political discourses 
around this issue were incomparable to those of these days and were primarily aimed 
at promoting tolerance toward people belonging to sexual minorities. In Resolution 
756
127
 (1981) the CoE recommended the World Health Organization to eliminate 
homosexuality from the list of illness (Res. 756, para.6). In 1981 the CoE also 
adopted Recommendation 924
128
  asking Member States to abolish those criminal 
provisions punishing homosexual consensual acts and harmonizing the age of consent 
for both heterosexual and homosexual sexual acts. In this document states were also 
urged to protect homosexuals from discrimination, to abandon every compulsory 
medical action or research aimed at preventing the expression of individuals’ sexual 
orientation (Rec. 924, para.7).  
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From ‘tolerance to recognition’, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE 
acknowledged the issue of same-sex partnerships in its Recommendation 1470
129
 
(2000), and subsequently in Recommendation 1474
130
 (2000). In the former document 
the Assembly underlined the need of protection – particularly for migrants – of those 
same-sex families moving from a country to another whose rights were usually not 
recognized as it happened for their opposite-sex counterparts. In the latter document, 
the Assembly recommended the Committee of Ministers to  
‘add sexual orientation to the grounds for discrimination prohibited by the ECHR as 
requested by the Assembly’s Opinion n. 216131 (2000) 132 […] and call upon Member 
States: to include sexual orientation among the prohibited grounds for discrimination in 
their national legislation
133
 […] to adopt legislation which makes provision for registered 
partnerships
134
 
Although the Committee of Ministers accepted the Assembly’s suggestions, it 
concluded that there was no necessity to include sexual orientation among the 
grounds for discrimination in the ECHR. As underlined by the Committee, this choice 
could have been merely symbolic since the ECtHR had already included through 
judicial interpretation this ground among those provided by art.14 ECHR
135
. In 2007 
the Parliamentary Assembly newly addressed the issue of discrimination on the basis 
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of sexual orientation in its Resolution 1547
136
 (2007), emphasizing how it was 
necessary to recognize same-sex unions within the broader aim of fighting 
discrimination against people with different sexual orientation
137
. 
To what concerns the elimination of discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, there would be a number of cases to be cited, in which the ECtHR had the 
occasion to deal with this issue. Since the case of Dudgeon
138
, the Strasbourg court 
has considered legal discrimination of homosexuals as infringing the ECHR. 
However, while according to the judicial interpretation of art.14 ECHR 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation has became inadmissible in several 
fields, the specific issue of same-sex unions has been dealt with different emphasis, 
leaving Contracting Parties of the ECHR a greater margin of appreciation.  
Under the ECHR the right to marry and to form a family is protected under art.12 
which reads:  
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
According to this article, while a fundamental right to marry and to found a family 
exists, states remain responsible for its application/transposition according to their 
national legislation. Art.12 ECHR, differently from art.9 of the EU Charter of Rights, 
does not differentiate between the right to marry and the right to found a family. 
Therefore, it might be argued that the ECHR conceives both the possibility to enter 
into matrimony and to form a family as two complementary fundamental rights. 
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Indeed, this association might lead to a conclusion that marriage and family are 
overlapping concepts, i.e. there is no family without marriage, and there is no 
marriage without family: end of the story. Hence, the possibility to reconcile same-
sex unions’ rights with conventional guarantees would be strictly linked with the 
reconsideration of the legal institution of marriage, i.e. enhancing its scope as to 
cover also these new types of relation. 
As interpreted by the ECtHR in Rees
139
: 
the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 refers to the traditional marriage between 
persons of opposite sex. This appears also from the wording of the Articles which makes 
it clear that Article 12 in mainly concerned to protect marriage as the basis of the 
family
140
. 
The same line of reasoning has been followed in the subsequent cases Cossey
141
 
(1990) and Sheffeld
142
 (1998). Exceptions have been formulated only in relation to 
transsexuality. In this specific situation, the ECtHR argued that biological difference 
cannot be considered as the only parameter to define marriage. As upheld by the 
ECtHR in Goodwin
143
: 
the Court observes that Article 12 secures the fundamental right of a man and woman to 
marry and to found a family. The second aspect is not however a condition of the first 
and the inability of any couple to conceive or parent a child cannot be regarded as per se 
removing their right to enjoy the first limb of this provision
144
 [it also added]: There 
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have been major social changes in the institution of marriage since the adoption of the 
Convention as well as dramatic changes brought about by developments in medicine and 
science in the field of transsexuality. [...] [Furthermore]: The Court would also note that 
Article 9 of the recently adopted Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
departs, no doubt deliberately, from the wording of Article 12 of the Convention in 
removing the reference to men and women
145
 
Nevertheless, transsexuality represents the exception that confirms the rule on 
marriage, rather than a departure from the ideal type. Evidently, the main obstacle is 
still there. Even in the case of transsexual people, marriage is between a man and a 
woman, though one of the partners was initially of the same gender. Accordingly, the 
ECtHR declared inadmissible both Parry
146
 and R. and F.
147
, where claimants 
complained that there would have been a breach of art.12 ECHR if national 
legislation required ending marriage in case one of the partners into matrimony 
wished to obtain full legal recognition of gender change.  
However, although in Goodwin the ECtHR has implicitly clarified that the right to 
marry and to found a family are to be distinct, i.e. the inability of any couple to 
conceive or parent a child is not per se an element for removing the right to marry, it 
has not a contrario considered that the right to found a family was not strictly related 
to the fact of being married, thus enhancing the scope of the right to family as to 
cover also homosexuals. 
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This tendency to consider family in its traditional dimension has been confirmed 
by the ECtHR in Estevez
148
 where the Court, declaring the application inadmissible, 
has stated that:  
the Court reiterates that, according to the established case-law of the Convention 
institutions, long-term homosexual relationships between two men do not fall within the 
scope of the right to respect for family life protected by Article 8 of the Convention […] 
The Court considers that, despite the growing tendency in a number of European States 
towards the legal and judicial recognition of stable de facto partnerships between 
homosexuals, this is, given the existence of little common ground between the 
Contracting States, an area in which they still enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (see, 
mutatis mutandis, the Cossey v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 September 1990, 
Series A no. 184, p. 16, § 40, and, a contrario, Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, 
nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 104, ECHR 1999-VI). Accordingly, the applicant’s 
relationship with his late partner does not fall within Article 8 in so far as that provision 
protects the right to respect for family life
149
 
Whereas in this decision the ECtHR seemed to be particular reluctant to extend 
conventional guarantees to same-sex long-life relationships, in subsequent judgments 
there has been a development in the judicial elaboration of the concept of family, 
more similar in its contents to those enshrined in the EU Charter of Rights.  
 
2.2. From Karner to Schalk and Kopf  
 
Each of these two cases represents an important step toward the legal affirmation 
of same-sex unions as social units deserving protection. In Karner
150
 the Court has 
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not gone so far as to determine the contents of ‘family life’, but has implicitly 
recognized a family relationship between the male applicant and his partner. This 
case originated from the denial of the Austrian Supreme Court 
(Verfassungsgerichtshof) to recognize Mr. W (Karner’s partner) the same benefits an 
opposite-sex partner could exercise in relation to tenancy after the death of the partner 
according to section 14 of the Rent Act (Mietrechtsgesetz). The Austrian 
constitutional court motivated its decision arguing that it was not in the intention of 
the legislator (in 1974) to encompass within the expression ‘life companion’ others 
than traditional opposite-sex partners. 
Since this complaint was transmitted to the ECtHR in 1998 when the applicant 
was already dead, the Austrian government argued that the case should have been 
dismissed. The ECtHR however, was not persuaded by this objection and emphasized 
how the ‘Karner’ case would have represented a leading case in the field of 
discrimination against homosexuals, since, in the words of the Court: 
[t]he Court has repeatedly stated that its “judgments in fact serve not only to decide 
those cases brought before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and 
develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by 
the States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties” (see Ireland v. 
the United Kingdom, cited above, p. 62, § 154, and Guzzardi v. Italy, judgment of 
6 November 1980, Series A no. 39, p. 31, § 86). Although the primary purpose of the 
Convention system is to provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues 
on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising the general standards 
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of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the 
community of Convention States
151
. 
The Court has avoided focusing on the concept of family, and has explicitly stated 
that it was not necessary to determine the notions of private life and family life to 
establish whether a breach of the Convention under art.8 ECHR had occurred
152
. In 
the reasoning of the Strasburg judge, the main point to be considered was the 
proportionality of a measure discriminating between heterosexual and homosexual 
life companions regarding the possibility to succeed to a lease (as provided by the 
Austrian Rent Act).  
As the Court has observed, though states are allowed a broad margin of 
appreciation in the context of protecting family life as an abstract concept, those 
concrete measures adopted to achieve that aim should be narrowly scrutinize. Karner 
in this sense shares some similarities with the ECJ’s cases Maruko and Römer 
(analyzed in the next section) since in all the cases, the judge has been concerned 
about facts, i.e. whether states pursue a legitimate aim when differentiating between 
de facto identical situations. In other words, what the ECtHR has underlined in 
Karner is that the principle of proportionality should be concretely respected 
avoiding discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation if not strictly necessary. In 
the specific case of a homosexual life companion the ECtHR has not found 
convincing the arguments ‘pro differentiation’ advanced by Austria153. 
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The ECtHR has newly dealt with the issue of same-sex couples in 2010 in the case 
Schalk and Kopf
154
. This judgment has been the first in which the ECtHR has 
expressly considered same-sex relations as falling within the notion of ‘family life’, 
and has acknowledged the possibility to extend the meaning of marriage beyond its 
traditional conception. The case was brought before the ECtHR by an Austrian 
couple claiming that, though according to Austrian legislation same-sex partners 
could enter into registered partnerships
155
, the impossibility to enter into matrimony 
configured a breach of the Convention under arts.12 and 14 ECHR read in 
conjunction with art.8 ECHR. 
When developing its reasoning, the ECtHR has made a comparative analysis. It 
has observed that within the CoE system national legal solutions adopted to recognize 
same-sex unions were still far from being harmonic. It has also considered the EU 
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Charter of Rights (art. 9) underlying how the scope of art.9 was broader in its 
potential legal interpretation if compared to other international instrument referring to 
marriage and family
156
. Indeed, as already highlighted, while the ECHR provides in 
art.12 ‘only’ for the right to marry, the EU Charter of Rights ‘distinguishes’ in art.9 
between the right to marry and the right to found a family, thus conceiving these two 
fundamental rights separately. The court has also mentioned EU Directive 
2003/86/EC and Directive 2004/38/EC as instruments providing protection to those 
families whose members belong to sexual minority (see next section on the EU level). 
This reference to the EU legal instruments by the ECtHR has been unusual, 
because traditionally the Strasbourg court has limited itself to the European 
Convention
157
. However, the ECtHR has underlined the importance of the 
‘Explanation to the Charter’ in order to stress how it was still a matter of national 
discretion to decide upon this matter.  
Declaring the case admissible the Court in relation to art.12 ECHR has upheld 
that: 
…the Court would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 
must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite 
sex. However, as matters stand, the question whether or not to allow same-sex marriage 
is left to regulation by the national law of the Contracting State
158
 [and] In view of this 
evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a 
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different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy ‘family life’ for the purposes of 
Article 8
159
. 
However, on the other hand it has once again affirmed how: 
marriage has deep-rooted social and cultural connotations which may differ largely from 
one country to another
160
 [and] it must not rush to substitute its own judgment in place of 
that of national authorities, who are best placed to asses and respond to the needs of 
society
161
 [and] the Convention does not impose an obligation […] to grant same sex 
couple […] access to marriage162. 
Despite the final outcome, this case has represented a victory for LGBTI people in 
relation to art.8 ECHR, since in Schalk and Kopf the ECtHR has reversed its previous 
position elaborated in Estevez, acknowledging the growing trend toward legal 
recognition of same-sex couples in many Contracting States
163
.  
Specifically, the ECtHR has recognized same-sex families in the same terms of 
opposite-sex families, and has adopted a more comprehensive understanding of the 
right to marry under the ECHR  which might now be considered as covering also 
same-sex partners. Nevertheless, the lack of a consolidated national practice among 
Contracting States has led to the conclusion that there is no obligation yet under the 
ECHR to allow same-sex marriage. For this reason, the ECtHR has not found a 
violation of art.14 ECHR in conjunction with art.8 ECHR. States, in the court’s view, 
should be allowed a certain margin of appreciation both in relation to the possibility 
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to allow same-sex marriage, or to provide alternative means of recognition. Hence, 
restrictions in the enjoyment of rights typical of marriage would not configure per se 
a breach of the Convention
164
.  
As some authors dispute, the decision in Schalk and Kopf has been partially 
ambiguous
165
. Whereas the ECtHR has accepted and confirmed that there exists a 
European idem sentire toward the recognition of same-sex unions, it is still unclear 
whether Contracting States are bound to provide legal recognition. Indeed, by 
analyzing these jurisprudential developments it is possible to conclude that ‘family 
life’ might be fully enjoyed only through appropriate legal means of recognition, but 
the court has preferred to remain silent on this point. In other words, it seems the 
ECtHR has advanced the idea that ‘ignoring’ the issues of same-sex unions would 
configure a breach of the Convention, without stating this principle explicitly. This 
position, if compared to the above analyzed case of Italy in judgment n.138/2010, 
shares a similar line of reasoning, i.e. it emphasizes the existence of a ‘duty to 
recognize’, without entering into the delicate debate about the specific contents of 
this duty. 
 
3. Supranational dimension 
3.1. The EU level and ECJ role 
 
The ECJ has represented one of the main actors aimed at broadening the scope of 
European nondiscrimination law. Its role has been relevant firstly in removing 
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discriminating attitudes both from private and public actors toward homosexuals, and 
secondly in reshaping the understanding of equal treatment in those situations where 
it was unclear if discrimination had occurred. However, before entering into the 
analysis of the ECJ’s jurisprudence between 2008 and 2011 involving same-sex 
partners, it is useful to remind the legal framework around which these judicial 
decisions have been elaborated. It is thus necessary to investigate those developments 
EU law has undergone in the specific field of nondiscrimination on the ground of 
sexual orientation. 
Within the EU, the prohibition to discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation 
was not mentioned in the first legal agreements regarding the European Communities. 
However, to what concerns EU primary law, art.10 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU)
166
 has established that ‘in defining and implementing 
its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’. As 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, art.6.1 of TEU explicitly refers to EU 
Charter of Rights as a binding document, consequently stressing the inderogability of 
art.21 (nondiscrimination principle). In addition, art.19.1 (ex art.13 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty) of the Treaty of Lisbon empowers EU Institutions with the capacity to take 
appropriate actions to combat discrimination. 
As for EU secondary legislation the main instrument is represented by Directive 
2000/78/CE
167
 of 27 November 2000, establishing a general framework for equal 
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treatment in employment and occupation. Directive 2000/78/EC is of prominent 
importance since it has been used to construe, i.e. to apply in concreto, the meaning 
of equal treatment within the EU. Although it is primarily related to economic issues, 
the conceptual scope of this Directive has gone far beyond its economic dimension. 
As this analysis demonstrates, the ECJ – when interrogated on this point – has 
recently built around the principles enshrined in this document a judicial attitude 
aimed at providing same-sex unions the same protection of opposite-sex couples, thus 
realizing the EU nondiscrimination principle for people belonging to sexual 
minorities. 
The first step ever made by Community Institutions to promote homosexuals’ 
rights was the adoption of the European Parliament (EP) resolution following the 
discussion on the report on Sexual Discrimination at the Working Place in 1984
168
 . 
In 1991 the EU Commission adopted the Recommendation on the protection of the 
dignity of women and men at work, emphasizing how ‘some specific groups are 
particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment […] gay men and young men are also 
vulnerable to harassment. It is undeniable that harassment on grounds of sexual 
orientation undermines the dignity at work of those affected and it is impossible to 
regard such harassment as appropriate workplace behavior
169.’ In 1994, the EP 
adopted the Resolution on equal rights for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC
170
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urging the Commission and MSs to ensure and promote equality also for those 
belonging to sexual minorities.  
In connection to the specific issue of same-sex unions, the EP Report of 2003
171
  
framed the concept of family regardless of the sex of the partners, thus implicitly 
acknowledging and supporting those unions. Nonetheless, the European Commission 
and the European Council rejected this proposal
172
. The EP indeed, in opposition to 
the Commission and the Council, has shown its concern in relation to the freedom of 
movement, as protected by ex art.39 TEC
173
, now art.45 TFEU. Evidently, the free 
movement right would be an empty right if the worker’s family could not be allowed 
to follow the ‘moving person’. For this reason, ex art.39 TEC has been completed by 
Directive 2004/38/EC
174
 which operates in the direction of extending the right to free 
movement also to family members. It reads: 
 ‘…the right of all Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States should, if it is to be exercised under objective conditions of freedom and 
dignity, be also granted to their family members, irrespective of nationality
175
. For the 
purposes of this Directive, the definition of ‘family member’ should also include the 
registered partner if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnership 
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as equivalent to marriage
176’. [Moreover] in order to maintain the unity of the family in a 
broader sense and without prejudice to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, the situation of those persons who are not included in the definition of 
family members under this Directive, and who therefore do not enjoy an automatic right 
of entry and residence in the host Member State, should be examined by the host 
Member State on the basis of its own national legislation, in order to decide whether 
entry and residence could be granted to such persons, taking into consideration their 
relationship with the Union citizen or any other circumstances, such as their financial or 
physical dependence on the Union citizen
177’. 
In 2011, the EU Parliament and the Commission have enacted a new Regulation 
on freedom of movement for workers within the Union
178
 in which at paragraph 6 of 
the explanatory introduction states: 
The right of freedom of movement, in order that it may be exercised, by objective 
standards, in freedom and dignity, requires that equality of treatment be ensured in fact 
and in law in respect of all matters relating to the actual pursuit of activities as employed 
persons and  to eligibility for housing, and also that obstacles to the  mobility of workers 
be eliminated, in particular as regards the conditions for the integration of the worker’s 
family into the host country
179
 
Nonetheless, both Directive 2004/38/EC and this Regulation remain silent on the 
definition of ‘family members’, and this omission has been (is) particularly salient in 
the case of same-sex unions. As a matter of facts, if the possibility for same-sex 
families to move freely within the EU is subordinated to a prior recognition of the 
hosting State of the union contracted in the country of origin, these families are de 
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facto prevented to move in all of the EU countries if they want to maintain their status 
as families (e.g. a Spanish married same-sex couple moving to Italy is not considered 
married under Italian legislation).  
The wording of Directive 2004/38/EC seems to mirror the Explanatory 
Commentary on the EU Charter of Rights about art.9, in which the Praesidium 
clarified that the right to marry enshrined in art. 9 should be interpreted as follow: 
‘The wording of the Article has been modernised to cover cases in which national 
legislation recognises arrangements other than marriage for founding a family. This 
Article neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status of marriage to unions 
between people of the same sex.
180’.  
Again, same-sex unions, though legally recognized by their own country, do not 
posses any specific entitlement vis-à-vis another EU Member States which does not 
provide legal recognition. Even if the Charter also comprises art.21, the Explanatory 
Commentary would seem to prevent an extensive interpretation of art.9 forcing MSs 
to provide at least a minimum degree of recognition. In this respect, it should not be 
forget that these explanations, though accompanying the EU Charter of Rights, 
cannot be given more importance than articles themselves . As argued by Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in its Opinion before the ECJ in the case of Maruko: 
legislative provisions describe facts, situations or circumstances and attribute certain 
consequences to them. The factual situation and the legal result are therefore the two 
essential elements of a legal rule.  But the explanatory memorandum, the preamble or 
the introductory recitals, which merely seek to illustrate, state the reasons for or explain, 
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do not form part of these essential elements, since, although they accompany, and 
usually precede, the enacting terms of the measure, forming a physical part of it, they 
have no binding force, notwithstanding their usefulness as criteria for interpretation, a 
role which the Court has frequently cited.  Accordingly, [they] merely assists with the 
interpretation of the provisions […] and its significance must not be overstated181. 
  In this respect, it is now necessary to verify the position of the ECJ related to the 
specific problem posed by the existence of same-sex unions. The ECJ has never 
directly dealt with the issue related to the recognition of same-sex unions, as national 
courts or the ECtHR have. However, the Luxemburg court had the occasion to 
express its position on the ‘essence’ of family relations a number of times. Thus, 
indirectly, it has contributed to the evolution of the concept of family. As it has 
happened in the other levels previously analyzed, this judicial process has undergone 
a series of small developments. 
The first relevant decision in which the ECJ was asked whether discriminating 
against a same-sex couple was compatible with EU law was the case of Grant
182
. In 
this case the court concluded that the refusal by an employer to allow travel 
concession to the person of the same sex with whom a worker had a stable relation, 
where such concession were allowed to a worker’s spouse or to the person of the 
opposite sex with whom the worker had a stable relationship outside marriage, did 
not constitute discrimination.  
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In the reasoning of the ECJ, both female and male same-sex couples were denied 
the benefits, thus there was no discrimination based on sex
183
. In 1998, as the ECJ 
itself underlined, the reference to sexual orientation was still to be introduced by the 
subsequent Amsterdam Treaty and the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC
184
, thus the 
possibility for the ECJ to intervene was restricted to sex-based discrimination. 
As stated by Advocate General Mazak, although it would be true to assume that a 
general principle of equality implies potentially a prohibition of any discrimination 
on specific grounds, it is also true that any specific prohibition is an expression of that 
general principle
185
. Thus, MSs should device appropriate measures to combat 
discrimination, specifying what the general principle truly means. 
 
3.2. From Maruko to Römer 
Since both the cases originated from a claim submitted in relation to a violation of 
EU law, in particular Directive 2000/78/EC, to understand these two cases, it is 
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necessary to comprehend the structure of Directive 2000/78/EC before moving into 
the analysis of the judgments
186
. 
It is crucial to focus on two main aspects of this document:  
(1) The concept of discrimination in employment and occupation. 
According to this Directive, discrimination might be distinguished in 
‘direct discrimination’ and ‘indirect discrimination’ (art. 2). The 
former (art. 2 [a]) occurs when one person is treated less favourably 
than another is on the grounds set for in art. 1 (religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation). The latter (art.2 b) arises when 
an apparently neutral provision put a person at a particular 
disadvantage compared with other people. In this respect, indirect 
discrimination might be justified if it is appropriate, necessary and it 
is meant to purse a legitimate aim (art. 2 [b] [i-ii]). Affirmative action 
might fall within this scheme. 
(2) Recital 22 which provides that the Directive is without prejudice to 
national law on marital status and the benefits dependent thereon. 
This reference delineates the limit on the application of the Directive, 
establishing that public benefits (e.g. pension treatment) remain 
reserved only to married couples (if so provided by national law) 
without encountering the risk of being declared inadmissible under 
EU law. This provision responds to the exigency of Member States to 
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autonomously legislate on ‘family-reserved’ benefits and freely 
decide who to include (exclude) from some social benefits
187
. 
3.2.1. Maruko 
 
In the case of Maruko
188
 the applicant claimed that he was discriminated on the 
ground of sexual orientation since he was denied a widower’ pension though he was 
in a same-sex union regularly registered under the Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz 
(German law on registered partnerships, ‘LPartG’) since 2001. The pension 
institution
189
 did not authorize Mr. Maruko to obtain his death partner’s pension, 
opposing that according to the institution’s regulation190, this benefit was reserved 
only to married couples. 
Mr. Maruko thus challenged this decision before a domestic German court, 
debating on the rationality of this prohibition, and arguing that this ban on his 
possibility to accede this benefit would have discriminated him on the ground of 
sexual orientation, expressly prohibited under EU law. The Bavarian administrative 
court in Munich decided to refer the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling
191
. 
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The ECJ had firstly to address the question on whether the widower’s pension 
issued by the VddB could be classified as ‘pay’ within the meaning of art.3 Directive 
2000/78/EC
192
. This passage of the case has been essential for the entire rationale of 
the judgment. The Court indeed, on one hand has maintained that, under Recital 22, 
Directive 2000/78/EC does not apply to provisions of national law related to civil 
status or benefits accruing from that status, but on the other hand it has concluded that 
those benefits deriving from the professional relation under its scrutiny, could be 
considered ‘pay’ within the meaning of art.141 EC, thus falling within the scope of 
Directive 2000/78/EC
193
 (the ‘pay argument’).  
Moreover, in Maruko the ECJ has recalled how ‘in the exercise of that competence 
[i.e. legislation on marital status and its consequences] the Member States must 
comply with Community law, and in particular with the provision relating to the 
principle of nondiscrimination
194’. 
Once established that Maruko’s claim concerned a differentiation in the attribution 
of a ‘pay’, the ECJ had to verify whether this was a case of direct or indirect 
discrimination. Both Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
195
 and the 
Commission
196
 indicated in their observations that this was a case of indirect 
discrimination as enshrined in art. 2b of the Directive 2000/78/EC. Their argument 
considered that an apparently neutral provision such as the one provided by the VddB, 
consisting in a differentiation between married and unmarried couples (considering 
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that only heterosexual might get married), was de facto discriminating on the ground 
of sexual orientation.  
The ECJ was not persuaded by this conclusion. The Court reasoned on the factual 
situation and it concluded that a surviving life-partner was comparable with a spouse. 
Thus, no distinction between married and registered couples could be adduced as 
exceptions, and the denial to concede a survivor’ benefit constituted a violation of 
art.1 and 2(2) of Directive 2000/78/EC (i.e. direct discrimination).  
What the Court has highlighted in this judgment is the importance of ‘facts’. As 
the ECJ has noticed, ‘the harmonization between marriage and partnership [through 
subsequent legislative reform after the introduction of the LPartG] places persons of 
the same sex in a situation comparable to that of spouses in relation to the survivors’ 
benefit at issue in the main proceeding
197’. From Grant – where differences between 
same-sex and opposite sex were conceived the essential element of distinction – to 
Maruko, the ECJ has thus considerably changed its view on same-sex partners. 
As argued, in Maruko the court ‘sought to render a decision that was “true-to-life” 
and “down-to-heart”’198. In doing so, the ECJ has left national judges the 
responsibility to verify whether the situation of registered partnerships was de facto 
comparable with married couple on a case by case analysis
199
. Comparability has thus 
became the main element to emphasize direct discrimination suffered by same-sex 
partners. 
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This conclusion is controversial if read considering the structure of the German 
LPartG. Since only person of same-sex can register, and only opposite-sex can marry, 
the argument of comparability could have been preceded by a reasoning related to the 
specific discrimination suffered by those who cannot enter into marriage. The denial 
of widower’s pension was based on the assumption that only married couple can 
benefit from it. Since only heterosexual persons can enter into matrimony, then the 
easier conclusion could have been that an indirect discrimination occurred as, per 
analogy, in the case of Schnorus (see, chapter II, section 4). 
It is possible to argue that by identifying a direct discrimination the ECJ has 
enhanced the protection for homosexuals insomuch as no justification to direct 
discrimination is allowed under Directive 2000/78/EC, whereas according to the 
Directive indirect discrimination might be justified if a legitimate state aim is pursued 
(in this respect, national judges would have been entitled to verify whether a 
compelling interest would have justified a different treatment). Nevertheless, the 
problem posed by ‘comparability’ is that it is narrowly applicable in other cases. In 
France for instance, or Italy, where people of same-sex can enter into Pacs or cannot 
at all be recognized, a claim formulated in the same terms of Maruko would be 
impossible to be placed before the ECJ
200
. 
Furthermore, the decision to leave ultimately on national judges the responsibility 
‘to compare’, i.e. to establish whether the situation of registered partners and spouses 
are comparable, does not ensure an harmonious application of nondiscrimination for 
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each case. An evidence can be found in the decision of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court issued in 2008, one month after the decision of Maruko has been 
issued
201
.  
The BVerfG has indeed interpreted Maruko in the sense of emphasizing 
differences instead of considering similarities, i.e. on the basis of the ECJ’s case law, 
the German constitutional judge has elaborated the rationale for treating same-sex 
partners differently
202
. In this case, the plaintiff submitted a question to the German 
constitutional judge related to the constitutionality of a provision which granted only 
to married civil servants a specific subsidy (Familienzuschlag der Stufe 1). The 
claimant, who entered into a life partnership in 2004, brought his claim before the 
competent administrative court
203
 but the case was dismissed in the first instance as 
well as on appeal
204
.  
German national courts elaborated their judgment coherently with the previous 
BVerwG’s case law which had already established that Directive 2000/78/EC would 
not automatically compel states to extend those benefits reserved to married couples 
also to other type of unions. This case was thus brought before the Constitutional 
Court arguing that the benefit-regulation was violating the constitution
205
 (principle 
of equality, art.3 cost. GG). 
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The BVerfG responded by rejecting the complaint on the basis that it did not 
constitute a violation of fundamental rights. In doing so, the German court 
acknowledged the ECJ ‘s decision in Maruko, but it used this case to frame an 
argument against the possibility to grant the same benefits to both married and 
registered couples. In the reasoning of the BVerfG, Maruko confirmed that there 
exists a difference between the two situations, and only courts should decide when, 
by comparison, it possible to equalize treatments reserved to both registered and 
married couples
206
.  
Thus, according to the constitutional court, under German law there was no 
obligation to treat equally married and registered partners. On the contrary, the legal 
rules governing marriage or registered partnership were meant to distinguish between 
the two (i.e. between heterosexual and homosexual couples). The conclusion 
achieved by the German supreme court reversed the rationale developed by the ECJ 
in Maruko. In fact, while the ECJ was concerned with de facto similarities, the 
German judge considered the de jure differentiation to justify different treatments.  
 
3.2.2. Römer: a final response? 
 
The case of Römer
207
, though similar to Maruko, posed a further problem in 
relation to scope of application of the EU nondiscrimination principle. The ECJ this 
time had to clarify whether this principle prevails also on national constitutions. In 
specific, the referring national court, Mr. Römer, the Commission, and the Advocate 
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General
208
 all agreed on the assumption that, in analogy with the case Mangold
209
 
(discrimination on the grounds of age), nondiscrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation would constitute a general principle of EU law
210
, thus directly applicable 
and automatically effective on the entire EU space. Furthermore, the question on 
whether same-sex unions suffer indirect discrimination if national legislation only 
grants married couples some benefits was raised again. 
Mr. Jurgen Römer, as Mr. Maruko, entered into a registered partnership according 
to the German LPartG in 2001. He decided to apply for the application of social 
benefits as provided by the law of the Land of Hamburg on supplementary pensions 
(Hamburgisches Zusatzversorgungsgesetz). He was employed as an administrative 
employee for the City of Hamburg from 1950 until 1990 when he became 
incapacitated to work. He then applied for amending his monthly pension in 
accordance with the supplementary retirement pension reserved to married couples 
under the regulation of his employer office, and he also claimed for obtaining a 
recalculation of his retirement pension since 2001 (i.e. the year when he entered into 
partnership with his companion). 
In December 2001, the Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg replied negatively to 
Römer’ s request,  opposing that this benefit was reserved only to married couples. 
According to the City of Hamburg, this restriction in the enjoyment of this benefit 
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was justified by the special protection the German Constitution provides for marriage.  
Mr. Römer appealed against this decision before the Labor Court in Hamburg 
(Arbeitsgericht Hamburg) which decided to refer the case before the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling in 2008. 
The referring court transmitted the case to ECJ wondering whether:  
(1) The benefit at stake was to be considered ‘pay’ under EU law, thus falling 
within the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC despite Recital 22 of the Directive.  
(2) Under EU law the denial of this benefit would constitute a direct 
discrimination and what relevance should be given to the constitutional 
provision concerning special protection for marriage. 
(3) The right to equal treatment in relation to non-discrimination on  the ground 
of sexual orientation is a general principle of EU law, so that the right to 
obtain the same pension amount arose since 2001. 
The ECJ firstly identified in the disputed benefit a ‘pay’, in accordance with its 
previous decision in Maruko
211
, recalling how Recital 22 cannot affect the application 
of Directive 2000/78/EC if the benefit at issue is a ‘pay’ within the meaning of 
art.157 TFEU
212
. Secondly, it again emphasized how, in order to establish whether 
there has been a direct discrimination, it was not necessary for two situations to be 
identical.  
Thus, the ECJ concluded that national courts should consider in their 
determination that:  
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[the two factual situations, i.e. married and registered life-companions must] be 
comparable and, , the assessment of that comparability must be carried out not in a 
global and abstract manner, but in a specific and concrete manner in the light of the 
benefit concerned
213
. 
In this sense, there would be no necessity to verify whether the protection of 
marriage under the German constitution is in contrast with the principles of EU law 
as wondered by the national referring court, since as the ECJ has pointed out, the 
claim under its scrutiny did not require to equalize the two legal institutions
214
. In 
other words, EU law simply requires to treat equally equal situations.  
The focus has thus been shifted by the ECJ on the consequences of being married 
or registered rather than on the legal institutions as such. Therefore, it has been 
uncontroversial for the ECJ to hold that the registered life partnership regime created 
under German law has gradually become equivalent to marriage, and for this reason 
there was no significant discrepancies between the regimes of marriage and registered 
life partnerships. Hence, as logical result, the ECJ has decided, as in Maruko, that in 
Römer the German legislation directly discriminated on the ground of sexual 
orientation in this specific case. 
In addition, addressing the last question on whether the prohibition to discriminate 
on the ground of sexual orientation constitutes a general principle of EU law the ECJ 
has stated:  
It should be recalled that the Council of the European Union adopted Directive 2000/78 
on the basis of Article 13 EC, and the Court has held that the Directive does not itself lay 
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down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation, which 
derives from various international instruments and from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, but has the sole purpose of laying down, in that field, a 
general framework for combating discrimination on various grounds (see Mangold, 
paragraph 74, and Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 20), 
including sexual orientation
215
. 
Therefore, as for the ‘temporal validity’ of this principle, the ECJ has concluded 
that it is possible to establish a right to equal treatment encompassing also the 
prohibition to discriminate on the ground of sexual orientation (and consequently a 
claim that it has been violated) only since 2003, i.e. the time of expiry of the period 
for transposition of the Directive 2000/78
216
. This seems to contradict partially the 
statement concerning the possibility to identify nondiscrimination based on sexual 
orientation as a general principle of EU law. Indeed, it would be possible to argue 
that if this is a general principle stemming from the common constitutional traditions 
of MSs, dating its temporal validity back to 2003 would not be reasonable. On the 
other hand, coherently with its previous case law in Grant, the ECJ has considered 
the issue of sexual orientation only once it has been translated into a specific legal 
document such as the Directive 2000/78/EC.  
 
4. The duty to recognize and the comparability of same-sex unions 
This chapter has analyzed through the lens of the comparative method the answers 
given to the claims raised by same-sex unions in the EU space. The main purpose of 
this chapter was twofold: (1) to verify whether the general ‘duty to recognize’, and 
consequently the violation of fundamental rights related to states’ ‘indifference’, were 
two concepts commonly endorsed by the judiciary at all levels of analysis in the EU; 
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(2) whether judges have so far demonstrated their willingness to address the issue of 
same-sex unions directly, i.e. bypassing the legislative power and imposing their idea 
of recognition through judicial law-making in light of the rights guaranteed either by 
the constitution, or the EU Charter of Rights, or the ECHR.  
As for the first this point, it is possible to conclude that there exists in the EU a 
shared understanding among judges on the importance of providing a solution to the 
situation of same-sex partners. In other words, states cannot legitimately continue to 
ignore the issue since the rights of same-sex unions are covered by the set of rights 
rooted in constitutional, supranational, and international provision on human rights.  
Recalling the Tribunal Constitucional’ position, the legislator has the duty to set 
up a series of rules able to guarantee family-life in the context of same-sex unions
217
. 
The same line of reasoning has been adopted by the Corte Costituzionale court when 
recognizing homosexual couples as ‘formazioni sociali218’ deserving protection under 
art.2 of the Italian constitution
219
. 
Indeed, this analysis shows how at national level differences in the reasoning of 
courts might not be found in relation to question of whether same-sex couples 
deserve legal protection, but solely on how this recognition should be afforded and 
how it should operate. 
In specific, although the Portuguese Tribunal Constitucional has clarified that 
there is neither a prohibition nor an obligation to open up marriage to same-sex 
couples under the Portuguese constitution, it has however upheld that while 
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‘marriage’ cannot be modified as legal institution, the opposite sex of the spouses is 
not a preliminary/necessary condition to enter into this legal institution
220
. In doing 
so, the Portuguese supreme court has acknowledged a change in the social 
understanding of marriage and has adhered to a pragmatic approach detached from 
traditionally driven arguments, thus considering marriage in its concrete dimension, 
i.e. ‘a common life path governed by the law221’. 
The Hungarian constitutional court, though conceiving the importance of 
providing a legal frame to regulate same-sex unions, has embraced an opposite 
perspective. According to its jurisprudence, the constitution does prohibit the 
enhancement of the scope of marriage as to cover also same-sex unions. This 
conservative position has been justified in the name of tradition. Marriage, in this 
scheme, is understood as the premise for the formation of a family aimed at giving 
birth to children. Hence, marriage conserves it own specific ‘reproductive function’ 
and for this reason cannot be extended to other types of unions unable to perform this 
task. This perspective has been coherently upheld by the court in both 2008 and 2010 
judgments. 
Nonetheless, confirming the conclusion that there exists a ‘duty to recognize’, 
despite the argument of same-sex marriage, the Hungarian court has confirmed the 
attitude of its European counterparts. Indeed, for the court same-sex partners deserve 
protection according to the constitution, since both the principle of equality and 
human dignity create an obligation on the side of the State. The Court has thus 
                                                          
220
 Tribunal Constitucional, judgment n.121/2010, Ibid, para. 26. 
221
 Ibid, para. 6. 
91 
 
emphasized the social value of long-lasting relations between same-sex partners, and 
the importance of promoting social acceptance of sexual minorities. Hence, the only 
relevant point for the Hungarian court is the distinction to be made between marriage 
and other types of legal institutions, giving for granted that same-sex unions fall 
within the scope of application of constitutional guarantees
222
. Therefore, as long as 
marriage and registered partnership are differently structured, and each one is 
available only for either opposite-sex or same-sex couples, there is no question of 
constitutionality to be raised. 
The reasoning expressed in 2010 by both the French Conseil Constitutionell
223
 and 
the Italian constitutional court are similar, though the situations in these two countries 
are not identical at all. In fact, while in France it is possible for homosexuals to enter 
into Pacs, in Italy no mean of legal recognition is available for these same-sex 
partners. In this context, both courts have been deferential to the legislative, i.e. both 
have endorsed the view that it is up to parliaments to address the issue of same-sex 
unions, deciding whether to allow same-sex marriage or adopting a legislation ad hoc 
for same-sex partners. In addition, the Italian Court in its judgment n.138/2010 has 
partially adhered to the same line of reasoning of its Hungarian colleagues. By 
explaining how marriage posses it own ‘typical’ (natural) meaning in the constitution, 
and observing how different legal solutions have been adopted by other European 
countries, the court has reached the conclusion that it is not possible for a judge to 
provide one right answer to this issue.  
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As underlined by the Strasbourg Court, it is now possible to argue that a common 
European idem sentire has been developed during these years, thus ‘it would be 
artificial to maintain the view that … same-sex couples cannot enjoy family life224’. 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR is still reluctant to declare that the ECHR imposes an 
obligation upon Contracting Parties toward the recognition of same-sex couples. In 
other words, the Strasburg judge has acknowledged that these unions might enjoy the 
guarantees offered by the ECHR but the decision to legislate on this field is left in the 
hands of States as the margin of appreciation is applied in this context. The reasons 
behind this attitude can be better understood when discussing the role of judges in 
democratic constitutional orders in chapter III. 
 Accordingly, also the ECJ, while upholding the formal distinction between 
married couples and registered partnerships, and formally excluding that family law 
falls as such within its competence, has made clear that the margin of discretion left 
to MSs in their possibility to differentiate between ‘unions’ is limited by the EU 
general principle of nondiscrimination, which does not allow distinctions whenever 
two situations are merely and formally unequal but equal in concreto. In this specific 
context, it would be interesting to analyze an ECJ’ s case involving mutual 
recognition among MSs, i.e. a case in which the ECJ was called to decide whether 
under EU law there exists an obligation for a MS to recognize a same-sex married 
couple moving in a country where only heterosexual married couples are legally 
recognized. Indeed, although at national level the recognition of a foreign marriage 
act might be refused by a MS arguing that it is against the ‘public order’, the ECJ 
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could be persuaded that such a refusal is infringing EU principles, rooting its 
argument in the normogenetic value of the now binding principles enshrined in the 
EU Charter of Rights .   
As for the second point, notwithstanding differences in the final outcome national, 
supranational, and international judicial decisions have prompted, it is possible to 
conclude that the judiciary at large has acknowledged and endorsed the view that the 
protection of fundamental rights provided at all levels does require states to intervene. 
The EU Charter of Rights has become relevant in the elaboration of courts’ 
judgments, and it has indeed become an essential reference for judges. Nonetheless, 
as the Portuguese case clearly demonstrates, supreme judges are unwilling to 
substitute the legislator in its prerogatives.  
In other words, judges are ready to confirm (e.g. as shown in the Portuguese case-
study) or narrowly define (e.g., the Hungarian and the ECJ case-study) the limits of 
legislative choices. In this context, the ECJ’s cases Maruko and Römer provide a 
strong example of this attitude. In fact, the ECJ’s decision to use the parameter of 
direct discrimination instead of indirect discrimination, has limited the scope of 
application of its decisions on Germany. This choice reveals a judicial approach 
aimed at preventing discrimination against same-sex couples, while at the same time 
preserving the legislator’s prerogative on the elaboration of legal models.  
This tendency, as examined in the next chapters, can be explained by investigating 
the meaning of equality in the contemporary debate (chapter II), and by analyzing the 
role of the courts in constitutional democratic systems (chapter III). Indeed, though it 
is possible to affirm that states’ ‘indifference’ toward same-sex unions constitutes a 
violation of fundamental rights in the EU, the path leading to the elaboration of an 
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harmonious European common standard is still far from being completed. Thus, in 
the lack of all-in-all comprehensive answer to this issue at EU level (i.e. 
encompassing all MSs’ legislation), while the ‘duty to recognize’ cannot be 
questioned, the way in which states decide to address this issue remains uncertain. 
Indeed, the situation could have been different if within the systems examined in 
this chapter there had been the possibility to issue a Declaration of Incompatibility
225
. 
This instrument is a declaration issued by judges in the United Kingdom when they 
consider that the terms of a statute is incompatible with the UK's obligations under 
the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporated the European Convention of Human 
Rights into the UK domestic law
226
. This possibility would give national courts and 
the ECJ the possibility to recall MSs on their duty to recognize same-sex unions, 
directly emphasizing how ‘omissions’ in the legal system do represent a violation of 
the rights of same-sex partners. Such a declaration could have far more reaching 
effects than those statements made at national level
227
 (the Corte Costituzionale is one 
example) in which Courts merely acknowledge that it is necessary to provide legal 
recognition without having the possibility to declare contemporary legislation in 
contrast with constitutional, supranational, and international principles.  
In conclusion, as the ECJ had the occasion to clarify twice in Maruko and Römer, 
MSs do not enjoy an unlimited discretion when differentiating among ‘couples’. 
Thus, though it is possible to argue that there is no time limit on ‘when’ the 
obligation to recognize upon states should be fulfilled, the parameters of unfair 
discrimination are being already shaped by judges.  
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CHAPTER II 
EQUALITY AND ITS MEANINGS 
 
 
Summary: Introduction; 1.Why should equality be considered; 2. Definitions; 3. 
Sociological and psychological approaches; 4. Formal equality v. substantial equality; 5. 
Application of the principle of  equality; 6. Considering equality in the of same-sex 
unions;  Concluding remarks. 
 
Introduction 
 
The first chapter has provided an insight on the situation of same-sex couples in 
the EU by adopting a comparative analysis of the case law so far developed at 
national, supranational, and international level. As shown, either in those countries 
where legislation on same-sex unions has been enacted, or those in which there is no 
legal institutions available for homosexual families, judicial actors perceive this issue 
as ‘a duty to recognize’ upon states to be fulfilled in order to reverse de facto 
discrimination. This ‘national approach’ to same-sex union is also confirmed at both 
supranational and international levels; in particular, while the ECtHR has now 
accepted to conceive same-sex unions within the scope of the right to form a family, 
the ECJ has demonstrated its willingness to consider partners regardless of sex when 
situations are de facto identical. 
As previously described, the Lisbon Treaty– entered into force on 1 December 
2009 – has amended both the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In addition, the Lisbon Treaty has 
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incorporated the EU Charter of Rights
228
. All these documents, representing EU 
primary law
229
, refer to the principle of nondiscrimination, including sexual 
orientation
230
, as a tool to enhance equality among EU citizens in all the Member 
States. EU institutions have also enacted a number of subsequent legal instruments – 
as underlined in chapter I – (so called EU secondary legislation231 to fight 
discrimination against people belonging to sexual minorities
232
). 
When discussing upon fundamental rights a preliminary distinction should be 
made between individual and collective rights. In the case of same-sex unions, the 
fact that those who struggle for legal recognition are homosexuals could lead to the 
conclusion that collective rights are at stake. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify that 
the claim posed by LGBTI people is not related to their sexual orientation, i.e. it is 
not a claim rooted in their belonging to a minority group (i.e. a sexual minority). The 
opportunity to be legally recognized as social units for partners, regardless of their 
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gender, it is the expression of an individual right. As for instance the Italian 
constitution reads in Art.2 ‘The Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviolable 
rights of the person, both as an individual and in the social groups where human 
personality is expressed’. In other words, LGBTI people’s rights can be considered as 
collective rights when the activity of lobbying political parties is considered (‘the 
minority group asks for’), while the fact of  forming a family represents an individual 
right, a free individual choice (‘a person is entitled to’). 
However, family matters imply the involvement of subconscious feelings 
regarding personal autonomy, motherhood, reproduction, masculinity, and sex-roles. 
When debating upon the opportunity of giving a legal status to same-sex unions, the 
archetype of cultural gender relations is questioned. Indeed, gender has been ‘the key’ 
for identifying the social status of sexes, first in marital relations, and then in society. 
The challenge posed by the consideration of different sexual attitudes is an element of 
pressure for standardized gender rules. Love, sex, and individuals’ expectations about 
the future are all involved in this debate
233
. In this context, homosexuality questions 
the dual and complementary relation between the male and the female as social 
(natural) unity. This is the leitmotiv of the reasoning proposed by those who identify 
marriage as a pre-legal value to be defended against arguments in support of the legal 
recognition of same-sex unions (in this context, see chapter I in relation to the case of 
Hungary).  
As underlined by Koppelman:  
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the two stigmas – sex-inappropriateness and homosexuality – are virtually 
interchangeable, and each is readily used as a metaphor for the other. Moreover, 
both stigmas have gender-specific forms that imply that men ought to have 
power over the women. Gay men are stigmatized as effeminate, which means 
insufficiently aggressive and dominant. Lesbians are stigmatized as too 
aggressive and dominant […] they appear to be guilty of some kind of 
insubordination
234
. 
Thus, individuals’ identity is under pressure, and a series of deep-rooted 
stereotypes must firstly be acknowledged, analyzed, and eventually resolved before 
considering equal rights in the context of family law (to the extent that also same-sex 
partners could enjoy those guarantees offered to heterosexual couples)
235
. Indeed, 
although in democratic societies the principle of equality and personal autonomy 
seem to be peacefully interiorized by citizens, when the issue of same-sex unions is 
raised the debate tends to blur into something contradictory and demagogic. 
According to which principle should heterosexual partnerships be the only ones 
granted recognition and protection before the law? Answering this question requires a 
careful analysis of the meaning of equality and its translation in concreto. In fact, 
there would be no sufficient and rational basis for an argument supporting the 
recognition of same-sex unions if equality was not framed in appropriate terms.  
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The principle of equality functions against discrimination
236
 and it has been 
described as ‘a treacherously simple concept’237, though there is no widespread 
agreement on what equality is and what a society should pursue (in terms of policies, 
legislation, jurisprudence) in order to enhance its scope. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine the several conceptions of equality, and then verifying whether the forms of 
inclusion granted to homosexual couples in the MSs adhere to idea of equality as an 
instrument able to promote differences without creating first and second-class 
citizens. This chapter emphasizes the importance of reflecting on the meaning of 
equality before debating on the possible remedies aimed at the eradication of 
discrimination in this specific field. This operation helps understanding the reasons 
behind those judicial decisions described in the first chapter. 
The first section challenges the idea that the principle of equality is unnecessary to 
solve the issue of discrimination in the enjoyment of rights. The second section, 
borrowing from the results achieved in feminist studies, explains the importance of 
terminology and the discrepancy emerging when considering individuals’ relations in 
terms of equality. 
The third section analyzes how the principle of equality is framed in democratic 
constitutional orders in order to verify whether ‘neutrality’ can be a solution to defeat 
discrimination. The third section focuses on the sociological and psychological 
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dimension of norms, explaining how the formation of social attitudes creates the basis 
for social exclusion. 
The fourth section addresses the issue of formal equality versus substantial 
equality by explaining the weakness of those arguments based on rationality. The 
following part provides a description of the application by the ECJ of the principle of 
equality, underlining the problematic aspects associated with the adoption of special 
measures (promotion of equality) for the inclusion of individuals in historical 
vulnerable positions. 
The sixth section explores the situation of same-sex unions in the EU, i.e. it 
describes how EU MSs have adopted different legal instruments for the recognition 
of these unions. In this context, it is questioned whether advocating for same-sex 
marriage would be consistent with the idea of equality as recognition and promotion 
of differences. 
 
1. Why should equality be considered?  
 
The legal protection of fundamental freedoms stands for the purpose of protecting 
human beings from states’ abuses. They ensure individuals’ physical and 
psychological integrity and safety regardless of the age, gender, physical or mental 
disability, national origin, race, sexual orientation, etc. Rights are usually linked to 
the concept of dignity and equality. Freedoms could not be defined as fundamental if 
they would protect only élites, or the majority. ‘Fundamentality’ is thus associated 
with ‘universality’: an ethical position that perceives each and every human being as 
deserving the same degree of protection for the mere fact of belonging to 
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humanity
238
. Therefore, in the contemporary debate, rights require equality as a 
vehicle. Hence, a reasoning about equality represents the first step to be made to 
enhance the scope of the guarantees offered to individuals by the law. 
However, according to some authors, equality should not be confused with the 
idea of rights and liberties. According to Peter Westen  equality is an empty concept. 
In his view, while there might exist a multitude of different rights, equality is 
singular. In his scheme, rights are non-comparative in nature – having their source in 
a person’s individual well-being – while equality is comparative, i.e. it is derived by 
the treatment of others. Consequently, the main difference between the two is that 
rights are individualistic (I am entitled to), while equality is social (it depends on the 
context)
239
. In other words, rights might be precisely identified, i.e. they are de jure 
and de facto simultaneously, so that either you are entitled to something or you are 
not, while equality needs to be constructed by considering whether individuals 
actually enjoy their set of rights. 
If this reasoning is to be followed, the legal value of equality, separated and 
distinct from the individualistic scheme of rights, loses its meaning in favor of a view 
in which equality is given, taken for granted, already achieved in a ‘society of rights’. 
This postulation implies that there should be no reason to concentrate the attention on 
equality per se, since the basis for any theoretical speculation should begin with the 
consideration of the nature of rights and their concrete application.  
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Individuals living within a democratic society – if they belong to the majority 
group – might tend to relegate minority rights to the margin because of the 
presumption that equality is somehow implicit and there is no need to explicitly refer 
to it when debating upon rights. Per contra, discussing the meaning of the concept 
‘equality’ and its implications, means going beyond the analysis of the simple ideal 
standard that ‘people who are alike should be treated alike’ and its correlative that 
‘people who are unlike should be treated unlike’240. Indeed, as shown in chapter I in 
the analysis of the ECJ’s case law – in light of a changed understanding of equality – 
what has been established in Grant
241
, has been reversed in Maruko
242
 and Römer
243
. 
Likeness and unlikeness represent the two highly complicated paradigms on which 
scholars of constitutional law (and constitutional judges) ought to concentrate before 
assessing whether discrimination has occurred. It is not exclusively a matter of 
applying them in order to prompt a fair protection of rights. On the contrary, what is 
necessary is to understand how likeness and unlikeness are formulated, constructed, 
and then applied to concrete cases within a legal system. The risk is otherwise to 
disregard how equality tends to behave as a ‘living concept’ during the time and how 
the social context is relevant in its elaboration
244. The ‘simplistic idea of equality’ is 
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unable to explain how and why the legal scope of rights have been extended  as far as 
to cover situations once thought to be against the law, the moral and religion
245
.  
The idea of equality/inequality is rooted in human history. Its meaning has 
changed considerably through the centuries. In ancient Greece, Antiphon was the first 
who spoke about equality underlining how  ‘we all breathe into the air with our 
mouths and with our nostrils, and we all laugh when there is joy in our mind, or we 
weep when suffering pain’246. However, in that period this view was provocative 
enough to be disregarded since the distinction between Greeks and Barbarians and 
also among Greeks themselves was perceived as ‘natural’. The entire Platonic 
discourse around politeia and nomos, was centered on the assumption that in nature a 
natural inequality exists among individuals. Inequality for Plato stems from the 
observation that individuals’ capabilities serve different purposes within the polis. 
Thus, inequality is not only natural, but essential since otherwise society would 
collapse
247
. 
According to Aristotle equality and justice are synonymous: ‘to be just means to 
be equal, to be unjust is to be unequal
248’. This formula expresses a concept which 
seems to be self-evident, i.e. equality is the basis of justice
249
. Nonetheless, 
considering likeness/unlikeness as the point of departure for defining what is equal 
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does not represent a linear process, and creates a paradoxical situation in which 
equality is explained only as a circular argument which does not provide for any 
explanation of the reasons subtending the value of equality. Equality in this paradigm 
could be conceived as in this figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The modern idea of equality elaborated within the context of the liberal state has 
been framed focusing mainly on individual rights, abandoning the discourse around 
the contents and definition of equality. Equality was perceived as a potential risk for 
individuals’ aspirations, since equality was associated with conformity250 (‘the risk of 
communism’). Thus, while leaving equality apart, the discussion has been centered 
on the limits to the principle of equality. Within this conceptual frame, inequality 
might exist if the State is able to guarantee (at least) equal opportunities for all
251
. In 
other words, shifting from equality to inequality, the approach has become negative: 
without discussing what equality means, social actors must avoid inequality. The 
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problem remains: how is it possible to realize whether there has been discrimination 
if it is arduous to know what being equal truly means? 
 
2. Definitions 
 
‘Equality’ is a contested concept: "People who praise it or disparage it disagree 
about what they are praising or disparaging
252
". In this context feminist studies are of 
particular interest, since within this theoretical framework equality has been observed 
and discussed analyzing the relations between equals. As underlined by MacKinnon, 
since women’s interests have been disregarded in the formation of the liberal states 
policies, ‘no woman had a voice in the design of the legal institutions that rule the 
social order under which women, as well men, live
253’.  
Assuming that equality has a self-evident meaning – i.e. focusing only on its 
implementation and enforcement – might lead to the perpetration of discrimination 
since discrimination cannot be removed if it is not understood where inequality 
comes from. Cutting a tree-branch does not eliminate the trunk, and cutting the trunk 
is not sufficient to eradicate the plant: the roots remain and might reform.  
Therefore, the first question to be answered is: what does ‘equal’ means? As a 
preliminary step, it is necessary to clarify that equal does not mean identical, and this 
is not only a semantic issue. Indeed, A is identical to A and there is no need to 
establish a relation in terms of equality since the two terms are identical. On the 
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contrary, the relationship between A and B is significant in terms of equality since it 
might be established by using equality as a relational link
254
.  
Thus, A and B are diverse, i.e., they are not identical so that A is not B and vice 
versa. Thus, A and B ‘are said’ to be equal when both are endowed with the same 
relevant characteristic within the context in which the equality principle is applied. 
Conversely, A and B are diverse when one of the two posses a characteristic which is 
exclusive, or if the relevant characteristic is mainly manifest in either A or B
255
.  
In this scheme, the difference between A and B is relevant only in relation to the 
context, or concretely, in relation to the legal order where rules are constructed and 
subsequently applied. An example: two students are equally enrolled in the same 
school; they are equally students though they decided to study different subjects. For 
the purpose of the school regulation all students are bound by the same rules, and 
they are diverse only if one considers the courses they are enrolled in. 
Formulated in these terms, and bringing the argument more strictly into the legal 
discipline, equality configures a relation between two or more individuals vis-à-vis a 
legal system in which a given legal rule creates a type of relation describing the 
subjects and the objects of this relation, and prescribing who is entitled to do 
something. Thus, another distinction must be introduced, that is, the difference 
between ‘descriptive equality’ and ‘prescriptive equality’. The first is necessary to 
affirm that two or more individuals are equals because they share a common 
characteristic; the second establishes a rule according to which two or more 
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individuals should be treated alike since they are entitled to something. Both concepts 
are relative, i.e., both might assume an infinitive set of possible similarities in relation 
to the context under consideration. It is one thing to say that two individuals are 
students, but quite another is to prescribe that being a student qualifies a subject as 
entitled to some rights or benefits. 
However, while descriptive equality is useful only in terms of describing 
qualitatively the relation of equality, e.g. ‘being students’, prescriptive equality 
establishes the legal rule, the circumstances under which two entities are considered 
equals, e.g. ‘treated as students’. The former is complementary to the latter to the 
extent it is needed to recognize the elements of similarity. In this scheme, both 
concepts of equality are reciprocal and the relation between A and B is transitive. A is 
equal to B, and if B is equal to C, then C is equal to A. Nonetheless, if reciprocity can 
be established in terms of equality, no matter whether in its descriptive or prescriptive 
meaning, diversity does not follow the same rule
256
.  
Diversity is reciprocal but the relation is not a transitive one. Indeed, if A and B 
are diverse, B and C might be equal so that only A is diverse if compared to B, while 
B and C might instead be equal
257
. This reasoning is necessary to understand how the 
terminology associated with both equality and diversity implies a series of sub-
speculations which are mostly unconsidered when discussing the principle of 
equality. Terminology is essential in this context.  
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Moving further in this analysis, it is now important to underline that the relation 
occurring between two entities requires a neutral parameter as a reference in order to 
identify ‘why’, ‘how’, and to ‘what extent’ they are diverse/equal. In other words, A 
and B are equal or diverse according to the X element. Here, the issue becomes more 
problematic when transferred from ‘the game A and B’ to a concrete scenario. If the 
X parameter is the legal rule, it should be neutral and ‘third’ in relation to ‘person A’ 
and ‘person B’.  
An example is: contemporary democratic constitutional legal systems consider 
men and women as equal before the law. This seems to be a neutral-based approach. 
The X parameter, the legal rule, establishes equality considering that all individuals 
belong to humanity. Thus, each person deserves to be treated equally. Diversity 
becomes an ‘absolute property’. An individual is diverse as a person, but she/he is 
equal to everyone else before the law.  
In theory, this is what is provided for by democratic constitutions. Nevertheless, 
the path toward the achievement of full equality between men and women, persons 
with disabilities and the others, white people and black people, heterosexuals and 
homosexuals, shows how the argument of equality has always been framed around a 
non-neutral parameter. Using the scheme proposed above, when struggling for 
achieving equality, A wants to be treated like B – rather than be treated equally – 
according to the standards pre-defined by B itself (people belonging to the ‘B group’ 
are already equally treated). The neutral legal rule (the X parameter) does not exist in 
reality; there is only the presumption that if A is similar to B, then it deserves the 
same treatment, while B does not need to be equal to A or anyone else. Only A must 
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conform to B, while B is at the same time one of the objects of the relation of equality 
and the standard parameter. B becomes not only the standard; it represents the best 
position in society, the superior one. Thus, the entire argument shifts from the 
equality/diversity paradigm to the superior/inferior paradigm
258
.  
In feminist studies, this situation has been highlighted several times, observing 
how in the very beginning the legal doctrine – to advance the demand for equality 
between men and women – has presented the question of inclusion of women in the 
same terms of men. This leads to another aspect of the issue-equality: the evaluative 
equality
259
. While prescriptive equality considers under which circumstances two 
entities should be treated alike, according to evaluative equality the relationship 
between two terms is expressed in accordance to the system of value of a specific 
society. Does a woman deserve to be treated equally to a man at work? Does a black 
person deserve to be treated the same as a white person? Do gay people deserve the 
same recognition of heterosexual people in their daily life? In the context of gender, 
manliness is the element around which the rule of equality is built. In the context of 
race, whiteness is the standard. When referring to sexual orientation, 
heterosexuality/masculinity is the ideal standard. 
In this scheme, an individual is equal as far as she/he is treated as 
everyman/white/heterosexual in society. In feminist legal theory this assumption has 
been reshaped bringing to the idea of a ‘unisex’ approach. ‘The idea of sexual 
equality and the interchangeability of gender roles became, in reality, permission for 
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some women to take on male gender roles, as the trope of the wig signifies. This is 
where we are now: some – generally privileged – women can choose to assume male 
gender roles’260. Thus, instead of standardizing principles using equality as a 
guideline, legal orders tend to adopt one historically defined standard and try to 
enhance its scope beyond its original meaning. In doing so, contradictions might 
emerge and create a strong cultural opposition. 
The cultural element clearly appears. Once the predominant stereotype has been 
established, equality follows the rule pre-formulated by society as if it was the natural 
one, the only one. The discussion is not built around the concept of equality per se – 
considering diversity as a structural element in society – but only on its 
consequences. 
 
3. Sociological and psychological approaches: 
 
Sociology of law might be helpful in explaining the phenomenon described above. 
Legal sociology is perceived as either a sub-discipline of sociology or an 
interdisciplinary approach to legal studies. In very general terms, it might be argued 
that sociology observes society and those interactions occurring between social actors 
(both at individual and institutional levels)
261
. As for all the other social sciences, 
sociology uses both empirical investigation and critical analysis in order to refine 
knowledge about human social activities
262
.  
                                                          
260
 J. K. PETERS, Gender Remembered: The Ghost of “Unisex” Past, Present, and Future, in Women's 
Studies, vol. 34, n. 1, 2004, p. 72. 
261
 See, A. COMTE, A Dictionary of Sociology (3rd ed.), J. SCOTT & G. MARSHALL (eds), Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
262
 D. ASHLEY, D.M. ORENSTEIN, Sociological theory: Classical statements (6th ed.). Boston, MA, 
USA: Pearson Education, 2005, pp. 3–5, 32–36. 
111 
 
The important contribution of sociology in the legal knowledge is to be found in 
both the possibility to comprehend how legal provisions represent a given society, 
and how societal understanding of normative values shape the attitude of the 
competent social actors (mainly, but not only, judges) in the interpretation of the law. 
Sociology tries to answer the question about the function of law in relation to social 
systems, i.e. how problems in society might be solved adopting different legal 
provisions. 
Since the effort is to understand how equality is framed in society, it is useful to 
concentrate the attention on two elements, namely the relation between law and 
society, and the concept of ‘legal culture’. The former might be explained by 
considering the debate between Kelsen and Ehrlich on the essence of law, the latter 
by analyzing Weber’s theorization. 
According to Ehrlich, a legal system is a social structure which identifies the 
position of an individual (a subordinate or higher position) in society. In doing so, a 
legal system resembles other systems whose structure is not legal at all, e.g., religious 
systems, moral systems, etc. In other words, he notices how the law should be 
understood not only as a sum of statutes and judgments. This means overcoming a 
simplistic approach that would be inadequate to explain the reality behind 
interactions within a community
263
. Thus, conceiving the principle of equality in 
solely legal terms is not enough to comprehend the reasons behind de facto 
discrimination. 
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In opposing Kelsen’s formalistic view of law, Ehrlich emphasizes the importance 
of non-legal provisions, observing how uncodified rules might condition behaviors at 
the individual and institutional levels. A formalistic approach to law might explain 
how a legal system works ‘from within’, i.e., according to formal procedures of 
norms-generation and norms-application, whist it is not able to do so ‘from the 
outside’. Where does legitimacy come from? Indeed, depending on the observer – a 
jurist or non-jurist – a legal provision is perceived either as legal or as legitimate. 
Within the system as far as a norm is perceived legal there is no issue; outside the 
system, a norm might well be legal but at the same time perceived as illegitimate.  
Thus, legal provisions do not only impose rules (lawfulness), they also recognize 
previous normative values, as they are in society before the creation of a legal text 
(legitimacy). Ehrlich tries to demonstrate his assumption by observing how some 
social groups follow a set of rules despite their codification and, though legal 
provisions exist, traditional behaviors might persist over written rules
264
.  
The law might encompass a number of traditional behaviors, thus regulating them 
in formalistic terms, but this does not mean that law is able to embrace the essence of 
society since society evolves over the time, and custom changes accordingly. This is 
why Ehrlich was fascinated by Savigny and his conception of law in its historical 
dimension
265
. Indeed, if it is accepted that legal provisions are amended over the time, 
the reasons behind changes can be described in historical terms
266
.  
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However, even if it would be possible to agree on the fact that the process of law 
formation is historically and traditionally driven, the main issue remains how to 
identify which traditions are to be codified. Indeed, although a pure formalistic 
approach tends to disregard reality in its entirety, it has the merit to create boundaries, 
gives certitude to the system, and project society toward developments within a 
defined path
267.  Ehrlich’ theory has the merit of reconsidering the relationship 
between law and society but it does not provide instruments to comprehend what is 
the casual relation between norms-generation and social custom. In other words, 
when do traditions become law? 
To answer this question it is possible to refer to Weber and his theorization on the 
concept of legal cultures. According to Weber the distinction between law and 
society should not be conceived as a model in which X precedes Y (e.g. social norms 
precede legal norms). In society a number of different cultures might coexist and the 
legal system does not consider one of them as more valuable than another when the 
process of codification begins. The need for a legal system stems from the exigency 
to create a rational space for social interactions among individuals. In this scheme a 
formal and rational model is deemed necessary since it is prima face neutral in 
relation to particular cultural instances.  
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Thus, the legal culture of a given system does not represent ‘the perspective’, but it 
is merely perceived as an instrumental device to resolve possible societal conflicts. 
This view places on institutions the role of balancing different interests, and 
individuals play ‘their game’ according to the rules of the game. What happens 
outside the game is irrelevant
268
. Judges in this context can proactively realize and 
acknowledge (as they do) when a community has changed its perception about the 
contents of rights and decide accordingly in their judgments (e.g. as the ECtHR in 
Schalk and Kopf
269
, see chapter I).  
Nonetheless, when assuming that a system is fair and coherent whenever it is 
rationally built up and its structure is formally designed, a series of postulates in legal 
doctrine recalling fundamental principles and their value can be unconsidered. Of 
course, legal sociology does not speak about values as such. It considers groups and 
their beliefs but not from the stand point of someone who wants to assign a major or a 
minor influence to one group or the other.  
However, in contemporary democratic countries it is deemed necessary to consider 
differences in society in order prevent social conflicts. Stigmatization on the basis of 
race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, etc., is a very common situation. This 
‘natural attitude’ toward discrimination is intrinsic in society and a legal system 
might decide to either correct or disregard this issues. To understand the causes 
behind this ‘natural attitude’, it is possible to refer to Festinger, a socio-psychologist 
who emphasized the integral interdependence of the individual and group by noting 
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that ‘an attitude’ is correct, valid, and proper to the extent it is anchored in a group of 
people with similar beliefs
270
. Social groups to which people belong play a 
fundamental role in attitude formation, attitude-behaviour consistency, and attitude 
change.  
Psychologists working in the tradition of social identity and self-categorization 
theories have proposed that when a particular social identity is made salient, people 
will categorize themselves in terms of that social category
271
.  As Terry and Hogg 
pointed out, ‘when social identity is salient, a person's feelings and actions are guided 
more by group prototypes and norms than by personal factors’272. When people see 
themselves as group members, group norms will be more likely to influence the ways 
in which they form, act upon, and change their attitudes. Groups can provide 
information and exert normative pressures on individuals, which will influence 
attitude formation. 
The denial of full humanity to other individuals, and the cruelty and pain that 
accompany it, is a very familiar phenomenon and it is often the basis for an 
intergroup discrimination and intergroup hostility.  In fact, this mental process called 
dehumanization is often associated with ethnic, racial and intergroup conflicts, issues 
relating to immigration and, in the most unfortunate case, genocide. 
Scholars have primarily focused attention to the ways in which Jewish people 
during the Holocaust, Bosnians in the Balkan wars, and Tutsis in Rwanda were 
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dehumanized both during intergroup violence by its perpetrators, and beforehand 
through images and stereotypes that likened the victims to vermin. Similar animal 
metaphors are common in images of immigrants, who are seen as threats 
undermining the stability of the status quo, and corrupting the social order. 
Dehumanization does not only speak about racial issues and ethnic conflicts, but it is 
also commonly discussed in feminist writings, mostly on the depiction of women in 
pornography
273
.  
Women in pornography are usually dehumanized because they are represented in 
an objectified fashion. Such an objectification is usually used to remove women from 
full moral consideration and it is offered as a legitimating factor for rape and 
victimization
274
. Nussbaum
275
 identified seven components of this objectification: 
‘instrumentality’ and ‘ownership’, which involve treating women as tools and 
possessions; ‘denial of autonomy’ and ‘inertness’, which involve seeing them as 
lacking autonomy and agency; ‘fungibility’, which involves seeing women as 
interchangeable members of that category, thus neglecting subjective characteristics; 
‘violability’ represents others as lacking integrity; and ‘denial of subjectivity’ which 
is the belief that their experiences and feelings can be neglected. In other feminist 
works it is also argued that women are typically attributed fewer human qualities than 
men.   According to Sherry B. Ortner, women are ‘seen as representing a lower order 
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of being, as being less transcendental of nature than men’ across cultures, and 
femaleness is associated with animality, nature, and childlikeness
276
. 
Kelman investigated the moral dimensions of dehumanization. According to 
Kelman, dehumanization involves denying a person ‘identity’; a perception of the 
person ‘as an individual, independent and distinguishable from others, capable of 
making choices’ and ‘community’ a perception of the other as ‘part of an 
interconnected network of individuals who care for each other’277. When people are 
deprived of the quality of agency and other communal aspects of humanness they are 
de-individualized, that is they lose the capacity to evoke compassion and other moral 
emotions, thus leading to a potential inhumane treatment. Schwartz and Struch offer a 
theoretical approach that stresses the central position of human values in 
dehumanization. People's values ‘express their distinctive humanity’, so ‘beliefs 
about a group's value hierarchy reveal the perceiver's view of the fundamental human 
nature of the members of that group’278. When the ingroup and outgroup are 
perceived as having dissimilar values, the outgroup is perceived to lack shared 
humanity and its interests can be ignored or dismissed.  
Schwartz and Struch argued that values reflecting a people have ‘transcended their 
basic animal nature and developed their human sensitivities and moral sensibilities’ 
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directly reflect a group's humanity
279. ‘Prosocial’ values (e.g., equality, helpful, 
forgiving) are transcendent in this sense, whereas ‘hedonism’ values (pleasure, a 
comfortable life) reflect ‘selfish interests shared with infra-human species’. People 
can therefore be dehumanized by the perception that they lack prosocial values and 
that their values are incompatible with one's ingroup values.  
Thus, it is possible to conclude using Hannah Arendt’s statement : “equality is not 
given but it is the result of human societal infrastructures to the extent they are built 
around the concept of justice; we were not born equals; we become equals as member 
of a group since among us we decided to grant each other rights
280”.   
Therefore, principles are ethically, morally, politically, and socially constructed. 
Fundamental norms mirror societies
281
 and appear appropriate to a group because 
they achieved a cultural validation through a (democratic) decision-making 
process
282
. Changes in society might push the boundaries of traditional interpretations 
and legal scholars as well as judges have to deal with the issue of ‘actualizing 
provisions’. In legal history it is the reshaping of traditional legal materials, the 
bringing in of the other materials from outside, and the adaption of these materials as 
a whole that has provided satisfaction of human wants under new condition of life in 
civilized society
283
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If culture is responsible for the definition of values, and if values are the premise 
for the construction of the legal order, then discussing the ‘order’ only in terms of 
‘validity’ does not allow for a true definition of the principle of equality. Borrowing 
Nedelsky’s relational model of rights and using it to construe the meaning of equality, 
one should understand equality as a product of a relational approach to equality in 
which the terms of equality are built around the societal consequences of a specific 
meaning
284. ‘Treating equally’ is significant to the extent this behavior is perceived 
legitimate in a democratic society.  
 
4. Formal equality v. substantial equality 
 
Today the majority of legal scholars support the idea that formal equality is 
complementary to substantial equality and vice-versa. Traditionally, equality has 
been translated in (inter)national legal systems has a system of rules, a set of formal 
requirements that the law should respect to be uniformly applied. Several 
constitutions adopt this version of equality and literal provisions usually read 
‘everyone is equal before the law without distinction’. ‘Everyone’ represents 
‘generality’, i.e., it encompasses (potentially) every individual situation. This 
assumption works on the premise that whenever the law is neutral no discrimination 
will take place; the state would not be allowed to intervene, and if ‘intrusions’ from 
the state occurs this leads to unfair discriminations. 
Recent constitutions have developed and introduced more sophisticated 
elaborations of the concept of equality by considering the de facto discrimination 
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suffered by those who are historically in a vulnerable position and are marginalize for 
several reasons (e.g., gender, race, ancestry origins, economic situation, etc.).  
For example, the Italian constitution at art.3 states  
‘All citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law, without 
distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinions, personal and social 
conditions (I sect.); It is the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an 
economic and social nature which, really limiting the freedom and equality of 
citizens, impede the full development of the human person and the effective 
participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organization of 
the country’ (II sect.).  
Thus, the state is bound to provide incentive, and take any reasonable step to 
remove the causes of discrimination.  
According to Piechowiak, fundamental rights exist because a human being exists 
as a person who is directed towards personal development. This development takes 
place through the actualization of the potentialities of a human being
285
. It follows 
that states play a crucial role in individuals’ development through appropriate policies 
of inclusion.  
If two persons are conceived normatively as equal, the consequence is that they 
must be granted the same treatment equally. This formal assumption is not immune 
from criticism. Obviously, the premise for the application of this principle is the 
establishment of a relation of similarity and difference. As it has been previously 
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underline, this operation is heavily influenced by the socio-historical context. To 
overcome this problem, some scholars argue that a rule of rationality should be use 
when defining what is ‘equal’. Rationality would be consistent with the formal 
demand of equality, regardless of preliminary moral assumptions about justice.  
Proponents of formal equality usually consider neutrality as the best solution. 
However, this formal approach is built upon a debatable assumption: since each 
individual is different to another, to avoid discrimination the law should disregard 
these differences when pursuing a given goal. This is what is called the liberal 
argument. In essence, setting out formal equal requirements for social benefit is 
necessary to promote not only equality but also the culture of merit around which 
democratic states develop and prosper
286
. If a legislative choice favors a specific 
category (e.g. an ethnic minority) this automatically leads to an arbitrary disfavor for 
other persons.  The decision-making process would then be unreasonably influenced 
by the consideration of irrelevant differences, while according to libertarians arbitrary 
criteria should be kept out of the process of policy-elaboration to prevent unfair 
decisions
287
. 
Although this approach might fascinate those who support equality, it should not 
be underestimated how rationality is a product of human intellect, thus intrinsically 
subjected to stereotypes of different nature. Thus, the assumption that the only basis 
of equal/unequal treatment is the final outcome of an objective consideration of the 
features of a specific situation when compared to the others might lead to 
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unwarranted results. Neutrality in this context translate into a mere illusion
288
. The 
legislator, the judiciary, or the law in general, represent a specific political will, and 
thus a claim of neutrality should not be made
289
.   
Of course, formal equality might perfectly work as principle when it is associated 
to laws regulating specific human activity. If a law provides for ‘keeping off the 
grass’, neutrality does make sense. Instead, there could easily be a law which is 
presented as neutral but creates unfair discrimination (see chapter I on the difference 
between direct and indirect discrimination). An example is represented by some laws 
for public selections: if a law proscribes that among the requirements to participate in 
the selection of civil servants one should have served as a soldier, in a country where 
women are forbidden to serve, this law is only apparently neutral since it 
discriminates on the basis of gender
290
.  
This approach is consistent with ECJ’s view in Schnorbus, where the Court 
contested the German legislation regulating ‘prior access’ to practical legal training 
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for those who had completed military service, when only men were obliged to 
perform this service in Germany
291
. The same reasoning seems to have inspired the 
ECJ in Maruko
292
and Römer
293
 in which the ECJ was asked whether a legislation 
discriminating between spouses and life-time partners was allowed under the Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation
294
. 
There are numbers of examples of laws which are prima facie neutral but instead 
create a disadvantage for certain individuals. In this sense, rights might exist without 
being at disposal for each citizen, creating a dichotomy between fundamental rights 
and equality, and separating what should be united: either individuals are equally 
entitled to rights and obstacles in the enjoyment of these rights are removed, or these 
rights are not at their disposal even if they are entitled to them. Diversity cannot be 
ignored. The price to be paid is living in a legal system where equality is respected de 
jure (i.e. in theory) but not de facto. 
From this perspective, the principle of equality is strictly associated with the 
concept of equal opportunities according to which policies and subsequent legislation 
are specifically formulated to promote the inclusion (in the job-market, public 
administration, representative institutions) of those who have historically encountered 
obstacles in society. Diversity plays a central role in this context and the recognition 
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and subsequent promotion of diversity is perceived as the main vehicle to enhance 
equality among individuals. 
When shifting from a neutrality approach (formality) to a promotional approach 
(equal opportunities) the key concept of justice can be revised. In other words, justice 
does not only ensure fair and equal treatment, it also affords individuals the 
possibility to reverse their disadvantage situation. It considers historical 
discriminations and follows a redistributive model in which – given that individuals 
and groups depart from different starting points – the central point is to rebalance 
differences from the very beginning
295
.  
Some authors suggest that due to the ambiguity of the equality concept, it would 
be better to centre the discourse on the concept of dignity
296. ‘Dignity’ brings into the 
debate a greater moral character, and embodies the universality, indivisibility, and the 
interdependence of fundamental rights. It operates as an internationally shared value 
that would be more difficult to contest by libertarians
297
. This argument could be 
potentially useful since there is no doubt that ‘“the dignity of the human person” and 
“human dignity” are phrases that have come to be used as an expression of a basic 
value accepted in a broad sense by all peoples
298’.  
Therefore, though it is possible to disagree on the appropriate approach to equality, 
it would be arduous to neglect the importance of respecting human dignity since it 
represents the Kantian categorical imperative: ‘Act in such a way that you always 
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treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never 
simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’299. Thus, the problem 
should be solved simply by abandoning ‘equality’ in favor of ‘dignity’, as if this was 
a purely semantic issue. Nonetheless, if on the one hand ‘dignity’ receives a greater 
attention at national and international level, on the other, its contents are far from 
being clearly identified. As it has been suggested in relation to human rights, they 
‘centers on a moral argument that cannot be empirically proven’300, and this creates a 
margin of interpretation allowing the interpreter to choose among possible meanings. 
What does dignity implies? Some would rightly argue that substantial equality is 
still at stake when discussing dignity, since it is a necessary condition to have equal 
opportunities for the respect of each human person, since otherwise there will always 
be dominating peoples and dominated people.  
 
5. Application of the principle of equality: 
 
Discussing theories concerning the principle of equality in philosophy, sociology, 
legal doctrine, etc, creates the conceptual basis for its application to concrete cases. 
Judges find themselves in a delicate position when deciding how to better respond to 
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demand of equality. In this context it is useful to schematize possible approaches at 
judges’ disposal.  
McCrudden has offered a schematic explanation of the ‘new concepts’ of equality 
within the system of EC law. It is possible to detach this categorization from an 
embedded European version of equality, since it is possible to observe the same 
understanding of the equality principle in other western jurisdictions. Indeed, by 
analyzing the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law, though there are several distinctions to 
be made, similarities can be clearly found
301
.  According to McCrudden there are at 
least four dimensions of equality. This categorization is not meant to represent a fixed 
system of meanings in which one approach is clearly defined and separated from the 
others. On the contrary, all these approaches are considered as potentially influencing 
and overlapping each other depending on the context
302
.  
The first approach conceives equality as the result of a rational choice
303
. This 
modus operandi reflects the classical attitude of ‘treating likes alike’. The premise is 
considering likeness, difference, acceptability, and justification as parameters to 
scrutinize whether the law is discriminating against individuals. Accordingly, 
discrimination, both direct and indirect discrimination, would operate directly against 
individuals or groups on arbitrary basis. A judge should then consider whether the 
criterion adopted (such as race, gender, etc.) is manifestly illegitimate.  This ‘test’ is 
necessary for the other proposed approaches. In this context, the reasoning adopted 
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by the ECJ in Grant responded to the necessity of adopting a neutral/rational 
approach vis-à-vis the determination of the validity of a differential treatment for 
same-sex partners (see chapter I). 
The second approach adheres to idea that equality serves also to protect rights
304
. 
The focus here is shifted from discrimination per se to the interests pursued by the 
legislation (or the legislator). What is relevant is the goal to be achieved through a 
selective discrimination aimed at preserving a public good. Balancing interests is the 
main aspect to be weighted. In Mangold
305
, the ECJ has opted for this line of 
reasoning when declaring in violation of EU law the German legislation entailing a 
differential treatment on the basis of age
306
. 
The third approach refers to equality as a tool to prevent status harm. In this 
context, equality serves to identify those characteristics associated with individuals 
who are discriminated on these grounds. Instead of perpetuating the ideal ‘likes 
should be treated alike’, the principle is reversed in ‘unlikes should not be treated 
alike’, i.e., a law should consider historical disadvantages and take them into 
consideration when pursuing its goal. Thus, ‘equality involves the recognition of 
diverse identities, and the failure to accord due importance to such differing identities 
is a form of oppression and inequality in itself’307. 
The fourth approach addresses equality as a proactive mean of 
individuals’/groups’ promotion308. This could be also called the substantial equality 
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approach, i.e., States should take reasonable steps to eliminate historically stratified 
disadvantages suffered in light of specific individuals’ or groups’ status (age, gender, 
race, sexual orientation, etc).  In Marshall
309
, the ECJ, differently from the position 
expressed in Kalanke
310
, has acknowledged the importance of adopting policy and 
legislative measures able to overcome historical discrimination, though maintaining 
the limit of proportionality and exceptionality
311
. 
This categorization does not exactly define the boundaries of one meaning over the 
other. However it has the merit of identifying several aspects of equality applied by 
the ECJ, all of them necessary to legitimate public authorities’ actions. The fourth 
approach is the most problematic. It requires a preliminary recognition of inequality – 
which implies a deep introspection about culture and stereotypes – and then a positive 
response in terms of promotion through legal remedies.  
Achieving equality might entail the elaboration of specific policies aimed at 
reversing the imbalance of opportunities among and between groups. For this reason, 
affirmative action
312
 have been regarded as a potentially effective remedy available 
for policy-makers and private actors. As some authors argue, affirmative action 
policies have also the merit to promote a never ending debate over the different 
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purposes of equality between those who conceive equality in its liberal dimension and 
those who believe equality should play a central role in diverse societies
313
.   
Affirmative action represent what Bobbio would call States’ ‘positive obligations’ 
whose intent – opposed to ‘negative obligations’ in which States self-restraint 
themselves from intervening –  is ‘facere’, i.e., to take any necessary step is deemed 
necessary to remove historical disadvantages in society
314
. Thus, what becomes 
crucial is the ‘result’ since the insurance of an equal starting point for each and every 
individual is perceived as not sufficient to safeguard vulnerable positions. The 
apparent dichotomy rotates around the two concepts of ‘descriptive equality’ and 
‘evaluative equality’; as Dworkin would argue, one thing is to treat everyone as equal 
(as everyone was perfectly equal), another is to treat individual equally
315
.  
Affirmative actions have been firstly introduced in the United States by the 
President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10925 promoting the ‘affirmative action 
policy’316 aimed at restoring equality between racial groups (whites and Afro-
American). These legislative and regulatory measures, together with judicial activism 
                                                          
313
 M. ROSENFELD, Affirmative Action and Justice, A Philosophical and Constitutional Inquiry, Yale 
University Press, New Haven-London, 1991, p. 5. 
314
 N. BOBBIO, Sulle sanzioni positive, in Scritti in onore di Antonio Raselli, Giuffrè, Milano, 1971, pp. 
227 ss; see also, G. LOMBARDI, Funzione promozionale del diritto, Pubblica Amministrazione e 
‘sanzioni positive’, in Amministrare, vol. 1, 1976, (pp. 98-118), pp. 98 ss; G. GAVAZZI, Diritto 
premiale e diritto promozionale, Giuffrè, Milano, 1983, pp. 37 ss. 
315
 R. DWORKIN, I diritti presi sul serio, translated by G. Rebuffa, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1982, p. 297; see 
also, A. CERRI, Eguaglianza giuridica ed egualitarismo, Japadre, L’Acquila, 1984, p. 35. 
316
 See, L. TRIBE, American Constitutional Law, 2
nd
 ed., Foundation Press, New York, 1987, pp. 1521 
ss; M. ROSENFELD, Ibid; M. ANIS, Le azioni positive e principio d’eguaglianza, in Giurisprudenza 
costituzionale, 1992, pp. 582 ss.; L. GIANFORMAGGIO, Eguaglianza e differenza: sono veramente 
incompatibili?, in G. BONACCHI & A. GROPPI (eds.), Il dilemma della cittadinanza. Diritti e doveri 
delle donne, Laterza, Roma, 1993, pp. 214 ss; L. ANTIONOLLI DEFLORIAN, Breve quadro ricostruttivo 
delle azioni positive nel sistema giuridico statunitense, in S. SCARPONI (ed.), Le parti opportunità nella 
rappresentenza politica e nell’accesso al lavoro. I sistemi di ‘quote’ al vaglio di legittimità, Università 
degli Studi di Trento, Trento, 1997, pp. 119 ss;  
130 
 
in this context, were broadly accepted in the U.S. during the first years of their 
elaboration; it was evident that a sort of compensation was due to those (blacks) who 
had suffered slavery and segregation. Stereotypes and prejudice were so deeply 
endorsed in society that affirmative actions represented a valid and fast solution for 
including blacks and promoting their societal status.  
The Supreme Court that in Plessy v. Fergusson
317
 established the ‘separate but 
equal doctrine
318’ – arguing that the phenomena of segregation was justified since it 
mirrored division in society and it prevented racial conflicts  – reversed its opinion in 
Green v. New Kent County Board of Education
319
 stating that the State should 
promote racial integration favoring the inclusion of Afro-American in schools. As 
rightly underlined by some scholars, the adoption of affirmative action was not only 
relevant for those who were favored by these measures, it also constituted a benefit 
for society as a whole; ‘the integration of police forces through strong affirmative 
action has often led to better relations between minority communities and the police, 
a result that improved public safety for all’320. 
The U.S. model had a great impact on other legal systems – such as in European 
countries and within the EU as a supranational organization – though different 
reasons have prompted the adoption of special measures for enhancing equality. In 
the U.S. the ideological frame was centered on ‘compensation’, while in Europe 
affirmative action have been considered as an instrument of promotion. In other 
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words, in U.S. affirmative action are enshrined in a complex discussion about the 
negative behaviors of previous generations, in Europe they represent part of a broader 
debate about the achievement of full equality among and between groups. It is 
possible that for this reasons, while in Europe affirmative actions are still conceived a 
viable and legitimate solution against de facto discrimination, in the U.S. their 
legitimacy is now put into question.  
Indeed, during the 1980s, the idea that affirmative actions were raising more 
problems than providing a solution to the problem of discrimination, started to be 
questioned by the policy-makers, legal expert, and the judiciary. One of the first 
elements called into question was the idea that affirmative action would function as 
an element of inclusion. Opponents argued that ‘forcing inclusion’ – despite the 
honorable intention of rebalancing – had the effect of exacerbating marginalization 
and exclusion of those benefiting from reverse discrimination. This claim was based 
on the assumption that affirmative action implicitly create a difference among 
individuals which might emphasize the perception of superiority: individuals who 
benefit from affirmative would be perceived as unable to compete on an equal basis 
with others members of society
321
.  
Nonetheless, a deeper speculation leads to another conclusion: marginalized 
groups are historically in a lower societal position, and adopting preferential 
treatments represents a way of reversing this trend; thus, if in society the paradigm 
superiority/inferiority is already well-established, it does not make sense to oppose 
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measures aimed at restoring a balance among and between groups pointing out that 
these measures create marginalization. Marginalization was there before the adoption 
of compensative measures. 
Another argument against the adoption of special legal provisions for 
discriminated groups is based on the idea that affirmative policies would actually be 
detrimental for historically stigmatized minorities. According to this view, favoring 
some individuals would undermine peaceful social cohabitation since it would create 
intense inter-groups resentment. The un-favored group would perceive compensative 
(promotional) legislative measures as anti-meritocratic and dysfunctional for society 
as a whole (would you be cured by a doctor hired in a hospital solely on the basis of 
his/her race/gender?).  
In this context, the meritocratic argument seems to be the most convincing
322
. Of 
course, each person should be granted better opportunity proportionally to what s/he 
deserves in relation to his/her capacity. Nonetheless, it would be naïve to ignore that 
the ‘starting point’ and the ‘relational network one is living in’ heavily influences the 
individual’s chance to achieve a good position in society. . The idea that a ‘golden 
age’ governed by meritocratic standards has ever existed is ill-founded, or at least to 
be demonstrated.  
There is also another argument focusing on self-esteem: those targeted by 
affirmative action would perceive themselves as morally and physically inferior since 
what they eventually earned is not linked to their capacity but only to their belonging 
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to one group, thus causing the lowering of the internal morale of a community
323
. By 
contrast, one should be able to verify whether this feeling is real, i.e., sociological 
studies should prove this is what the minority feels (while it is easy to prove the 
contrary, that is, minorities ask for rebalancing and redistribution).  
Indeed, it should not be underestimated that if an individual has been historically 
discriminated it is more likely s/he could perceive affirmative action as an 
opportunity to finally meet his/her own aspirations on an equal basis rather than 
provoking a sense of moral disvalue. Indeed, the stigma suffered by a minority (or in 
the case of gender by females, or the in the case of sexual orientation by LGBTI 
people) is particular relevant in relation to many jobs requiring relatively little 
specialized training, so that, if a person has undergone his/her training and he/she is 
hired according to a system of quotas there is no reason to suspect that person is less 
qualified or morally inferior than his/her historically-advantaged counterpart. 
Bearing in mind these objections to affirmative action, now it is useful to analyze 
when and how these measures should be considered a legitimate instrument to 
remove discrimination in society. First, these measures must be justified: according to 
Isaiah Berlin, while there is no need to justify an equal treatment, a differentiation 
must be justified
324
; this explains why legislation providing for special adjustments 
for those in vulnerable positions are usually accompanied by explicit motivations. 
Indeed, when the legislator (or a private company) derogates from the general 
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principle of equality (formal equality) a clear compelling interest must be pursued
325
.  
Another fundamental component is represented by the ‘temporary element’: whether 
it is needed to derogate from the normalcy, this must be clearly an exception limited 
in time. Conversely, favoring one group over the others without a temporal limit 
would likely create the basis for a consolidated reverse discrimination, i.e. instead of 
‘equalizing situations’ the result would be creating a new discriminated category.  
In this sense, affirmative action could be considered a ‘legal antibiotic’: once the 
patient has been cured it would be harmful to continue the therapy. Using this 
metaphor, it is possible to explain also why ‘proportionality’ together with 
‘rationality’ is another key element. If it has been identified the best antibiotic for a 
specific disease (rationality), and the necessary dose of antibiotic is 1mg-pill per/day 
it is deleterious to take twice the dose. Thus, if for example the legislator wants to 
enhance women participation, it would be disproportionate a legislation proscribing 
that the 80 % of the seats in the Parliament should be reserved as a fixed quota for 
females
326
. 
 
6. Considering equality in the case of same-sex unions 
 
When LGBTI people started their struggle for achieving public recognition in 
society the issue of marriage was not an issue at all. The main concerns were to 
decriminalize homosexual behaviors and combating discrimination against LGBTI 
people in everyday life. During ‘the sexual revolution’ in the 1970s, people belonging 
to sexual minorities envisaged the possibility to stand before discriminatory state 
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legislation and fight politically and judicially those homophobic elements in 
society
327
. Hence, legal recognition of homosexual families represented a second 
stage in the fought against discrimination  
Denmark was the first country in which same-sex unions were legally recognized. 
The Danish legislator granted gay people the right to register their partnerships 
(registreret partnerskab) providing them almost the same guarantees offered to 
heterosexual married couples
328
. The Netherlands was the first State which has 
introduced the possibility for same-sex partners to get married in 2001
329
. It first 
allowed same-sex unions the possibility to register their relations in 1998
330
 and 
subsequently opened the legal institution of marriage also to same-sex couples. Other 
EU Member States have followed the Dutch example.  In Belgium registered 
cohabitation was allowed since 2000
331
 and same-sex marriage became legal in 
2003
332. In Spain, under Zapatero’s government, notwithstanding strong political 
opposition by the Catholic Church and the Popular Party, same-sex marriage was 
introduced in 2005
333
. In Sweden it was possible for same-sex unions to be legally 
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registered since 1995
334
, and by 2009 marriage was also permitted to same-sex 
partners
335
. In Portugal de facto unions were recognized since 2001
336
 and marriage 
was eventually allowed in 2010 after the decision of the Tribunal Constitucional
 
n.121/2010
337
. 
In other EU Member States, although strictly speaking marriage remains an 
exclusively heterosexual legal institution, the forms of recognition, such as 
registration, have been adopted with characteristics which make these new legal 
institutions comparable if not identical to marriage. By 2011, sixteen of the twenty-
seven EU Member States, representing roughly the 65 percent of the ‘EU population’, 
have already adopted legislation recognizing same-sex unions
338
.In addition, since in 
the majority of the cases were same-sex marriage is allowed or  were same-sex 
couples can benefit from other legal means for recognition, rights related to adoption 
are restricted if not excluded, it is possible to argue that apart from some exceptions, 
same-sex marriage and registered partnerships result very similar (or comparable, see 
chapter I, the ECJ’s new developments).  
Thus, it could be affirmed, by observing non-harmonious legislative choices made 
by States on this subject, that ‘marriage’ is not ‘the solution’. Instead, it could be said 
that it represents one of the possible legal instruments able to provide recognition to 
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same-sex unions
339
. Thus a question arises: why should a legal system opt for 
marriage? Would it be better to choose another type of legal institution? These 
questions should be preliminarily answered before discussing the legal reasoning 
behind constitutional courts’ decision on this issue. As first step, it is useful to recall 
the main arguments opposed to the legal recognition of same-sex unions.  
One of the main arguments put forward to impose a differential treatment of 
individuals within the institution of marriage is that the primary aim of marriage is 
procreation
340.  The argument of procreation or “finalized marriage” is commonly 
considered weak in light of the number of couples without children, or by observing 
how legal systems do not prevent individuals to enter into marriage in non-fertile 
age
341
. In addition, if procreation would be the aim, then it would be reasonable to 
forbid the use of contraception
342
.  Others opposed to same-sex marriage argue that 
policy-makers should only allow traditional families to get married since otherwise 
the concept of family would be undermined, and this would lead to a lower birth-rate. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies have shown how allowing same-sex partners to marry 
did not lead to a decrease in the number of heterosexual marriage (or increased 
divorce) and how the birth rate has not been influenced
343
. As Eskridge notices, 
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instead of negative impact on heterosexual marriage, allowing same-sex marriage has 
contributed to resuscitate marriage among heterosexuals
344
.  
Other objections refer to the admissibility of certain limitations on the ability to 
marry given that States are interested in promoting health, safety, and stability, thus, 
for these reasons they may justify prohibiting or not recognizing certain types of 
marriages, such as incestuous, underage, or polygamous.  However, the health and 
consent rationales that justify the prohibition of such marriages are not applicable to 
same-sex unions. States prohibit consanguineous marriages because such unions both 
threaten the biological health of the family. Same-sex marriages, however, cannot 
increase the chance of genetic deterioration. States prohibit underage marriages 
because the parties are not old enough to give meaningful consent, but the parties 
who enter same-sex relationships, and ask for legal recognition, are adults whose 
consent is presumed to be meaningful.   
Finally, States prohibit polygamous marriages because such marriages might 
undermine the stability of family relationships. More specifically, the multiplicity of 
parties in polygamous marriages raises concerns about knowledge and consent, 
support, and inheritance. Same-sex adult couples involve no more parties, and 
therefore raise no more concerns, than non-polygamous heterosexual marriages do. 
The distinction between the number of parties and gender of parties also provides the 
logical rope that prevents a slide down the slippery slope. 
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Another argument put forward, is the importance of tradition. This is the leitmotiv 
of the reasoning proposed by those who identify in marriage a pre-legal value to be 
defended against any argument in favor of same-sex unions recognition.  
Nonetheless, this position does not take into consideration that traditions change 
over time. The history of marriage is neither monolithic nor as monogamous as 
sometimes it is suggested.  In recent years, contracts have come to provide a 
significant alternative to marital status for governing reciprocal economic relations of 
couples and this trend has reduced the differences between married and unmarried 
couples.   
As underlined by Wintemute:  
The progression from the second stage of ‘sex rights’ to the third stage of ‘love 
rights’ requires a society to acknowledge that there is more to the lives of LGBT 
individuals than a search for sexual pleasure, or a need to change their physical 
appearance and dress. Rather they have the same human capacity as 
heterosexual and non-transsexual individuals to fall in love with another person, 
to establish a long-term emotional and physical relationship with them, and 
potentially to want to raise children with them. When they choose to do so, they 
will often want the same opportunities as heterosexual individuals to be treated 
as a ‘couple’, as ‘spouses’, as ‘parents’, as a ‘family’345. 
Therefore, arguments against legal recognition of same-sex couples could not 
reasonably prevent legislative authorities to legalize relations between couples of 
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same-sex. Legal recognition is matter of citizenship. It works against the formation of 
second-class citizens. EU countries – with some exceptions – clearly express a trend 
that goes in the direction of ‘providing rights’ to homosexual families instead of 
limiting them. It follows that the most interesting question is not whether recognition 
should be provided, but what kind of legal solution should be adopted. As discussed 
in chapter I, the guardian of fundamental rights, i.e. supreme courts, are now ready to 
acknowledge the existence of homosexuals’ rights also in relation to family matters. 
Nevertheless, if on the one hand national courts have supported the idea that 
‘indifference’ constitutes a violation of fundamental freedoms, on the other hand they 
have preferred not to interfere with the legislative. 
 In other words, could marriage be considered the standard ideal type to regulate 
family relations?  It is interesting to consider the opinions of those who advocate for 
recognition pro or contra the enhancement of the concept of marriage.  
This question, if considered in the light of the previous section when the principle 
of equality has been discussed, is of crucial importance. Indeed, if marriage is 
considered ‘the standard’, a possible conclusion is that equality in this case does not 
mean the recognition of differences but homologation. Hence, regardless of the fact 
that homosexuals have not participated in the elaboration of the notion of marriage, 
and might not conceive marriage as a viable solution, if they want to be equal they 
should conform.  
On the contrary, those who advocate for same-sex marriage argue that establishing 
different legal models for persons of same-sex would prompt the idea of second class 
citizens. As suggested by Merin, ‘the fact that models are self-consciously separate 
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from marriage [explains why] marriage substitutes constitute second-class 
marriage
346
.  This position seems to imply that marriage is per se a human rights, thus 
it should be enjoyed by all regardless of their sexual orientation. For this reason, 
some authors suggest that ‘substitute legal institutions’ represent one of the steps 
toward the achievement of same-sex marriage
347
. 
It seems, again, the scheme inferior/superior (see section 2). This is a reasonable 
position, but If marriage is understood as the only instrument available (or the best), 
and if the focus is not on the right to form a family but on marriage, then diversity 
might blurs into homologation. Indeed, in contrast with the idea that marriage is the 
ultimate equal rights goal
348
 for gays and lesbians, opponents argue that marriage is 
an element representing a historical site of oppression for women
349
, and the 
introduction of same-sex marriage may reduce the possibilities for wider-reaching 
reform of marriage increasing the possibilities of assimilation of same-sex 
relationships into the heterosexual norm
350
. In addition, as highlighted by Butler, by 
extending same-sex couples the possibility to marry, marriage itself would be 
strengthened as a legal institution, further marginalizing those on the outside of this 
institution
351
.  
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Indeed, as other authors suggest, marriage might instead represent a conservative 
position in society, since historically has been a heterosexual prerogative. Thus the 
need to enhance the scope of marriage as to cover also homosexuals might derive 
more from the necessity to feel similar to the heterosexual mainstream rather than 
configuring a solution for the achievement of full equality
352
.  
The balance between these two positions might be found in the possibility to 
provide individuals both instruments, i.e. allowing persons to opt freely for one or the 
other legal institution (marriage or registered partnership), thus leaving on individuals 
the decision on what better responds to their interests. However, the trend in the EU 
countries shows a different approach: in the majority of the cases, either individuals 
can enter into matrimony or can enter into registration (e.g. in Germany, Hungary, 
etc.). 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
As reminded in the introduction of this chapter, one of the first questions 
advocates of LGBTI people’s rights must answer – in relation to the issue of same-
sex unions’ legal recognition – concerns the reasons why it is possible to argue that 
non-recognition infringes LGBTI people’s rights in light of the principle of equality. 
Hence, the discussion about rights, or as this research points out, ‘the duty to 
recognize’ requires a speculation about the meaning of equality and its translation in 
concreto. In opposition to those arguments that perceive equality as an empty 
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concept, to be given for granted in a system of rights, this chapter has contested the 
idea that equality is a self-evident concept. 
Indeed, as underlined also in chapter I, equality does change its meaning over time 
and legislation change accordingly. The selected cases examined in the first chapter 
have shown how both the legislator and judicial actors have begun to consider the 
rights of homosexual families as deserving the same attention of others. The example 
of the ECJ in this context is emblematic: while in Grant
353
 there was no ground of 
discrimination to be addressed, in Maruko
354
 and Römer
355
 the situation has 
drastically changed. Portugal represents a further evidence of this assumption: the 
approval of same-sex marriage has considerably changed the situation of homosexual 
couples. 
To discuss the importance of speculating about equality, this chapter has firstly 
introduced the arguments elaborated in feminist and critical studies regarding the 
various dimensions of equality considering how the use of the word equality 
represents more than a semantic issue about this concept. Thus, from descriptive 
equality to evaluative equality, it has been highlighted how equality operates in terms 
of superior/inferior, therefore posing the basis for discrimination. 
A multidisciplinary approach has thus been adopted to understand how social 
norms are created and how stereotypes penetrate society. Sociology of law has 
contributed in explaining how equality is value-driven, and social-psychology has 
introduced stigmatization and marginalization as the typical element of conceiving 
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equals in terms of likeness. As debated, societies and legal systems are built around 
principles which are ethically, morally, politically constructed. Thus, equality cannot 
be considered as an obvious and separate concept. Instead, its meaning is redefined 
according to exigencies of the period under analysis. As illustrated, judges in this 
context can play the crucial role of detecting changes in society and addressing new 
claims accordingly. 
The dichotomy between formal equality and substantial equality has been analyzed 
to comprehend how these two concepts are to be conceived as two complementary 
elements in the elaboration of policies of inclusion. Within this logical frame, 
references have been made to the ECJ’s case law to stress how the Luxembourg court 
has changed its attitude toward the principle of nondiscrimination. 
In the last section, this chapter has firstly examined those arguments against the 
legal recognition of same-sex unions in order to verify their consistency. As 
discussed, the main weakness of these positions is to be found in their rationale (e.g. 
the association of polygamy and same-sex partners does not convince). Secondly, this 
section has approached the discussion about the possibility to grant same-sex unions 
either through ‘marriage’ or by other legal means. As debated, if the principle of 
equality is conceived as an element for the promotion of diversity, instead of a tool of 
minimizing differences, it cannot be argued that ‘the duty to recognize’, as described 
in chapter I, can be fulfilled only by opening up the heterosexual marriage. 
In conclusion, this chapter, in connection with chapter I, has emphasized the 
reasons behind judicial developments in the context of same-sex unions, by pointing 
out the fluidity of the concept equality. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN A DEMOCRATIC AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
 
Summary: Introduction; 1. The constitutional judge; 2. Constitutionalism; 3. 
Constituent power; 5. Constituent power and the EU: what is missing?; 5. The 
legitimacy of the EU multilevel system of protection of fundamental rights. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first chapter of this research, a comparative analysis of the case law 
associated with the issue of same-sex unions in the EU has been provided to 
understand the attitude of the judiciary, at different jurisdictional levels, towards 
claims brought by same-sex partners before courts. In particular, it has been verified 
whether courts acknowledge the existence of a duty upon states in this respect. The 
second chapter has investigated the evolution and the changing intrinsic nature of the 
concept of equality stressing the importance of reconsidering equality when debating 
about rights, or states’ obligations.  
Both chapters have tried to conceptualized in concreto the implications associated 
with the transformation of the understanding of rights associated with the idea of 
family, or more generally, ‘basic social units’. However, the first two chapters have 
remained silent on ‘the issue of legitimacy’. Specifically, if the ‘duty to recognize’ 
exists, and if ‘indifference’ constitutes a violation of fundamental rights, who is in 
charge of detecting this ‘duty’ and/or condemning ‘indifference’? In addition, if a 
violation persists, how should judges behave? Purpose of this third chapter is to 
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understand what is the role a constitutional court, or as in the case of the ECJ a quasi-
constitutional judge, in a context where a fundamental right does not find protection 
and is ignored by the political majority. 
Therefore, the aim of this part is to understand the role supreme judges might play 
in a constitutional democratic system when interpreting and enhancing the scope of 
the meaning of fundamental rights provisions through judicial law-making. This 
theoretical speculation can help to comprehend why, though same-sex unions’ non-
recognition constitutes a violation of fundamental rights, this does not automatically 
lead to judicial intervention.   
As this research tries to demonstrate, when judges are asked to address 
minoritarian claims which do not find a way to enter into the political decision-
making process, they need to consider not only the interests of the conflicting parties 
but also whether it is appropriate to intervene ‘judicially’ or rather be deferential, thus 
leaving in ‘the hands of politics’ the decision on whether, and how to deal with a 
given issue.  
Hence, to understand the attitude of judges, i.e. the reasons why judicial activism 
or restraint prevails over a given period, such as the period under analysis (2008-
2011), it is necessary to frame the argument in a broader context considering the 
theories regarding the role of the constitutional judge. Indeed, as stated in the 
introduction of this thesis, one of the purpose of this research is also to understand 
whether there is now, after the EU Charter of Rights has become binding, a broader 
margin of intervention for judges. Undeniably, the number of cases pending before 
courts involving the issue of same-sex unions’ recognition is likely to increase in the 
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next future. However, this theoretical effort is not made to elaborate statistics or to 
predict future judges’ behavior. Instead, the argument of this chapter is whether it 
would be appropriate and desirable an affirmation of rights through judicial law-
making in the specific context of same-sex unions.  
As a matter of fact, these two issues, i.e. appropriateness and desirability are of 
crucial importance. The first is mainly related to legitimacy: in a constitutional 
democratic system the separation of powers would endow the legislator with the 
competence to decide over family matters, thus defining social policy through 
legislation, while leaving the judicial power a residual role to be exercised in 
exceptional cases. 
To what concerns desirability, this aspect is related to the possibility, considering 
what has been discussed in chapter II, of conceiving different legal solutions as more 
or less responding to the principle of equality meant as a tool able to promote 
differences. In other words, if in a given system there is no legal recognition for 
same-sex unions, and the only option is to open up marriage through judicial law-
making, this solution could only partially resolve the issue of discrimination between 
‘couples’, since for some individuals marriage would still represent a heterosexual 
legal institution. 
   This chapter in the first section explores theories of constitutional interpretation. 
The issue of ‘counter-majoritarian’ judicial law-making is examined to evaluate what 
are the interpretative margins for creative judicial elaborations in a democratic system 
where the separation of powers might be regarded as imposing judicial restraint in 
matters usually of legislative competence.  
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Accordingly, the second sections examines ‘constitutionalism’ as a system of ideas 
developed by philosophers, political scientists, and legal scholars. In particular, a 
description of the main schools of thought that led to the elaboration of contemporary 
constitutions is offered in order to explain how the process of theoretical elaboration 
has led to the introduction of constitutional courts. On this premise, the third section 
approaches the argument of what ‘constituent power’ is, and how it should be 
considered by judicial authorities. This concept is developed to understand those 
difficulties in the interpretation of constitutional texts in a changing society, i.e. the 
difficulty to reconcile literal provisions written at the time the constitution has been 
adopted with the exigencies a society might subsequently express.  
The fourth section examines the concept of constituent power from an EU 
perspective, analyzing the theory of multilevel constitutionalism in order to verify 
whether the EU structure might represent a constitutional system even the absence of 
the classical State-structure. 
In section five, the chapter describes the European system for the protection of 
fundamental rights explaining its multilevel structure. Specifically, it underlines how 
the relations between different levels of adjudication are heterarchically organized 
instead of following a hierarchic scheme, thus raising the issue of legitimacy within 
this system. This in turn might allow the development of a dialogic process of 
redefinition of the meaning of rights. 
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1. The constitutional judge  
 
In a democratic constitutional system the role played by a constitutional court is of 
crucial of importance for two main reasons: (1) it ensures the resolution for those 
conflicts occurring between state’s organs, i.e., it decides whether according to the 
constitution one institution has exclusive or concurring competence on a specific 
subject; (2) it rules on whether laws that are challenged before it are constitutional or 
infringe constitutional rights enshrined in the constitution
356
.  
Since this research has analyzed the role constitutional courts have played in the 
specific context of same-sex unions, this second point is now the main reference to be 
considered. Nondiscrimination and legal recognition of these unions, in the light of 
constitutionally, supranationally, and internationally defined principles, are 
investigated from the perspective of what constitutional courts could do to when 
addressing this issue. 
 Of course, though the first point is not the predominant reference, it would be 
inappropriate to underestimate the fact that, when deciding over one subject, a 
supreme court should also verify whether it is in its competence to intervene. In other 
words, as it is shown in this thesis, when deciding over some relevant issues such as 
the legal recognition of same-sex couples, a court has primarily to assess whether it is 
competent to solve the issue judicially or whether it might solely recall other 
constitutional powers to do so (e.g. the Italian judgment n.138/2010, see chapter I, 
section 1.1.).  
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Indeed, in light of the democratic principle of the separation of powers, 
constitutional adjudication might be subjected to strong criticism by those who 
believe the legislative power should not be censored by a non-representative state’s 
organs. As underlined by Habermas, ‘the competition between the constitutional 
court and the democratically elected legislature becomes acute primarily in the sphere 
of abstract judicial review
357’. 
A constitutional court, at least formally, neither adds nor creates anything: norms 
enshrined in the constitution possess their specific meanings which have to be 
reminded whenever laws seem to ignore them. However, despite the meaning of 
constitutional provisions might seem self-evident, thus binding judges in their 
interpretation, the operation constitutional judges have to carry out is neither a 
mathematical equation nor an application of syllogism
358
.  
When analyzing constitutional courts’ case law, what is immediately clear is that 
judicial decision-making is a complex process of balancing. Indeed, ‘if no value can 
claim to have an inherently unconditional priority over other values, this weighting 
operation transforms the interpretation of established law into the business of 
realizing values by giving them concrete shape in relation to specific cases
359’.  In 
this respect, the example provided by the two analyzed Portuguese judgments, 
namely ruling 359/2009
360
 and ruling 121/2010
361
, shows how judicial interpretation 
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is able to address differently the same issue depending on the question concerned. In 
fact, the Tribunal Constitucional has realized the right to marry for same-sex unions 
by acknowledging first that there was no constitutional obligation
362
, and second that 
there was no constitutional ban
363
 (see, chapter I, section 1.4). 
Therefore, justices are not in charge of discovering the true meaning of the 
constitution, and the normative understanding of principles might be subjected to 
different interpretations according to the constitutional system under analysis. Since 
provisions are made of words, these words are contextualized. However, words have 
their own meanings and this represents one of the main aspects/limits of judicial 
interpretation, i.e. meanings cannot be unlimitedly/unreasonably overstretched.  
A legal provision is the literal transposition of a rule, or a value, which is not a 
concrete thing (though it leads to concrete consequences). It falls within the realm of 
intellectual activity, thus judges must preliminarily construe the meanings of these 
words and subsequently interpret them
364
. Then, the question on how the process of 
interpretation should be carried out becomes crucial.  
One possibility is represented by textualism. According to this theory of statutory 
interpretation, the interpreter should consider the ordinary meaning of the words 
composing legal provisions. In doing so, the interpreter is more similar to a reader, 
i.e. any reference to ‘history’ or ‘socio-political evolutions’ is deemed unnecessary 
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since interpretation is strictly linked to the meaning a person could objectively and 
reasonably attribute to the words of the provision.  
In contrast with ‘intentionalism’, a legal theory according to which the interpreter 
should also consider the legislature’s intentions beyond the mere literal transposition 
of a rule, textualism opposes that it would be unreasonable to conceive a ‘genuine 
collective intent’ of representatives, and that considering legislative history as a tool 
for the interpretation of norms would offend the constitutionally mandated process of 
bicameralism
365
. In this theoretical frame, a constitutional judge is bound by the text 
and creative interpretation of constitutional principles would betray his/her mandate. 
A similar but not identical line of reasoning is adopted by those who embrace 
‘originalism’. This approach has developed in the USA366 while in Europe has not 
been invoked as a driving principle by judges. It is possible to distinguish two 
subcategories of originalism, namely ‘the original intent theory’ and ‘the original 
meaning theory’. According to the former, a supreme court is in charge of 
reconstructing the intent of the drafter when interpreting constitutional provisions.  
It follows that judges should ascertain as accurately as possible what drafters 
meant by the words they used. Therefore, clarification might be found in the 
legislative history of the bill but any departure from the ‘true and original’ meaning is 
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allowed. The latter, which tends to overlap textualism to some extent, holds that the 
interpretation of a constitution should be based on what a reasonable person, living at 
the time of its adoption, would have conceived as the actual meaning of the used 
words
367
. 
In both cases, originalism is a principle of interpretation that imposes 
constitutional courts to discover ‘the original truth’ of the constitution. The 
preservation of the legal system, the safeguard of the status quo is the primary aim of 
this theoretical approach. Thus, judges are not supposed to create, amend, or interpret 
laws entering into conflict with the legislative branch.  
Consequently, the constitutional meanings of norms might not undergo an 
evolution adhering to transformations in society. Indeed, if the focal point of the 
interpretative reasoning rests on the framers’ conception, judicial review (but also the 
legislative power) cannot legitimately enhance the scope of application of 
constitutional provisions maintaining their literal form. As a consequence, 
constitutional amendments would be necessary each time a new social demand has 
emerged.  
The case of LGBTI rights can provide an enlightening example in this context: 
since no issue was raised at the time the constitution was elaborated, their legal 
recognition and inclusion would be impossible unless the constitution is amended 
accordingly. Within the originalist theory, the example provided in chapter I 
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concerning Portugal would not be acceptable, since marriage would remain inevitably 
confined in its historical interpretation with no possibility to undergo transformation. 
However, according to another school of thought, the meaning of constitutional 
provisions might change over the time given that a constitution should be understood 
as a ‘living instrument368’. Conceiving the constitution as a ‘living constitution’ 
allows the text to be adaptable to modern issues without forcing the legislative to pass 
new amendments (which are indeed procedurally complex and often require greater 
parliamentary majority). According to this perspective, the constitution is phrased in 
broad and flexible terms in order to promote a dynamic understanding of 
constitutional provisions. 
In the western world, though accompanied by criticism by part of the legal 
scholarship, this conceptualization of the constitutional text has been effectively 
embraced by supreme courts. Particularly in the European scenario, national, 
supranational and international courts have adhered to this line of reasoning, 
specifically in the field of fundamental rights protection
369
. This conception follows 
the idea that fundamental freedoms might undergo transformation through 
reinterpretation, to the extent that even those claims previously considered 
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unconceivable can find protection. Adopting Dworkin’s classification, while rules 
posses their own ‘rigidity’ as far as they identify concrete procedural aspects, 
principles are in need of interpretation due to their nature as general principles
370
. A 
constitutional judge is hence in charge of operating a pragmatic recognition of 
changes in society in order to reconcile abstract literal provisions to concrete cases. 
As underlined in chapter II when discussing the sociological dimension of law, 
judges might detect changes in society and balancing different constitutional values 
accordingly (see, chapter II, section 3) 
The process of democratization and cooperation among states has meant the 
beginning of a dialogue between different cultural traditions, which has taken place at 
different levels among different actors. The legal doctrine has not been immune from 
this process of interacting. Opinions, ideas, approaches have become soon familiar to 
every person working in a specific field. Judges, as other important actors of the 
organized social life become more and more prone to the idea of exploring new legal 
understandings coming from other legal traditions. Indeed, as shown in chapter I, 
national judges have framed their reasoning looking for guidance in other legal 
experience. In the case of Hungary, the German experience has been used to strike 
down the 2007 Hungarian Act CLXXXIV, introducing the institution of registered 
partnerships resembling marriage
371
 (see chapter I, section 1.3) 
As many scholars recognize, it is now usual for judges to refer to decisions of 
foreign jurisdictions, particularly, when interpreting domestic human rights 
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guarantees. The phenomenon of borrowing and transplantating relevant precedents is 
now more than an episodic attitude
372
. As explained in last section of this chapter, in 
the EU this dialogic process, mostly between national courts of MSs and the ECJ, has 
contributed to the harmonization of the EU legal space. Conversely, supranational 
and international tribunals faced with analogous legal issues might refer to domestic 
courts’ decisions373.  
According to Kirsh, the reasons influencing this dialogic process between courts 
are mainly three: attitudinal, normative, and strategic. The attitudinal factor refers to 
the behavior of judges in relation to their political view, i.e. it assumes that, on 
average, conservative judges should have a stronger nationalist attitude that makes 
them more skeptical over the possibility to look at foreign case law, while left-leaning 
judges should be more inclined towards judicial dialogue (in terms of referring to 
outside sources)
374
.   
The strategic factor regards the possibility to favor or contrast judicial dialogue in 
order to obtain legitimacy or, conversely, strengthening the position and the authority 
of the court as an autonomous institution
375
. The normative factor is related to the 
judges’ cultural heritages, i.e., the attitude of judges would be shaped by their 
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psychological internalization and socialization of constitutional settings. For instance, 
if the predominant idea among judges is that of parliamentary supremacy, it is more 
likely that this will lead to some skepticism as regard to the possibility to refer to 
foreign jurisprudence or to accept supranational supremacy claims
376
.  
However, since supreme judges do not represent a constituency, i.e. they do not 
have to follow a political agenda, this interpretive operation must be carried out 
bearing in mind that their legitimacy can be questioned whenever they decide in a 
counter-majoritarian fashion. Accordingly, if judges examine the purpose of the law, 
they must examine also the ethical, the social, and economic objective that the law is 
pursuing contextualizing the legal reasoning in historical terms
377
. Nonetheless, 
judicial discretion cannot be unlimited. The pursued aim must be consistent with the 
values of the legal system (as they are or as they have presumably changed). In this 
scenario, judges find themselves at the center of the dispute between those who 
oppose conservative arguments to judicial activism and those who claim that the 
meaning associated to constitutional provisions is never definitive.  
As Habermas argues, the main problem posed to judges is how to preserve 
simultaneously the certainty of law, its rightness, and the legitimacy of the judicial 
decision-making process
378
. Since decisions at judicial level must be consistent in 
their rationality, constitutional judges must justify their decisions adopting a line of 
reasoning able to overcome the risk of losing legitimacy. Hence, the counter-
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majoritarian dilemma and the related issues of legitimacy for ‘judicial intervention’ 
might become an obstacle for supreme courts. 
The definition ‘counter-majoritarian difficulty’ was first adopted by Bickel in 
1961, who explained how judicial review could be conceived illegitimate to extent it 
allows the unelected individuals (judges) to overrule what elected representatives 
have decided
379
. In this conception, democracy is assumed to be legitimate as far as it 
implements the majority’s will; democracy is thus ‘reduced’ to its procedural 
dimension and the problem of enforcing constitutional rights even against the will of 
the temporary political majority is unconsidered.  
This concern emerges particularly in those environments characterized by political 
pluralism, where constitutional courts might favor differentiation through judicial 
law-making, or might prompt conformity
380
. In both cases judicial review poses a 
risk: (1) undermining the perception of legitimacy on the side of constitutional judges 
by affording non-majoritarian views legal recognition; (2) discouraging the 
democratic political debate by diminishing pluralism, hence ‘freezing’ democracy on 
majoritarian positions
381
.  
In legal doctrine, some scholars emphasize how judicial law-making relates to 
compensation, i.e. constitutional interpretation operates as safeguard and reparation 
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for abuses
382
. Thus, courts would act as engines of principles and judges would be in 
charge of shaping the meaning of constitutional values to make rights concretely 
available
383
. Again, the main issue is translated into a problem of interpretation (what 
approach, among textualism, original intent, living instrument, etc. should prevail?), 
rather than focusing on the structural position a supreme court occupies in its 
constitutional democratic system ‘to secure’ its legitimacy. 
Indeed, according to those who support judicial intervention, since a constitutional 
democratic system is made of several political checks also on constitutional judges 
(e.g. the way judges are appointed) the counter-majoritarian dilemma is a moot point. 
In this scheme, the risk that courts would be totally out of line vis-à-vis the majority 
of the population is ill-founded
384
.  In addition, other commentators argue that 
judicial law-making serves as the last resort for individual rights often disregarded by 
political majority. Instead of adopting a ‘counter-majoritarian dilemma’ approach, the 
non-majoritarian perspective is conceived as a structural feature of democratic 
regimes.  
Accordingly, supreme courts are perceived as one of the main instrument of 
democracy to preserve fundamental rights. Those who support this idea underline 
how in modern constitutional democracy the non-majoritarian attitude of courts is 
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inherently associated with the democratic necessity of enhancing the scope of 
fundamental rights despite the mood of political majority, thus going beyond the idea 
that legislative enactment is always needed to acknowledge changes in society
385
.  
In other words, in describing constitutional democratic systems, while the 
‘counter-majoritarian dilemma’ puts emphasis on the word ‘democratic’, the ‘non-
majoritarian attitude’ concentrates on the word ‘constitutional’, thus solving the 
problem of legitimacy in judicial law-making within the normalcy of constitutional 
checks and balances. In addition, at least by examining what has emerged from the 
comparison made in chapter I, it seems evident that when the issue of same-sex 
unions has been raised, judges has not attempted to substitute the legislator; 
conversely, they have reminded the legislative power, by acknowledging the 
existence of a duty to recognize, its duty to intervene. 
 
2. Constitutionalism  
After having analyzed where the process of judicial law-making finds its 
justification, it now necessary to understand in which theoretical frame constitutional 
courts have been enshrined, i.e. where their legitimacy comes from.  
Democratic regimes encompass a series of different mechanisms and institutions 
aimed at preserving the ‘civic cohabitation’ of several individuals’ and groups’ social 
instances
386
. Although interests in society might compete for their establishment as 
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social and legal norms, the democratic structure allows this competition to be 
conducted within a given set of rules. Liberal polities are thus constructed following 
the bedrock of separation of powers. In very general terms the legislative is in charge 
of making laws, the executive implement them through its administrative branches, 
and the judiciary applies them in case of disputes.  
There exists no accepted definition of ‘democracy’ since in both political science 
and legal doctrine a number of different explanations might be associated with the 
phenomenon ‘democracy’387. However, democracy in its Greek etymology demos-
kratos means ‘the people rule’388. In the modern idea of democracy, fundamental 
rights and their protection have also become one the relevant elements to classify a 
regime as a democratic one
389
. 
Therefore, participation, the protection of fundamental rights, and the separation of 
powers represent the main features for a democratic regime. Forms of participation 
are then regulated and developed through political institutions able to collect social 
instances and bring them into the democratic process of elaboration of the legal 
provisions.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
arranged. One of such components is elections. Many political scientists have also regarded democracy 
as a system where the “most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest and 
periodic elections” (S.P.Huntington). This electoralist approach has found many followers, especially 
before the 1990s. Further on the scholars of democracy have started including features corresponding 
to the established industrial democracy, which entails certain political, economic, and social features 
associated with social rights and the idea of welfare. See, L. WHITEHEAD,  Democratization, Theory 
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The democratic process of legislating needs to be built according to a predefined 
set of rules in order to provide legitimacy to potential outcomes deriving from the 
elaboration  at institutional level of individuals’ or groups’ interests. The perception 
of legitimacy stems from the recognition of a ‘common frame’ around which each 
and every social instance is formed, discussed, and eventually rejected or developed 
as a new legal instrument responding to need of a social claim. This ‘common frame’ 
is provided by the constitution. This ‘fundamental norm’ identifies: principles and 
fundamental rights; the separation of powers and its institutionalization; the 
functioning of democratic mechanisms through procedures legally predefined. 
In this context, it might seem that participation would play the key role in ensuring 
that societal demands are addressed properly. As long as electoral systems provide 
for the possibility of changing majority, and ‘the people’ is entitled to decide who 
will govern, there should be no concern. Nonetheless, in the contemporary debate 
about democracy and fundamental rights it is accepted that basic constitutional 
guarantees are not per se sufficient.  
As in the case of minority groups, it is possible that some groups’ interests are 
marginalized if the governing majority is not willing to dealt with them. It is better to 
clarify that the reference to minority in this context is not meant to refer to an 
electoral minority (e.g. a potential parliamentary opposition which might become a 
majority the next electoral turn), but instead it indicates a social group whose member 
are numerically unable to create a political majority. In this case, within democratic 
regimes constitutions provide means of protection through institutional mechanisms 
aimed at promoting and protecting minority groups’ interests (e.g. affirmative action). 
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However, despite those mechanisms constitutionally constructed for those 
belonging to specific minorities, there is a number of social instances which could be 
left apart by political parties, and thus disregarded and never addressed by the 
governing majority, despite changes in the political majority over the time. In this 
case, since as underlined above, the protection of fundamental rights remains an 
essential feature of democracy, the role of the constitutional judge has become more 
and more important in the interpretation and de facto application of fundamental 
rights through case law. Supreme courts (have) play(ed) in this context a specific role 
of protecting, even irrespective of the will of the majority (nonmajoritarian attitude), 
the rights of those who are unable to bring their claims directly to the legislative 
through elections. 
LGBTI people’s rights have often been addressed to constitutional courts in the 
lack of a political will to approach their claims. As shown in this research in chapter 
I, supreme courts have been repeatedly asked to investigate the meaning of equality 
in relation to LGBTI’s rights, and provide a solution for discrimination suffered by 
homosexuals. The ECJ’s cases of Maruko to Römer can provide a good example (see, 
chapter I, section 3.2.). 
To do so, it is necessary to investigate the meaning of constitutionalism, i.e. the 
process leading to the elaboration of contemporary democratic constitutions
390
 and 
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the establishment of those organs, namely constitutional courts, whose competence is 
to preserve a deformation of the constitutional order and ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights as enshrined in the constitution through their ‘evolving’ 
interpretation over the time. Constitutionalism is usually approached from a 
historical, philosophical, political, and legal perspective since this phenomenon can 
be observed historically, noting how its evolution has been influenced by the socio-
political and cultural environment in which it developed.  
For this reason, providing a comprehensive explanation of constitutionalism able 
to explain exhaustively its theoretical complexity through the investigation of the 
influence of each discipline mentioned above would be extremely arduous and would 
constitute a separate analysis. However, to provide the necessary theoretical 
background explaining the context in which supreme courts have been created and 
now operates, thus ‘grasping the structure’ of the speculative frame leading to their 
establishment,  it is possible to focus narrowly on some specific theoretical points 
developed in the western philosophical, political, and legal tradition
391
. 
Simplifying at the extreme, the consequences in the structure of contemporary 
democratic constitutional orders – deriving from the development of 
constitutionalism –  can be identified by observing how constitutional orders all 
posses: (1) an autonomous public sphere, i.e. politics is secularized and distinct from 
religion; (2) citizenship is the premise for being part of society, and from citizenship 
                                                                                                                                                                     
this declaration [section 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998] allows ministers to amend the legislation 
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stems the set of rights an individual is entitled to
392
; (3) fundamental rights are those 
values around which the collectivity recognizes itself; the task of protecting these 
rights is attributed to autonomous organs, usually a constitutional court
393
; (4) the 
exercise of power is legitimate because it stems from ‘the will of the people’ and it is 
lawful to the extent it respects the procedural rules established according to the 
constitution; (5) the separation of powers in a system of checks and balances 
integrated in the constitution
394
. 
These features might be observed, with some distinctions, in all western countries, 
and in particular in those countries where this research (chapter I) focuses its 
attention when considering the case law related to same-sex unions legal recognition 
in a comparative perspective. These structural constitutional characteristics represent 
the result of the influence of two main schools of philosophical thoughts, namely the 
Anglo-Saxon (common law) and the continental (civil law) constitutional traditions.  
These two competing ideas of the state and the citizen have been the most influential 
‘theoretical engine’ for the elaboration of modern and contemporary constitutions. 
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The analysis of western constitutions shows indeed how constitutional designs adhere 
to one or the other conception or even to both. 
Both conceptions refer to the theory of ‘the social contract395’, but their 
understanding of the reasons leading to the formation of the social contract and of its 
contents is different. These differences have led to a different elaboration of the 
consequences of this contract, thus, consequently to a different constitutional design.  
One of the main scholars of the Anglo-Saxon tradition is John Locke. In the 17
th
 
century he became one the most influential philosophers of his time and his 
conception of the individual created the basis for elaborating the idea that States exist 
to safeguard human beings from arbitrary abuses. Unlike Thomas Hobbes who 
assumed that human beings needed absolute monarchy to govern their malicious 
attitude toward each other, Locke believed that human nature is characterized by 
reason and tolerance
396
. Like Hobbes, Locke believed that human nature allowed men 
to be selfish. In a natural state all people were equal and independent, and everyone 
had a natural right to defend his ‘life, health, liberty, or possessions397’. 
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According to Locke the state must protect its citizens, and in case this task is not 
performed or governmental authorities abuses of their powers, revolution is a right 
individuals should exercise
398
.  In accordance with the Lockean idea of the state, 
Montesquieu, Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and Tocqueville subsequently elaborated their 
theorization of the liberal state.  Tocqueville in his famous De la Démocratie in 
Amérique, firstly emphasized how putting too much emphasis on parliamentarism 
and the majoritarian principle would have meant to disregard the risk of a new kind 
of authoritarianism represented by the dictatorship of the majority
399
. Thus, 
subsequently the liberal state was thought and designed bearing in mind that 
individuals are entitled to some basic rights exercised through their representatives 
and protected by the separation of powers. Parliamentarism, the majoritarian 
principle, the separation of powers, and  in those cases such as the US by adopting 
federalism, have became the main features of this new idea of constitutional structure.  
While the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition has influenced the United States 
and the British legal systems
400
, in continental Europe constitutionalism has been 
characterized mainly by the theoretical work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Although 
Rousseau shares with Locke and Hobbes the contrattualistic nature of the State, their 
understanding of the reasons bringing together individuals for the stipulation of the 
social contract and its results are different.  
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In Rousseau s’ theory, in the state of nature individuals were isolated and 
dispersed without a structured community and they freely decided to create a 
community without abandoning their freedom for the sake of their wellness. In 
Rousseau, the social contract is not a ‘pactum subjectionis’ as in Hobbes but rather a 
‘pactum unionis’. In this scheme, individuals are not separated from the State. The 
community, its members as citizens are the nation. Thus, in Rousseau the separation 
between State a citizens is overcome in favor of vision that perceives the social 
contract as the moment in which an individual gives up his rights as a uti singulus and 
receive them back as a utis civis
401
. 
Democracy is established as a direct form of participation since each individual 
exercised his right to participate directly through the ‘volonté générale’. The ‘general 
will’ is not the sum of each individuals’ will, but it is something transcendent that 
exists within each and every human being
402
. The law is the concrete outcome of the 
general will to which all individuals participate. This postulate has been crystallized 
in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. Art.6 of the 
Declaration reads: ‘La Loi est l’expression de la volonté générale. Tous les Citoyens 
ont droit de concourir personnellement, ou par leurs Représentans, à sa formation. 
Elle doit être la même pour tous, soit qu’elle protège, soit qu’elle punisse. Tous les 
Citoyens étant égaux à ses yeux, sont également admissibles à toutes dignités, places 
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et emplois publics, selon leur capacité, et sans autre distinction que celle de leurs 
vertus et de leurs talens’403. 
In this model, the parliamentary assembly plays the key role and the separation of 
powers is organic to the functioning of the system rather than representing a way of 
preventing an authoritarian drift.  Government and judiciary are considered 
subordinate entities of the State vis-à-vis the parliament, i.e. a government is in 
charge as long as the parliament confers its trust, and judges must apply the law and 
cannot interfere with the legislative.  
The underlying risks related to the general will doctrine resulted evident after the 
French revolution where from the aim of creating a society of equal citizens, France 
went through the period of the Napoleonic Empire. 
From the premises of contractualism under both the Anglo-Saxon and continental 
traditions of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century, the philosophical elaboration concerning 
constitutionalism has developed in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century with the fundamental 
contribution of Hans Kelsen. This prominent scholar, who personally participated in 
the elaboration of the Austrian constitution (1920), conceived the constitution as the 
‘top’ and the ‘centre’ of a legal order404. A fundamental norm encompassing those 
values typical of a given political community (written down in the text as of 
fundamental rights), and ‘the zenith’ of the legal order since no legal provision might 
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contrast with constitutional provisions. In this pyramidal scheme hierarchy governs 
the legal system from the top to the bottom. 
Kelsen’s main concern was to design a system in which the issue previously 
underlined by Tocqueville, that is majoritarian despotism, could be overcome by 
introducing a new constraint on the exercise of power by representative bodies, 
namely a constitutional judge. In contrast with Schmitt
405
, who rejected the idea of a 
constitutional court as guardian of the constitution against the will of political 
majorities, Kelsen argued that a democratic system needs a constitutional judge. In 
his view, since it would be unlikely to expect impartiality by a derivation of a 
majority (e.g. parliament or government), a judicial body is better equipped to 
provide an impartial decision over issue concerning legitimacy and constitutionality 
of institutional acts
406
. 
Given that the number of socio-political problems might conduct to institutional 
conflicts on ‘whether’, ‘when’, and ‘how’ it is appropriate to address them, the 
constitution represents that device able to prevent or resolve clashes between 
competing identities and interests. In this environment, a supreme court plays a 
crucial role in defining, limiting, or prompting the answers of representative 
authorities. Indeed, as Rosenfeld observes, there would be no reason to impose a 
constitution if a society was peacefully homogeneous so that interests are the same 
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for each and every member of society
407. The case of LGBTI s’ claims for legal 
recognition is emblematic in this context. They represent a social minority since 
homosexual sexual orientation is typical of only a part of the population which is not 
the majority. Thus, their demands for social inclusion, welfare benefits, etc., might be 
easily ignored by politics as far as their electoral power is relatively weak. In this 
context, the possibility for homosexual people to vehicle their claims through 
political representation does not ensure that their fundamental rights are firstly 
recognized and subsequently protected.  
3. Constituent power 
History of constitutionalism might help understanding the mechanisms of 
contemporary democracy and explaining the theoretical frame giving birth to the 
creation of supreme courts. However, in order to comprehend more precisely the role 
played by judicial review, it is also of crucial importance to understand the concept of 
‘constituent power408’. This term is used in legal doctrine to indicate ‘the momentum’ 
in which a constitution has been created. Its relevance for the elaboration of this 
research stems from the fact that when a constitutional judge interprets constitutional 
values in light of social changes, it should do so without betray the ‘spirit of the 
constitution’, i.e. bearing in mind what the constitution stands for. This operation 
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implies the recognition of an intrinsic meaning enshrined in the constitution
409
. It 
follows, that the stronger is conceived the relation between the constitution and the 
constituent power, the lesser is allowed for the possibility of supreme courts to 
reinterpret the meanings of its provisions. The German constitutional court –  in the 
proceeding against the parliamentary act on the Lisbon Treaty –  had to occasion to 
clarify how the ‘…the constituent power of the Germans which gave itself the Basic 
Law wanted to set an insurmountable boundary to any future political development. 
Amendments of the Basic Law affecting the principles laid down in Article 1 and 
Article 20 of the Basic Law shall be inadmissible (Article 79.3 of the Basic Law). The 
so-called eternity guarantee takes the disposal of the identity of the free constitutional 
order even out of the hands of the constitution-amending legislature. The Basic Law 
thus not only assumes sovereign statehood but guarantees it
410’. 
Questions regarding the nature of the constituent power and its relation with the 
textual dimension of a constitution lead to different responses according to different 
theoretical perspectives. According to contrattualists as Locke or Rousseau, in the 
moment the social contract has been stipulated it is possible to perceive the 
constituent power. Thus, according to this view, the power to make a constitution 
should be the power to create a political and legal order ex nihilo.  
On the contrary, the observation of historical developments at socio-political level 
shows how legal orders have undergone transformations after the collapse of previous 
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systems or subsequent to a series of tumultuous events (e.g. the French revolution, the 
Second World War). A revolution as well as a war might pose the basis for the 
emergence of the constituent power ex novo, thus leading to the elaboration of a new 
constitutional text. 
In democracy, the legitimacy of the constituent power resides in the people’s will. 
The idea, typical of natural law theories, that the origin of political orders and 
fundamental rights was an innate process of recognition of a metaphysical truth 
(revealed by God), is abandoned in favor of the contemporary assumption that the 
constituent power is a moment of rational elaboration. In other words, the constituent 
power represents the secularized version of the divine power to create ex nihilo
411
. 
Therefore, the constituent power is an extraordinary moment of making fundamental 
choices. However, the main issue posed by the idea of constituent power is related to 
what it represents. 
Usually, when referring to constituent power, concepts such as ‘people’ or ‘nation’ 
are used as preliminary reference to indicate ‘who’ this power legitimately represents. 
Both references seem prima face overlapping, i.e. the people forms the nation, the 
nation is formed by the people. In addition, both terms endorse a rhetorical construct 
that gives constituent power a strong resistance vis-à-vis possible ideological 
conflicts: if everyone is part of the nation or part of the people, the constituent power 
is all-in-all-comprehensive and the process of drafting a constitution is legitimate by 
definition. 
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Nonetheless, ‘people’ and ‘nation’ are two distinct words and this difference is not 
only semantic, but it is linked to the socio-political environment in which these words 
are used. ‘Nation’ indicates a plurality of individuals whose similarities (the sense of 
belonging) might be understood in terms of ethnicity or in terms of residency on a 
given territory: ‘we are all English’ or ‘we all were born and live in Italy’. In the first 
case, ‘nation’ refers to communalities (ethnicity, religion, language) among 
individuals and this is the linking element. The constituent power expresses the will 
of a specific social group and is legitimate because include each one equally. The 
nation is thus a sort of pre-political community whose constitutive elements are 
represented by race, language, religion, culture, history, and the like
412
.  
In the second case, ‘People’ is the group individuals all belong to, thus the linking 
element is the territory. Citizenship is the ‘belonging adhesive’. The concept of 
people in this perspective covers civil society as a whole, i.e. individuals despite their 
ancestral origins are considered equally part of the demos. There is no need for a 
homogenous collectivity and differences blur within the constituent power, since the 
system of values and rules are decided according to a true spirit of cooperation 
regardless of individuals’ peculiarities or groups’ interests.  
In this model, the constituent power envisages a true commitment toward the 
creation of a fair social order. As in Rawls theorization
413
, individuals in this context 
pursue their goal of constituting a society through a process of bargaining and 
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compromises which excludes arguments of self-interest to favor an elaboration of 
shared principles
414
. 
In all cases, the constituent power represents the moment in which a polity decides 
its future by designing a functional constitutional order able to regulate and maintain 
the social order. In this respect, another issue to be addressed regards the relation 
between the constituent power and the constitution. In fact, constitutions are 
subjected to both amendments and judicial reinterpretation of their provisions, thus 
between the moment of drafting and subsequent periods the constitution might 
undergone through changes without the necessity of resorting the constituent power, 
but by using the amending power as provided by the constitution itself
415
.  
However, in the former case, as long as the legislator acts according to the 
procedures and within the limit set in the constitution, there should be no issues to be 
raised. Instead, in the latter case, when a supreme court interprets constitutional 
principles in light of societal changes, the constituent power, representing the ‘spirit 
of the constitution’, could work as a constraint on the judicial activity of 
‘modernizing principles’416. 
In this context, courts cannot betray the spirit of the constitution. Human rights 
provisions might indeed pose a challenge to judicial review, since they possess a 
natural vis expansiva which allows them to be reinterpreted beyond their original 
meanings, i.e. ‘permitting definitions’ that would have been unconceivable at the time 
                                                          
414
 J. ELSTER, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, in University of Chicago Law 
Review, vol.58, n.2, 1991, (pp.447-482), p. 447. 
415
 M. LOUGHLIN, N. WALKER, The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form, in International Journal of Constitutional Law,  2008,  vol. 6, n.2,  (pp 358-370), 
p. 362. 
416
 U. K. PREUSS, Ibid, p.156. 
176 
 
the constitution was written
417
. Thus, either the constituent power is considered 
mediated forever in the constitution and confined in its historical frame, or it might 
create clashes whenever it is necessary to modernize the meanings of constitutional 
texts. 
The role of a supreme court in this framework of reshaping meanings maintaining 
the spirit underlying the constitutional order is of crucial importance. The equilibrium 
judicial review is able to preserve represents a safeguard against the possibility of 
collapsing for the legal system. This aspect might sound in contrast with a purely 
procedural understanding of democracy which conceives representation (through the 
legislator) as the main guarantee for the safeguard of individuals’ interests.  
However, as underlined above, a democratic regime is not ‘by default’ able to 
accomplish its duty of addressing individuals’ demands for protection, especially in 
the case of minority groups. In a number of occasions, an electoral majority might 
disregard ‘the others’ interests’ without infringing democratic rules418. A 
constitutional court, acting as an impartial guardian of those values contained in the 
constitution can actually provide, through judicial law-making, the necessary 
protection for those who are historically in a vulnerable position and are unable to 
raise their claims through the electoral system. 
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In opposition to this reasoning, some scholars argue that supreme courts should 
restraint themselves in the context of ‘values-reshaping-meanings’, and focus mainly 
on maximizing participation
419
. In other words, judicial review should favor an all-
inclusive representation within the political arena, so that participation is able to 
ensure that each individual’s interest is heard and possibly addressed.  
In this model there is no need for balancing different interests because the system 
guarantees a priori individuals’ positions (X is involved in the decision-making 
process thus Y is not left alone to decide marginalizing X). Therefore, the role of 
constitutional judges becomes collateral to the entire system and it is functional only 
to extent it is able to ensure participation
420
. The same logic is applied by those who 
conceive a democratic regime as a ‘free market of ideas’. As long as the market is 
free ideas will compete fairly
421
. 
Per contra, these arguments seem to underestimate that due to the enormous 
numbers of possible claims a collectivity might express, in order to be sure that each 
of them is heard, it should be preliminarily defined what is the optimal, or at least 
sufficient, degree of participation. In addition, even in a ‘free market of ideas’ there 
will always be majoritarian ideas prevailing over minoritarian ones. Since 
fundamental rights are not constructed on the basis of belonging to a majority, but 
they define the spectrum of rights individuals are entitled to as human beings, 
representation can ensure that most of the claims are discussed, but some of them 
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would inevitably be ignored. Thus, an a posteriori remedy would still be needed to 
safeguard individuals’ rights.  
Again, as shown in this research, the struggle of LGBTI people for their rights is 
emblematic. Homosexuality has always existed but the right not to be discriminated 
in relation to sexual orientation has been achieved in a number cases through 
jurisprudential elaboration of the principle of equality. In this sense the ECtHR’s case 
law on sodomy law might provide a good example  (see, chapter I, section 2). In 
addition, the history of the ‘rainbow movement’ since the 1970s shows how judicial 
review has played in this field a strong role of ‘driving politics’ toward a new 
understanding of LGBTI rights as fundamental rights
422
.  
4. Constituent power and the EU: what is missing? 
 
The Lisbon Treaty has represented a step toward the constitutionalization of the 
EU system, though the process of elaboration of its contents has been characterized 
by a strong political commitment at national level aimed at avoiding the definition 
‘EU constitution’. Indeed, the decision to call this new institutional device ‘the Treaty 
of Lisbon’ instead of adopting the word ‘EU Constitution’, the adoption of protocols 
(opting out clauses), and the elimination of symbolic references to the constitutional 
nature of the EU (as it was in principle when the European Convention was appointed 
after the Laeken European Council in December 2001
423
) , could drive to the 
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conclusion that this is ‘just another international treaty’. However, as many authors in 
legal doctrine suggest, the Lisbon Treaty does push the entire EU system toward the 
elaboration of a proper constitutional system
424
.  
Certainly, an analysis of the Lisbon Treaty through the lens of classical 
constitutional law theory cannot be very helpful to understand the importance of this 
new European development. 
 Instead, by adopting the theoretical lens of ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ it is 
possible to conceive the constitutional nature of the Lisbon Treaty, thus its relevance 
for future developments in the direction of a stronger European integration
425
. In fact, 
the EU institutional architecture developed by this new treaty, which emends the 
previous TEU and TFEU, follows the ideological path aimed at elaborating a greater 
integration among MSs. A path that has been also delineated by the creative 
contribution of the ECJ in the elaboration of the doctrine of direct effect and 
supremacy of EU law (see, chapter I).  
While constitutionalism places emphasis on the relations between governed and 
governing within the State, and justifies the legitimacy of the constitutional system in 
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light of the democratic process of formation of constitutions – i.e. the constituent 
power is legitimate because it represents citizens’ will,  thus it expresses those 
national values around which citizens recognize their identity  – multilevel 
constitutionalism is detached from the classic idea of the State, meant as the only 
subject able to perform each and every task in a globalized and interdependent world.   
As Harbemas has pointed out, contemporary States are unable to fulfill certain 
tasks of common interest. In his view, the so called ‘postnational constellation’ 
imposes a changing in the understanding of governance and constitutional systems, 
since the preservation of liberty, peace, and citizens’ welfare, require cooperation 
among States
426
. 
The EU is a sui generis organization that tries to respond to contemporary issues 
which cannot be dealt with directly and autonomously by one single State. As 
suggested by Pernice: ‘multilevel constitutionalism is meant to describe and 
understand the ongoing process of establishing new structures of government 
complementary to and building upon – while also changing – existing forms of self-
organization of the people or society’427.  The main distinction to be made – 
according to those who support multilevel constitutionalism theory – between 
classical constitutionalism and multilevel constitutionalism, rests on the reasons 
behind the decision to create supranational institutions (e.g. a multilevel structure 
beyond the State). In fact, while constitutions are usually created under the 
empowerment  of representatives of the groups of people concerned to negotiate a 
                                                          
426
 J. HARBEMAS, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, MIT Press, 2001, pp. 20 ss. 
427
 I. PERNICE, Multilevel constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-
making Revisited?, in Common Market Law Review, vol.36, 1999, p.703, 
181 
 
draft that is later submitted to people ratification in order to regulate intra-State 
relations and protect fundamental freedoms, European Treaties have been adopted 
and developed to regulate inter-States relations, in order to pursue (only) certain 
common goals.  
Thus, the State and the supranational organization are organized following the 
criterion of competence, i.e. some of the tasks previously performed at national level 
are transferred to the supranational one. In other words, the relation between 
European law and national law is not hierarchical but functional (e.g. 
complementarity), i.e. the former regulates  –  ‘commonly’ – those matters MSs have 
decided that should be elaborated at EU level and then applied in each MS uniformly 
(e.g. reciprocity). The uniform application of both national and supranational law is 
however guaranteed by national judicial actors (and by the ECJ if called to intervene) 
since EU law is de jure and de facto one of the sources of law national authorities 
must acknowledge.    
European citizenship follows this scheme. All MSs’ citizens are both national and 
EU citizens. EU citizenship is complementary to the national one and provide EU 
citizens with the possibility to enjoy the liberties of the internal market, and the rule 
of non-discrimination is applied to all EU citizens in each MS. As EU citizens, 
individuals might vote at local and European level, they might freely move within the 
EU, and their rights as EU citizens can be claimed before every national courts. As 
discussed in chapter I, the possibility to move freely within the EU is applied also to 
family members, and this, in turn, creates the issue concerning those who are not 
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recognized as family members (e.g. same-sex partners in those countries where no 
legislation on same-sex unions is provided by the national legal system) 
In this structure, the Europäische Verfassungsverbund
428
 does not need a direct 
reference to the concept ‘State’, national or federal State,  since its primary aim is to 
perform a subsidiary and complementary function in relation to those issues MSs 
have decided to transfer at the supranational level. In addition, since MSs are 
constructed according to a democratic constitutional order, the process of transferring 
competences to the EU is intrinsically legitimate since intergovernmental decisions 
are supported by national parliaments. Thus, the EU represents a complex 
constitutional system which is at the same time:  (a) united when considering the 
supremacy of the EU law, the principle of direct effect, and the EU Charter of Rights; 
(b) pluralistic when considering  those matters falling outside the scope of application 
of EU law, and when looking at the constitutional common traditions of the MSs
429
. 
This theoretical approach explains how is thus possible the coexistence of two 
different and autonomous entities, namely the EU and the MSs which are at the same 
time independent and interdependent depending on the matters under consideration. 
The EU Treaties designed this constitutional architecture in a way that it is possible to 
affirm that a legitimate European constitutional order does exist, though it operates 
differently from the classical nation-state constitutional paradigm.   
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Nevertheless, before the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
establishment of a common system of protection of fundamental rights (which is 
commonly accompanied by the establishment of contemporary democratic 
constitutional systems) at the EU level was mainly left in the hands of the ECJ. Its 
case law has favored the creation of the so called European dialogic judicial system in 
which the vertical relations (EU-MSs) among Courts are based on the assumption that 
the ECJ will supervise EU law conformity with fundamental rights as provided for by 
national constitutions and by EU Treaties (see, next section). 
The entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the inclusion of the EU Charter 
of Rights as a binding legal instrument for the EU system, and the possibility for the 
EU to accede the ECHR has given a greater emphasis on the constitutional character 
of the EU itself as an autonomous entity vis-à-vis MSs.  As some scholars argue, 
from a multilevel constitutionalism approach, this new formulation of art.6 TEU has 
provided the legitimation and the natural  evolution of the EU as a system governed 
by the same principles typical of national constitutional orders
430
, though without 
creating a proper federal State. The issue of the constituent power from an EU 
perspective is thus mediated by the introduction of the formal recognition of common 
principles, and by the formal definition of a set of EU rights enjoyed by all EU 
citizens under the supervision of the ECJ (the constitutional judge of this 
constitutional order).  
In addition, as the Lisbon Treaty confers a greater importance to national 
parliaments (i.e. according to art.12 TUE, national parliaments contribute actively to 
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the good functioning of the Union), the lack of democratic representation in the EU 
seems to be overcome by the possibility of national legislative authority to be 
involved in the decision-making process. It follows that by adopting the multilevel 
constitutionalism approach, the role of the judiciary in this multilevel architecture, at 
both the national and supranational level is divided according to the their respective 
competences, and the two levels are to be conceived legitimate since both are framed 
within a constitutional order. 
This theoretical frame helps to analyze the issue of constituent power also from an 
EU perspective, and seems to solve the issue of judicial legitimacy on the side of the 
ECJ by giving a constitutional character to the EU. In other words, the same 
arguments discussed in the previous section concerning the role of constitutional 
courts within a nation-state, could be considered valid also in relation to the EU. 
Nonetheless, the multilevel constitutionalism theory seems to overstretch the limits of 
the meaning ‘constitutionalism’ and ignore the lack of a direct link between EU 
citizens and EU institutions.  
As some authors contend, contemporary constitutionalism is strictly associated 
with the idea of democratic participation and transparency, and the link between 
governed and governing authorities is of crucial point. On the contrary, multilevel 
constitutionalism seems more focused on procedural aspects, i.e. a syllogism is 
applied: if decisions are taken intergovernmentally, since governments are 
democratic, then decision are democratic. Indeed, by arguing that EU institutions are 
the results of democratic MSs interactions/decisions, multilevel constitutionalism 
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does not consider the importance of citizens involvement in the formation, 
elaboration, and acceptance of common European values
431
.  
As for the legitimacy of the entire system, the question to be answered remains: 
who do EU institutions represent? States or citizens?. If the answer is States, then 
there would be no reason to refer to constituent power since it would be merely a 
question of international agreements between States. If the answer is citizens, then it 
would be possible to argue that the constituent power require individuals’ 
participation. 
Elements of participation can be observed at the EU level. The EP is indeed 
elected directly by EU citizens, and citizens might present petitions. However, the EP 
is still marginal to the functioning of the EU and the intergovernmental nature of the 
decision-making process is still the main feature of the EU system. In conclusion, this 
situation, as examined in the next section, might pose a number of problems in 
relation to the legitimacy of the ECJ, specifically in connection to the possibility to 
define the meaning of  European fundamental rights.   
 
5. The legitimacy of the EU multilevel structure of human rights protection 
 
The analysis of the role of courts in democratic constitutional regimes explains the 
reasons behind judicial law-making. However, these theoretical approaches when 
adopted to analyze the EU multilevel system of protection of fundamental rights 
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might help understanding the reasoning of judicial decisions at various levels 
(national, supranational, international).  
In order to verify whether the now binding EU Charter of Rights can contribute in 
prompting new developments in relation to legal recognition of same-sex unions 
among EU Member States given its normogenetic value, it is necessary to understand 
‘theoretically’ and legally how the EU system for the protection of fundamental rights 
functions. Indeed, the recognition of same-sex unions at national level, in the lack of 
an EU-harmonized system of mutual recognition between MSs, generates several 
theoretical problems. 
The EU is more than international organization but less than a federal state. As 
some authors describe it, the EU is a quasi-federal state
432
. A hybrid legal creature, 
whose different bodies (e.g. Parliament, Commission, ECJ, etc.) resemble those 
typical of a state, but whose decisional procedures vary (simple majority, qualified 
majority, unanimity) depending on the subject considered, give alternatively the idea 
of a ‘Unity’ or the idea of ‘Diversity’. While leaving aside an analysis of the entire 
EU system, for this research it is necessary to understand how the mechanisms for the 
protection of rights function. 
The European system for the protection of human rights is characterized by a 
complex multilevel structure: (a) the national level - constitutional courts; (b) the 
supranational level - the ECJ; (c) the international level - the ECtHR. Despite this 
differentiation, one should not conceive this seemingly vertical categorization as 
governed by hierarchical rules. On the contrary, this legal (dis)order represents a 
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pluralist system in which the relationships between constituent parts are governed not 
by legal rules (hierarchy) but primarily by politics, often judicial politics 
(heterarchy)
433
. In other words, the definition of rights is made by different judicial 
authorities institutionalized at different level, within and beyond the state
434
. 
This system, differently from a constitutional state’s order, though organized, it is 
not constructed according to rules typically applied to constitutional state. At 
supranational and international level, the institutional architecture does not provide 
for a ‘legislative power’, and the system of check and balances  is substitute by the 
self-restraints of judges. Indeed, constraints usually applied to constitutional courts do 
not apply to the ECJ and the ECtHR.  
In order to understand the complexity of the EU scenario it is necessary to analyze 
how, at different levels, courts understand their role as guardians of fundamental 
freedoms. Thus, from a system governed by dogmatism, where predefined 
(constitutional) rules regulate the relationship between different actors, the system 
seems to move toward an order where ‘the criterion of competence’ is prevailing over 
written rules, (e.g., the ECJ is responsible to protect individuals’ rights when 
scrutinizing EU law, while the ECtHR supervise compliance to the ECHR).  
National constitutional courts (see, chapter I, section 1) have demonstrated their 
willingness to comply with their European counterparts’ case law (either the ECJ or 
the ECtHR), though preserving their autonomy as independent institutions.  
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The idea of a dialogic process among jurisdictions in the EU stems from the 
observation of  those interactions occurring between the ECJ and national courts. For 
instance, the German constitutional court has established the conceptual margins of 
its ‘judicial relationship’ during these years. Indeed, the Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
has defined, through Solange I and Solange II, its relation with the ECJ in the field of 
fundamental rights protection. In particular, while in Solange I
435
 the German court 
was skeptical that the European system was able to provide an adequate protection 
for fundamental freedoms, in Solange II
436
 the BVerfGE gave up its reservation 
considering that the ECJ had developed an extensive case law in the area of 
fundamental rights. 
In fact, before the adoption of a EU Charter of Rights, binding for EU institutions, 
in the lack of EU catalogue of fundamental rights the ECJ autonomously expanded 
the competence of the European Community to the field of protection of human 
rights through judicial law-making
437
, particularly through judgments such as 
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Stauder
438
, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
439
, Nold
440
, and Les Verts 
441
. As 
explained in the previous section, this attitude of the ECJ might be explained through 
the theoretical lens of multilevel constitutionalism, i.e. the ECJ has deemed necessary 
to perform its constitutional task in a system that might be understood as a 
constitutional one even in the absence of a typical State architecture. 
Moreover, this decision was driven by the exigency of overcoming the challenge 
national constitutional court could have made to the supremacy of EU law and over 
the competence of the ECJ. However, as underlined by Schimmelfennig, ‘… the ECJ 
became entangled in a dilemma. Binding its jurisdiction to the human rights norms of 
the ECHR helped to placate national constitutional courts but made it difficult to 
refuse the formal adherence of the European Community (EC) to the ECHR. As 
much as it could entrap national constitutional courts to accept the supremacy of the 
ECJ with regard to Community law, the ECJ was entrapped itself to acknowledge the 
supremacy of the ECtHR with regard to human rights. The most important but 
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initially unintended outcome of this strategic interaction was the progressive 
institutionalization of human rights in the EU
442’. 
For this reason, the same attitude can be found in the judgments of the ECJ and 
ECtHR to what concerns their bilateral relationship within the European space. 
Indeed, since 1970, when for the first time the ECJ stated that it was also bound to 
protect fundamental rights
443
, the relationship between Strasbourg and Luxemburg 
has deeply evolved
444
. The ECJ has usually, but not always, chosen to follow the 
interpretations of fundamental rights given by the ECtHR, even if the first direct 
reference to the latter’s jurisprudence appeared in 1996. In turn, the ECtHR has 
elaborated, starting with its decision M. & Co
445
 (at that time the European 
Commission on Human Rights), a theory providing that even if the EU MSs remain 
responsible for violations of fundamental rights committed by international 
organizations to which they have transferred part of their powers, the protection of 
fundamental rights within the EU is substantially equivalent to that guaranteed by the 
ECHR.  
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For some years this theory has allowed the ECtHR to declare the judgments 
concerning Community acts inadmissible, but this trend changed with the Cantoni
446
 
case and the Matthews
447
 case in the 1990s. In the former case the ECtHR reviewed 
the legality of a French law reflecting an EC Directive word by word, while in the 
latter case it found the UK responsible for the violation of the rights of a citizen 
residing in Gibraltar, since he was not allowed to vote in the elections of the 
European Parliament, even if the law on such elections was Community legislation 
that could not be unilaterally modified by the UK.  Finally in its Bosphorus
448
 case 
the Court confirmed the approach adopted in M&Co, but affirming that such 
presumption of equivalent protection is rebuttable and that it will review the legality 
of community acts in cases of manifest deficiencies in the protection of fundamental 
rights. 
As Douglas–Scott suggests, the European human rights landscape provides a 
strong example of legal pluralism, illustrating a variety of interesting interactions and 
relationships, and the current human rights acquis leaves room for possibilities 
behind the binary poles of certainty and chaos, anticipating the conceptualization of 
fuzzy logic, not the constricting “either/or” of a formal mechanistic jurisprudence, but 
the “both/and” of a less clockwork-like world449.  In other words, the behavior of 
national, supranational, and international judiciaries, in the field of human rights 
protection, shows how there exists a true dialogic process of judicial interaction, in 
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which each part recognizes the legitimacy of the other without questioning its 
independence and authority. In this context, the BVerfG ‘s ‘identity decision’ can 
effectively explain how the European system functions. According to German judge:  
The elaboration of the principle of democracy by the Basic Law is open to the 
objective of integrating Germany into an international and European peaceful order. The 
new shape of political rule which is thereby made possible is not schematically subject 
to the requirements of a constitutional state applicable on the national level and may 
therefore not be measured without further ado against the concrete manifestations of the 
principle of democracy in a Contracting State or Member State. The empowerment to 
embark on European integration permits a different shaping of political opinion-forming 
than the one that is determined by the Basic Law for the German constitutional order. 
This applies as far as the limit of the inalienable constitutional identity (Article 79.3 of 
the Basic Law). The principle of democratic self-determination and of participation in 
public authority with due account being taken of equality remains unaffected also by the 
Basic Law’s mandate of peace and integration and the constitutional principle of the 
openness towards international law (Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit)
450
  [In addition] The 
German constitution is oriented towards opening the state system of rule to the peaceful 
cooperation of the nations and towards European integration. Neither the integration pari 
passu into the European Union nor the integration into peacekeeping systems such as the 
United Nations is tantamount to submission to alien powers. Instead, it is a voluntary, 
mutual commitment pari passu, which secures peace and strengthens the possibilities of 
shaping policy by joint coordinated action
451
 
However a distinction should be made between different levels of adjudication. If, as 
described, legitimacy would be linked only to ‘right interpretation’, the problem of 
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adjudication would become a secondary issue. Therefore, a court would merely be in 
charge of concretely addressing claims according to the driving constitutional 
(national constitutional courts) or European (ECJ), or Conventional (ECtHR) 
principles.  
Nonetheless, as underlined above, legitimacy derives also from the position a 
democratic institution occupies within a given system in particular when the judiciary 
adopts a nonmajoritarian perspective in its judgments. Adopting the ECtHR doctrine 
of the margin of appreciation, a national court would be in the best position to deal 
with a sensitive political issue, since it also legitimated by the fact of being part of 
that specific constitutional system. Indeed,  the legitimacy of a constitutional court is 
rooted in the constitution and in its ‘cultural proximity’ with the constitutional order, 
whereas a supranational or international court might be perceived as collateral to the 
system, or even extra-system. 
In addition, while the ECtHR has repeatedly referred to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine recognizing its subsidiary role in the system of protection of fundamental 
rights, i.e. it has defined itself as the guardian of the CEDU but at the same time 
preserving national Contracting States differences, the ECJ has instead tried to create 
a uniform European space of values operating in accordance to the general principles 
of EU law and considering the common constitutional traditions of MSs.  
However, as explained in the previous sections, the main issue at stake when 
observing the attitude of the ECJ toward the definition of ‘EU rights’, regards the 
legitimacy of the EU system itself as a (multilevel) constitutional order in which the 
supranational court plays a roles similar to a national constitutional court. In this 
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context, the EU Charter of Rights might be perceived as the natural reference for 
reinforcing the authority of the ECJ in the field of human rights protection in the EU, 
though, given the nature of the EU, the main risk is to overstretch the limits of the 
ECJ competence. In fact, as discussed in chapter I, the scope of application of EU law 
is clearly defined in the Lisbon Treaty. As already underlined, neither the 
introduction of the EU Charter of Rights, nor the possibility to accede the EU (new 
Art.6 TEU) will affect the EU’s competences as defined in the Treaties.       
The so called ‘European heterarchy’ might enhance the degree of protection 
afforded to individuals, but at the same time might pose a problem of legitimacy. If 
an order is not organized into a Kelsenian hierarchy, the recognition of the 
competences typical of an authority, such as a judicial authority, might blur and lead 
to conflicts  in relation to which constitutional powers is competent in addressing one 
specific issue (e.g. the legislative, or the executive) thus pushing the judiciary to be 
deferential. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
1. Preliminary observations 
 
Within the broader discussion about LGBTI people’s rights in the EU, this 
research has developed its argument adopting a comparative constitutional law 
perspective. It has approached one of the issues debated both in legal doctrine and by 
politics, i.e. the right to be legally recognized as a family for those of same-sex. One 
of the premises of this work has been that there is now a widespread social 
acceptance of homosexuality as a human phenomenon within MSs (e.g. in most of 
MSs homophobia is condemned as a criminal offence
452
) . In other words, today it is 
no longer a matter of preventing direct discrimination against people belonging to 
sexual minorities. Indeed, the so called sodomy laws have been declared in violation 
of human rights several years ago (see chapter I, ‘The CoE framework and the role of 
the ECtHR’).  Therefore, the daily issue is what equality really means for same-sex 
partners.  
Hence, this research has been centered on the specific right of homosexuals to 
found a family, adopting an EU-centered perspective. Nonetheless, the specific issue 
of the right to found a family for same-sex partners has been dealt with choosing 
purposely to focus on ‘the duty to recognize’ instead of stressing the argument of the 
‘the right to recognition’.   This choice has found its raison d’être on four main 
considerations emerged during the period of research.  
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The first motivation regards ‘the incertitude on the contents of rights’. Despite the 
recognition of sexual orientation as a forbidden ground of discrimination – implicitly 
through case law at international level (ECtHR) or national level (in those states 
where constitutions do not mention this ground directly), and explicitly in EU law 
(Regulation, Directives, and the EU Charter of Rights) – the spectrum of rights to be 
afforded to homosexuals is still far to be uniformly accepted in the whole EU, in 
particular with reference to family matters (social benefits, parental rights, etc.). 
Evidences have been provided in chapter I.  
At national level, all examined countries, excluded Portugal, sharply distinguish 
between married couples and other types of unions, thus conferring couples outside 
marriage specific rights and duties. In all national cases, constitutional courts have 
expressed their concern about the lack of legal recognition for family-life of same-sex 
couples, but the lines of reasoning adopted diverge from country to country, and 
consequently what ‘legal recognition’ means is uncertain (i.e. the contents of rights 
associated with the idea of family).  
For instance, while in Portugal the Tribunal Constitucional in its judgment 
n.121/2010
453
 did not foresee any significant distinction to be made between 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, in Hungary the constitutional court has made clear 
that legislation on same-sex unions needs to be dissimilar from the institution of 
marriage to be constitutionally legitimate. The main question is however how to 
delineate specifically which rights should be granted to same-sex partners, and which 
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are not available
454
 (e.g. parental rights). The Hungarian court has indeed excluded 
parental rights, but it has not clearly defined the differences between opposite-sex and 
same-sex partners.  
The French case could be placed in between these two positions, since the Conseil 
Constitutionnel has not neglected the possibility to introduce a new piece of 
legislation enhancing the rights of same-sex unions
455
, though it has preferred to 
leave the matter in the hands of the legislator. In Italy, the Corte Costituzionale in its 
2010 judgment has deemed necessary a parliamentary intervention, without urging 
the parliament, and without indicating the possible contents of a specific legislation 
on this subject
456
.   
At the international level the position taken by the ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf
457
 
confirms the judicial attitude to consider the parliament the best place where to 
elaborate policy of recognition for same-sex unions. However, the recognition of two 
separated rights, i.e. the right to marry and the right to found a family has confirmed 
an evolution of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in the direction of covering also same-sex 
partners in the sphere of family-life. 
As for the ECJ, both in Maruko
458
 and Römer
459, the Luxembourg court’s decision 
to consider same-sex and opposite-sex couples de facto identical in the these cases, 
adopting however a ‘direct discrimination approach’, emphasizes the ECJ’s 
willingness to refrain from a general intervention. Indeed, as underlined in chapter I, 
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considering the situations in both Maruko and Römer a case of direct discrimination 
has allowed to confine these cases in their geographical dimension. i.e. in Germany. 
On the contrary, upholding indirect discrimination would have meant enhancing the 
scope of application of these judgments as to cover all the situations in the EU where 
same-sex couples are discriminated vis-à-vis opposite-sex couples. In addition 
The second consideration acknowledges that constructing the argument on ‘the 
duty to’ leaves states a greater flexibility on the possibility to legislate considering 
their own specific legal traditions, and according to the claims expressed by their own 
national sexual minorities. In turn, this would also respect the EU motto ‘united in 
diversity’. In fact, as stressed in the Italian judgment n.138/2010, in the EU several 
legal models of recognition have been adopted to grant same-sex unions’ legal 
protection. The EU situation on this specific aspect presents a multitude of options. 
Imposing one model over the others would create a number of problems. As 
considered in chapter II, the sociological dimension of equality is rooted in tradition 
and its evolution moves in combination with society changes. Judges in this context 
play the role of detecting changes, but without overstretching their competence
460
. 
In fact, as discussed in chapter III, doubts might be raised regarding the legitimate 
authority in charge of deciding which solution would be the best for same-sex 
partners. This research has demonstrated how the issue of legitimacy tends to 
increase in a multilevel system, and how the lack of political will to solve an issue 
related to fundamental rights cannot automatically lead to judicial intervention, since 
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in constitutional democratic systems both the legislative and the judiciary tend to 
function in respect of their sphere of competence. 
In this sense, as underlined in chapter I, EU law specifically addresses the issue of 
‘marital status’ leaving MSs exclusive competence over this subject. Thus, what 
would be acceptable in one country could be perceived unacceptable in another. In 
constitutional democratic states nonmajoritarian decisions might indeed pose evident 
problems of legitimacy. As described in chapter III, this concern is characteristic of 
those systems such as the EU in which political pluralism can accentuate both the 
differences and the struggle between values
461
. In addition, although the EU could be 
understood as a constitutional order according to the theory of multilevel 
constitutionalism as described in third chapter (sec.4), the main problem, i.e. the lack 
of democratic participation is still an issue that creates a gap between EU citizens and 
EU institutions.  
The third motivation is rooted in the idea that ‘the duty to’ approach, since it does 
not clearly lay down a series of specific rights, would not crystallize the rights of 
sexual minorities, thus allowing further developments whenever the necessity to 
change emerges in society. In this context, the Portuguese case analyzed in chapter I 
can provide a good example: whereas in 2009 the Tribunal Constitucional did not 
accepted the argument of an automatic right to legal recognition for same-sex unions 
stemming from a ‘violation by omission’ on the side of the parliament, in 2010 it has 
been ready to acknowledge that ‘while there can be no doubt that from the biological, 
sociological or anthropological point of view, a lasting union between two persons of 
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the same sex and that between two persons of different sexes constitute different 
realities, from the legal perspective treating them in equivalent ways is not without 
material grounds’462.  
As highlighted in chapter II, the idea of equality does change over time, and rights 
consequently expand their scope accordingly. Moreover, while for some authors 
marriage represents the point of arrival, for others it might lead to homologation. In 
the next section this aspect is further developed. 
The fourth motivation conceives ‘the duty to’ as an approach that leaves the 
judiciary the opportunity to play a crucial role in defining the margins of fair 
differentiation whenever states decide to distinguish between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals. This line of reasoning overcomes the parallelism/antagonism between 
the judicial power and the legislative power since it focuses on the possibility to 
intervene a posteriori for judges. As the ECJ has demonstrated in Maruko
463
 and 
Römer
464
, the competence of the judge is to verify whether differentiation is 
legitimate on a case by case analysis. According to some scholars, the same attitude 
can be observed when considering the Italian judgment of 2010. The Italian 
constitutional court has preferred to remain silent on the contents of rights to be 
granted to same-sex unions in order to be able to exercise its supervision on the 
constitutionality of future legislation on this subject
465
.   
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As shown in this research, the path toward the affirmation of the right to found a 
family for same-sex partners has been supported at all analyzed levels of 
adjudication, but the steps to be made are still a matter of national discretion. 
National parliaments remain in charge of finding the most appropriate solution to this 
issue, whereas courts preserve their role of guardians in relation to unfair 
discrimination. It follows that, while it is possible to argue that ‘indifference’ by 
states constitute a violation of a fundamental right, the regime of protection cannot be 
established a priori. For the time being, each state might opt for the solution it finds 
more reasonable. However, as demonstrated in the two examined cases before the 
ECJ, states’ discretion finds its limits in the application of the EU principle of 
equality and nondiscrimination, now reinforced by the EU Charter of Rights.  In 
particular, it would be interesting to analyze an ECJ’s decision concerning a same-sex 
married couple moving to a MS where legal recognition is not provided in order to 
verify whether the ECJ would consider the absence of mutual recognition as 
infringing EU law (primary legislation, as well as secondary legislation).    
 
2. Marriage and civil partnership should be available for all citizens 
 
In the first chapter, the selected cases law demonstrates how this issue is not 
anymore an ‘extraordinary’ issue but an ordinary one, and the attitude of judges at all 
levels is consistent with the idea that states’ ‘indifference’ cannot be justified and 
does constitute a violation of fundamental rights. One clear conclusion can be drawn 
by chapter I: there exists an EU trend toward the recognition of same-sex unions as 
an element of achieving equality, though marriage remains one option among the 
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others. This conclusion it is not meant to denote a ‘normative statement’. Instead it 
represents ‘the picture’ of this specific period of time, thus it is possible to imagine a 
change in the next future.    As the EU Charter of Rights clarifies, the right to marry 
and the right to found a family are two distinct and fundamental rights. This has been 
also confirmed by the ECtHR in Schalk and Kopf, where the Strasbourg court had the 
occasion to distinguish between marriage and family life, considering this latter one 
as applicable also to same-sex partners.  
In the third chapter, when discussing the role of the constitutional judge, another 
point has emerged: although it is possible to affirm that the right to found a family is 
a fundamental right belonging to each individual universally, the role a court might 
play is limited by the social and cultural context and by the fact that the judicial 
power cannot substitute the legislator without putting at risk its legitimacy. In 
constitutional democratic systems this creates a tension between the willingness of 
constitutional courts to protect  minoritarian claims, and the legislative power, i.e. the 
right of a political majority to decide over policy matters, such as family law within 
the limits of the constitution.  In turn, this becomes a greater obstacle if the EU level 
is concerned. Indeed, since the ECJ operates in multilevel system in which the 
constitutional elements  typically associated with the idea of constitutional orders are 
not identical to those usually accompanying the idea of a State (e.g. the lack of 
democratic participation within the supranational system), its legitimacy might be put 
a risk when decisions over very sensitive issues are taken. 
Nevertheless, the fallacy of ‘the right to marry approach’ related to same-sex 
unions is firstly rooted in the understanding of the principle of equality. As discussed 
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in chapter II, the principle of equality works mainly in two directions: (1) it favors 
equal treatment removing discrimination; (2) it acknowledges differences and 
promotes them. As already explained, the discussion around equality is the 
preliminary step to be made before entering into the deliberation about rights. This 
implies a never ending debate able to reconcile changes in society with new 
interpretation of legal provisions. In the EU, MSs have opted for several different 
solutions in relation to same-sex unions, and same-sex marriage remains just one of 
the options.  
It follows that the decision to open up marriage to homosexuals, instead of 
elaborating other legal institutions, might apparently remove discrimination, while de 
facto perpetrating the stereotype of normalcy. As highlighted, equality should not 
pursue the aim of homologating situations which are not identical.  Certainly, as 
observed in legal scholarship, and also upheld by the Corte Costituzionale court in its 
judgment 138/2010, marriage is not a crystallized legal institution. In other words, 
changes in the understanding of the rights and duties associated with marriage might 
occur. Thus, allowing same-sex partners to get married is not per se a way to enhance 
homologation, since it might be perceived just as an evolution of the cultural and 
legal system of a given community. 
However, the contemporary ‘constitutionalization’ of marriage has been 
elaborated with the idea of a union between a man and woman. Therefore, at least 
originally, the institution of marriage has functioned as a conventio ad excludendum, 
i.e. same-sex partners have been de jure and de facto forbidden to enter into 
matrimony. Indeed, this position has been upheld by the Hungarian constitutional 
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court when deciding over the Parliament Act XXIX of 2009466, when it did not 
declare the unconstitutionality of the registration act in light of the clear distinction 
between this legal institution and marriage. 
A reference to marriage as ‘the standard ideal type’ can reinforce the stereotype 
that homosexuality is unnatural and should be stigmatized. Moreover, the right to 
found a family as enshrined in the EU Charter of Rights is distinct from the right to 
marry. This means that the two situations can be considered separately. In other 
words, while ‘a family’ is a union of two persons, marriage represents one of the 
possible legal institutions to regulate partners’ commitment.  
In this scheme, marriage is not ‘the standard’, and possible substitute institutions 
such as registration can show their importance as tools for restoring the imbalance 
between those who can marry and those who cannot. In this sense, the strict 
adherence to the heterosexual stereotype is overcome in favor of a vision that 
perceives all ‘families’ as all deserving protection. Nevertheless, as suggested in 
chapter II, to achieve full equality a legal system has to allow both solutions, i.e. 
marriage and registration, to all citizens regardless of their sexual orientation. This 
would represent the only way to defeat the scheme inferior/superior intrinsic to the 
view of marriage as the ‘normal/ideal type’ of union, avoiding the categorization of 
citizens in first and second-class citizens. 
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3. The impact of the EU Charter Rights 
 
 
The EU Charter of Rights has introduced a new set of rights within the context of 
the EU. It is now a binding instrument whose potential is to strengthen the protection 
of fundamental rights within the EU, promoting a common space of rights for all EU 
citizens. Although as repeatedly underlined in this research the scope of application 
of EU law is not expanded in light of the EU Charter of Rights, its normogenetic 
impact might create the basis for future judicial developments at both national and 
supranational level.  
This research had the aim to verify whether this new instrument could have an 
impact on the situation of same-sex unions in the EU. In particular, the purpose has 
been to understand whether the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty would have 
enhanced the chances to succeed for same-sex unions’ claims before courts (judicial 
intervention). As this thesis shows, the EU Charter of Rights has become a reference-
element at all levels of adjudication. At national level constitutional courts regard the 
Charter as a system of driving principles.  
However, a distinction should be made between what the EU Charter of Rights 
introduces as characteristic element of novelty and what this instrument is able to 
produce in a practical way. As underlined in chapter I, the rights enshrined in the EU 
Charter of Rights according to new art.6 TEU are binding only for EU institutions 
and MSs in the fields of application of EU law. However, both the EU Charter of 
Rights, and the possible accession of the EU to the ECHR will not affect the scope of 
application of EU law outside the competences identified by the Treaties. 
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As argued, the ECJ, –  which has now started to refer to the EU Charter in its 
judgment (e.g. ‘insurance case’, see chapter I)  – has been clear on this point: this 
new set of EU rights applies only to those matters falling within the competence of 
the EU467. Hence, formally speaking, it could be affirm that the spectrum of 
guarantees for same-sex unions in the EU has neither been transformed nor enhanced 
by the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, there are several elements 
to believe the EU Charter of Rights will produce its effect on this specific subject.  
One argument supporting this assumption is rooted in the now consolidated 
attitude of judges to consider the EU Charter of Rights as a reference to construe the 
argument about rights (the normogenetic value of the EU Charter of Rights). In the 
first chapter of this research the analysis shows how national constitutional judges are 
now referring to this document in order to frame their reasoning. Additionally, the 
EU Charter of Rights in art.9 introduces a specific innovation in relation to family-
life. In effect, art.9 represents a far more comprehensive guarantee for partners, 
regardless of the sexes of partners, than any other human rights document. In 
comparison with art.12 ECHR, art.9 of the EU Charter of Rights distinguishes 
between the right to marry and the right to found a family. This distinction is an 
essential one. 
As already stated, this differentiation is salient for several aspects. Firstly, it 
overcomes that idea that marriage and family are two complementary concepts.  
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Secondly, by stressing the ‘fundamentality’ of the right to found a family, and 
considering art.21 of the Charter (nondiscrimination principle) it helps reinforcing the 
argument of those who claim that same-sex partners should be legally recognized 
despite the possibility to enter into matrimony, since the fundamental and universal 
reference-right is the right to found a family; The Italian case is emblematic in this 
context since the constitutional court, though leaving the parliament the prerogative 
to intervene, explicitly pointed out that same-sex unions are social units deserving 
protection under the constitution.  
Thirdly, having regard for the right to free movement in the EU (ex Art. 39 
TEC468), neglecting the right to found a family in one EU country compromise both 
the principle of nondiscrimination and the right to free movement (the issue of mutual 
recognition). As further explained in the first chapter, in light of the right to free 
movement, and according to the EU principle of equality the possibility for families 
to move and reside freely within the EU is seriously compromised by the non-
harmonious recognition of same-sex families within the EU. 
Opponents of the ‘free movement approach’ argue that EU law clearly states that 
recognition of families is mutual between MSs as far as the country of origin and the 
hosting country both recognize those unions outside marriage. Some others contest 
the validity of art.9 in relation to the right to free movement underlining how the 
Explanations to the Charter explicitly confines the scope of application of this 
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article
469
. However, this position has been neglected by Advocate General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion before the ECJ in the case of Maruko470, when he 
affirmed that explanatory memorandum –  though it represents one of the means of 
interpretation – cannot be regarded as an imperative rules. Besides, it is possible to 
read the explanations of art.9 in the opposite sense: an opening-clause modernizing 
the concepts of family and marriage instead of freezing their scope of application.  
Furthermore, as highlighted in chapter III, it should not be forgotten that the EJC 
in a number of occasions has demonstrated its willingness to push forward a common 
European standard of equality, de facto implementing the EU social policy despite 
MSs’ national sovereignty471.   
In addition, as shown by the case now pending before an Italian ordinary judge, 
the heterogeneity of the EU system in this context leads to the paradoxical situation in 
which an Italian man can legally marry in Spain a Latin-American man, obtaining the 
visa for his spouse as a family member, and then moving back to Italy losing the 
status of married person, and most importantly, losing the possibility to obtain the 
permission to stay for his partner. Put it differently, the situation makes clear how the 
refusal to recognize same-sex unions, i.e. ‘indifference’ of some MSs on this subject, 
produces a great impact on individuals, and deprives them of the possibility to enjoy 
the fundamental right to form a social unit. A situation which needs to be dealt with 
since these kind of cases are likely to increase. 
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In conclusion, the EU Charter of Rights is unlikely to produce immediate effects 
for the situation of same-sex unions in the EU. Hence, there should be no surprise if 
during the analyzed period, i.e. 2008-2011, the attitude of judges, both nationally and 
supranationally, has been prudent on this subject. To simplify at the extreme, judges 
in the EU are today: (1) willing ‘to listen and invite parliaments’ in those cases where 
same-sex partners do not enjoy family protection (e.g. Italy or France), i.e. they 
acknowledge the existence of an issue to be solved; (2) willing ‘to enhance equality’ 
in those cases where recognition has been achieved but is contested (e.g. in Portugal 
when the same-sex marriage Act was referred to the Tribunal Constitucional) or 
works discriminating between partners (e.g. the ECJ’s cases Maruko and Römer.)  
Nonetheless, it is realistic to believe that this issue will soon find its solution 
‘judicially’ if politics continues to be unable to provide an effective answer. As stated 
above, the main obstacle is represented by the contents of rights associated with the 
right to found a family. Since these contents might include not only social-economic 
benefits but also parental rights, judicial actors are not in the best position to solve 
this issue. 
As observed in chapter III, the issue of appropriateness and desirability is of 
crucial importance when the judiciary is called to fill the gap left by the legislator. As 
argued, in light of the principle of equality, if in a given system there is no legal 
recognition for same-sex unions, and the only option is to open up marriage through 
judicial law-making, this solution could only partially resolve the issue of 
discrimination between ‘couples’, since for some marriage would still represent a 
heterosexual legal institution. 
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 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that judges will leave additional but not 
infinite time to the legislator. In fact, as reminded above, despite the incertitude on 
the contents of rights, there exists a duty to recognize upon states, and ‘indifference’ 
configures a breach of fundamental freedoms. 
As a matter of fact, the guardians of the constitution can be trusted (or the quasi-
guardian of the quasi-constitution of the EU) but politics must realize that it is time to 
begin performing its duty to address the issue of same-sex partners in accordance 
with the democratic principle of equality. Otherwise, the main risk  is to reinforce the 
idea that the EU is not ‘a community of law472’, an integrated system of values in 
which each and every citizen is granted her/his rights on equal basis, but (still) merely 
an institutional device aimed at economic integration, i.e. very close to the market 
and very distant from individuals.  
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